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14 March 1986

# Sub-Saharan Africa Report

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

WRITER ANALYZES JAPANESE AID TO AFRICA

Brussels NORD SUD in French Nov-Dec 85 pp 39-42

[Article by Sylviane Cannio: "Japanese Cooperation: Realistic and Well Organized"]

[Text] Geared mainly toward the countries of Asia, Japanese cooperation is nonetheless present in Africa. And practically everywhere. "Promising" countries are eligible for loans; the poorest ones for gifts. New to Africa, Japan wants above all to be realistic.

It was the end of World War II. Japan was in ruins: There had been intensive bombings over Tokyo and two atomic bombs over Hiroshima and Nagasaki. People were hungry. They had to rebuild their houses. Winter arrived; the Japanese were cold.

Maybe it is this tragic and ever lasting memory inscribed in the collective consciousness which awakens this cooperative effort. Japan acts immediately when it comes to helping those who are hungry and cold. A case in point is the large-scale operation which made it possible to supply over 900,000 covers to the drought-affected African people late in 1984. The ONGs [Non-Governmental Organizations] abound and young people are participating. One often encounters in Tokyo young people chanting slogans aimed at raising the consciousness of city dwellers and collecting money for African countries.

It is amazing to find such an infatuation despite the fact that the country is located at the other end of the world. The government encourages private initiatives. The minister of foreign affairs also went to Ethiopia not too long ago.

An Active Role in Multilateral Endeavors

Let us analyze the origins of Japanese cooperation, beneficiary countries and the sectors it favors.

The first traces of economic aid abroad appeared shortly after World War II. A war reparation agreement with Burma, signed in 1954, was involved. In 1958, it was India which became the first beneficiary of a loan granted in yens. There are now over 70 countries receiving this type of loan.

Japan is also very involved on a multilateral level. It is a very active member of the World Bank. It acts as a leader in the Asian Development Bank created in 1966. It became a member of the African Development Fund in 1973 and of the Inter-American Development Bank in 1976. Japan also contributes to the UN specialized institutions like the PNUD [UN Development Program], FAO and UNICEF.

The reparations for war damages which were monopolizing the largest share of the Japanese economic cooperation budget ended late in April 1977. Japan had begun to grant cash gifts as early as 1969. Several assistance programs of this type were created, such as aid for natural disasters and for improved food production and aid to fisheries. They were the rough draft of Japan's official aid program currently in effect and which includes three very distinct items, namely, technical cooperation, gift-type aid and loan-type aid.

With its rapid economic growth and its accession to the leading ranks of the world economic powers, Japan felt an increasing concern for development problems and it accepted its responsibilities. Thus, Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda promised during the 1978 Bonn Conference to double the official Japanese aid over a 2-year period. This was in fact achieved in 1980 with a \$3.3 billion budget. As for the aid/gross national product ratio, it reached 0.33 percent in 1983, thus placing Japan honorably among the leading countries of the OECD Development countries (DAC [Development Assistance Committee] countries).

Let us add that 65 percent of the budget is taken up by bilateral aid, the remaining 35 percent going for multilateral aid. Let us also note that Japan is striving to set aside over half of its budget (55 percent) for the granting of gifts.

#### Fifteen Percent of the Japanese Bilateral Aid Toward Africa

Where does Japanese aid go and what are the privileged sectors?

Let us state now that seven-tenth of this aid is set aside for the Asian countries; 66 percent for Southeast Asian and Far East countries, 35 percent of which for the ANASE countries; and 3 percent for the Middle East; as for the remainder, 15 percent goes to Africa and 10 percent to Central and Latin America.

The chief countries receiving Japanese aid in 1983-1984 were: The People's Republic of China, Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines, India, Burma, Bangladesh, Malaysia, Sri Lanka, Pakistan and Egypt.

As for the sectors, let us note that over half of the budget is set aside for public works and the infrastructure; 11 percent for mining and manufacturing industries; 9 percent for agriculture; and 5 percent for education.

In short, Japanese aid centers essentially around large-scale exports at world level.

## A Very Powerful JICA

### Who manages the Japanese economic cooperation?

It is, of course, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs which is responsible for bilateral economic cooperation negotiations with foreign governments. When needed, the minister consults other ministers, such as the minister of finance, the minister of foreign trade and industry--the famous MITI which holds the strings of Japanese industry--and the Economic Planning Agency. For all the large-scale economic cooperation projects, however, it is the Cabinet which is the supreme decision-making government body.

In another connection, economic cooperation is managed by some development agencies. Thus, the International Cooperation Agency (JICA), under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, is responsible for technical cooperation at the government level. The Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund (OECF), under the jurisdiction of the Economic Planning Agency is used as the financial backer to cover the programs and projects of Japanese cooperation.

The duty of the Import-Export Bank of Japan is to promote both exports and imports financing from or toward developing countries and investments made directly in these same countries by the Japanese firms. The Bank also lends to the governments of Third World countries. But it sometimes lends as well to the governments of industrialized countries. Thus economic cooperation financing is only a share of its overall activities.

### Over 50,000 Africans Already Trained in Japan

### What types of aid have been granted by Japan and what did they achieve?

Japan then operates on three levels, namely, technical cooperation, gift-type aid and loan-type aid. Let us first analyze technical cooperation.

Technical cooperation is administered by JICA and it has eight programs.

1. The training of trainees in Japan in several sectors, namely, agriculture, forestry, fishing, engineering, public works, planning and administration, mining and manufacturing industries, health care, trade and tourism, energy, etc.

Over 4,300 students were able to study in Japan in 1983 and over 50,000 students have been trained in Japan since 1954!

2. Sending experts abroad is a way to impart Japanese technology to requesting countries. In 1983, JICA sent 6,458 experts who were assigned to either the requesting countries, the UN agencies, the Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center, or the Asian Institute of Technology.

3. The volunteers' program of the Japanese Overseas Cooperation (Japan Overseas Corporation Volunteers - JOCV) started in 1965 and covers over 33 countries which signed a cooperation agreement with Japan. At the beginning of 1985, there were 1,206 volunteers in host countries, 266 of which were women. And the JICA is

thinking about doubling, by the end of 1985, the number of people sent annually, which will then pass from 430 to 800.

4. The program dealing with supplying equipment allows the experts, trainees who have returned to the homeland and JOCV volunteers to carry out their duties under favorable conditions and with the necessary equipment. Thus, a 1,300 million yen budget was spent in 1983 (47 million FF [French francs]).

5. JICA development surveys are carried out for all the development projects considered important for the economic and social development of the requesting countries. The fields studied are very broad and aimed at agricultural developments as well as road or port constructions, telecommunication improvements, energy resource development, industrial modernization, etc. Two hundred projects were reviewed in 1983, 31 of which were in Africa, 112 in Asia, 24 in the Middle East, 27 in Latin America and 6 in Oceania.

6. The JICA financing and investment development program allows the financial support of cooperation projects between the government and host countries and Japanese private enterprises. There are, among other things, loans granted to projects which have the characteristic of consolidating the ties between state enterprises and the Japanese private sector and conditions are much easier than those offered by the Export-Import Bank of Japan.

7. Technical cooperation based on timely projects is a three-pronged integrated form of technical cooperation, namely, the sending of experts, the acceptance of trainees and the supply of material and equipment. This type of project usually lasts 5 years. Technical specialists are trained in the host country in several fields, such as agriculture, forestry, fishing mining and manufacturing industries, electricity and communications, construction and transportation, health and medical care and family planning. These activities are carried out in research centers and hospitals and it can be said that these specialists become real agents in the transfer of technology.

Technical cooperation projects include five programs, namely, that of the technical cooperation center and those involving health and medical care, population and family planning, agricultural and forestry and industrial development.

8. ASEAN youth's visit to Japan. This program, which invites young nationals from the ANASE countries to visit Japan, enabled 750 young people to go there in 1984.

#### Japan Favors Gift-Type Bilateral Aid for Africa

Let us analyze now the second largest item of the Japanese cooperation, namely, gift-type bilateral aid.

One hundred and fifty-two billion yen (5.5 billion FF) were distributed to developing countries in 1983 alone, or a budget nearly five times larger than that of 1977. Let us recall that war damages were reimbursed in April 1976, thus leaving Japan free to turn its financial aid toward other countries. It is JICA which has administered the aid aimed at supporting technical cooperation since

1978: Pre-contract feasibility studies, technical implementation of these contracts, etc. Let us not forget the 1977 founding of a consulting organization attached to the Economic Cooperation Bureau of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs through which the minister and the experts can also express their opinion in the context of the overall organization of the financial aid.

Japanese financial aid is divided into six important sectors, namely, general financial aid and gifts to the fishing, natural disasters cultural matters, food and food production improvement sectors.

1. The general financial aid covers the largest share of the economic assistance program, with a total amount of 90 billion yen (3 billion FF). The purpose of this program is to channel funds in timely projects in key development sectors, such as medical care, education, agriculture, the improvement of living conditions and of the environment, communication and transportation. These funds are especially set aside for projects unable to find financial backers due to either too little profit-earning capacity or to the countries themselves being incapable of assuming them financially.

2. Gifts to the fishing sector enabled several countries (see our table) to acquire fishing boats and build installations for the training of future fishermen and for oceanic research.

3. In the case of natural disasters, the gifts are made within the framework of an immediate assistance to the countries touched by natural disasters such as hurricanes, floods, earthquakes, drought, etc. This aid is also given to assist humanitarian efforts toward refugees victims of conflicts within a given country. In 1983 alone, Japan thus intervened in Colombia, Ecuador, Bolivia, Thailand, Cambodia and Afghanistan.

4. Gifts involving cultural matters allow the purchase of the equipment necessary for research, education and the preservation of the cultural heritage of developing countries.

5. Food aid is given within the framework of the 1980 Food Aid Agreement. The annual Japanese contribution calls for the distribution of 300,000 tons of wheat when in kind or their equivalent in cash when the requesting country itself purchases the cereals. Let us not forget either the Japanese aid granted through the UN specialized organizations in which Japan participates, such as the FAO, and its food aid to Cambodian, Afghan and Palestinian refugees.

Let us note that the geographic distribution of the Japanese bilateral aid involving the food sector was as follows: 64 percent for Africa, 31 percent for Asia, 4.5 percent for the Middle East and 0.5 percent for Oceania.

6. The aid for improved food production is based on the idea that distributing food to the countries in need is not enough; it is also necessary to help them improve the quality of their agricultural sector in order to produce more. It is the goal of that Japanese aid, i.e., the purchase of fertilizers and of the equipment necessary for an agricultural production aimed at improving the food assistance program. Over 24 billion yen (800 million FF) were distributed

among 28 countries in 1983, 61 percent of which went to Asia; 16 percent to Africa; 15 percent to the Middle East; 6.5 percent to Central and Latin America and 0.8 percent to Oceania.

#### Very Selective Loans

The last item of Japanese economic cooperation involves loans granted to developing countries. Those loans are generally made in yen and they involve the financing of specific projects, such as the building of bridges, roads, ports and telecommunication networks, or they allow countries, which are short of foreign exchange, to purchase food and some of the equipment necessary to its economic survival. Japan (see Fujita's interview) loans only to countries capable of honoring their debts and meeting good economic conditions. This explains why over 80 percent of the Japanese loans go to Asia, 11 percent to the Middle East and 5 percent to Central and Latin America. Africa receives only 2.8 percent and Kenya, Egypt, Nigeria and Tunisia are among the more eligible countries. Some will say that, in fact, this type of aid allows Japan to ensure itself economic outlets by opening African markets with simple payment facilities. Let us be frank, it is certainly not the only country engaging in this practice.

Others will say that it is paternalistic aid: "I know what is good for you, you are not capable of assuming financial responsibilities which are too heavy for you." Is this type of aid then, economic, elitist or is it simply realistic?

#### Japanese Cooperation in Africa: 1980 to 1983 Projects (in million yen)

Only major projects have been listed.

The other African countries having received gifts are: Botswana, Cape Verde, the Central African Republic, Chad, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Gambia, Lesotho, Madagascar, Liberia, Mali, Seychelles, Sierra Leone and Togo.

Countries	Loan-Type Aid	Gift-Type Aid
Egypt	El Dikheila steel-works (180) Expansion of the Suez Canal (180) El Salam Canal (46) Water supply for Greater Cairo (89) Kous paper-works (250) Cement works (88) Port of Damietta (27) Khattara agricultural project (63) Masa Matrock motor manufacturing plant (127)	Cairo University Hospital (40) Aid to agricultural production (20) Mechanization of rice harvesting (14) Training center for rice growing (15)

Countries	Loan-Type Aid	Gift-Type Aid
Morocco	Sulphuric acid plant for the Ore Phosphates Company (20)	Food aid (4) Teaching aids for the ministry of education (1)
Tunisia	Rades thermal power station (68) Expansion of the telecommunication network (41)	
Sudan	Commodity loan (25)	Khartoum Hospital (15) Water supply project (14) Aid to agricultural production (29) Food aid (20)
Benin		Medical equipment for rural areas (3) Food aid (5)
Burundi		Road improvements (5) Aid to public transportation (6) Aid to agricultural production (4)
Cameroon		Aid to agricultural production (2) Underground exploitation of water (5)
Congo Brazzaville		Road improvements (2)
Ethiopia		Foreign debt relief (14) Food aid (6)
Gabon		Teaching and research aids for the University of Bongo (0.4)
Ghana	Expansion of the telecommunication network (59)	Food aid (8) Fisheries (4) Road improvements (13)
Guinea	Sea transport of bauxite (61)	Food aid (10) Irrigation project (4) Small-scale fisheries project (4)
Guinea Bissau		Food aid (10)

Countries	Loan-Type Aid	Gift-Type Aid
Ivory Coast		Oceanographic Sciences and Technologies Institute (10) Scientific equipment for the University of Abidjan (0.5)
Kenya		
Kilifi Bridge (78)	Roads for the north-eastern region (61)	Food aid (12)
Kenya Medical Research Institute (15)	Aid to agricultural production (17) Building of a grain silo (120)	Expansion of the telecommunication network (64) Jomo Kenyatta College (8)
Mauritania/ Mozambique		Food aid (5 + 8) Aid to agricultural production (2 + 2) Fisheries (10 + 5)
Niger	Malbaza cement-works (72)	Niamey steam engine manufacturing plant (16) Nutritional aid (2) Food aid (16) Aid to agricultural production (4)
Nigeria	Anambra irrigation project (169)	Fisheries (5) Training center for the fishing industry (5)
Rwanda		Communications satellite land station (13) Public transportation (6) Food aid (7)
Senegal		Food aid (15) Seafood refrigeration center (6) Training center for the building trade (20) Oceanographic research vessel (6)
Somalia	Expansion of the telecommunication network (53)	Food aid (18) Magachishu Hospital (5)
Tanzania	Bas-Mashi agricultural project (33)	Extension of the Selander Bridge (15) Food aid (21) Aid to agricultural production (23) Expansion of grain keeping facilities (9)

Countries	Loan-Type Aid	Gift-Type Aid
Uganda/Burkina Faso		Food aid (16 + 10) Aid to agricultural production (9 + 2)
Zaire		Farm equipment (15) Roads in rural areas (14) Aid to agricultural production (6)

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

JAPANESE FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIAL DISCUSSES AID TO AFRICA

Brussels NORD SUD in French Nov-Dec 85 p 43

[Sylviane Cannio interviews Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Mayumi Moriyama; date and place not given]

[Text] [Question] Madame Minister, what is your personal involvement in Africa?

[Answer] You know that I recently went to Kenya where I attended the International Conference on Women's Rights; I went to Cameroon in July and I also went to Uganda. I also would like to remind you that I went to Matadi, Zaire, in 1981 as a parliamentarian in order to observe the state of progress of the work on the rail and road bridge.

[Question] Can Japan make a specific contribution to Africa?

[Answer] You know perfectly well that many African peoples are starving. Consequently, we send them food and medicines. This is a short-range measure. But in the longer-range, these nations must be able to cultivate their land. They must be helped to achieve this goal. Water is needed for farming and we impart well digging technology. An infrastructure and roads are needed to market products. Regional congestion must be cleared to allow people and goods to travel. Furthermore, it is to that end that we granted the loan for the Matadi bridge.

[Question] What was the reason for the Malian prime minister's visit to Tokyo last June?

[Answer] He came to request an increase in the aid dealing with the building of wells, for the country lacks water. He asked us for additional experts and an increase in the budget which we allocate for aid to Mali. All of this is currently under discussion.

[Question] What procedure must an African country follow when requesting aid?

[Answer] Requests may be submitted in two ways: Either our African interlocutor contacts us or our local embassy directly for a project or it is our ambassador who proposes a project. We then send experts to assess the situation and, if the project is interesting, discussions are begun.

[Question] Is it in that context that Minister of Foreign Affairs Abe went to Ethiopia last year?

[Answer] Between us, he went to Ethiopia mainly to verify what was being done with the food and medicine gifts sent by Japan. He also approved the shipment of medicines and nurses. And his luggage included several tons of food.

[Question] Over 900,000 covers were collected in Japan for the Sahel in November 1984; by the same token, when one strolls through Tokyo, one is struck by the presence of young people selling things and collecting money for the African continent. What, in reality, motivates these young people when their country is located at the other end of the world?

[Answer] Do not forget that Japan has experienced the sad reality of war. We would have been unable to rebuild our country had it not been for international aid. What African countries are currently going through is similar to our post-1945 situation. This is a good opportunity for us to show that we too, in turn, can help a country in distress. We can say that, in a way, we are paying back the international aid we received.

I visited refugee camps in Thailand last March. Thanks to UN aid, these people are not hungry. But they have no future, no prospect whatsoever. It is not a human life! I was terribly shocked by this situation. Many young Japanese participate in the life of the camps where they teach writing, reading and weaving. They see that, although without future, these people are fighting anyway. I will then simply say that I believe that there are good and generous young people in Japan and that is what motivates the aid they give Cambodia and Africa.

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

PAPER VIEWS FOOD SHORTAGE PROBLEM IN SAHEL

Paris AFRIQUE CONTEMPORAINE in French Oct-Dec 85 pp 47-62

[Analysis by Jacques Bellotteau]

[Text] Geologists tell us that the so-called continental intercalary limestones that extend from East to West, from Senegal to Ethiopia, belong to a class very common in Africa and known as acidic rocks, meaning that they contain a lot of silicon but very little calcium, magnesium, phosphorus, or potassium, the chemical elements essential to plant life. These rocks are the predominant class in the Sahel.(1)

Climatological studies also indicate that the rainy season, which lasts 7 months and lavishes as much as 1,600 meters of rainfall on central Ivory Coast, grows shorter as one moves to the North; there, the rainy season lasts only 5 months, and precipitation in Burkina is 1,200 mm; the numbers dwindle to 2 or 3 months and 400 mm when you reach the latitude of Gao, in Mail, which is roughly the same as that of Agades in Niger, Oum-Chaloubain Chad, Khartoum in Sudan, or Asmara in Ethiopia.

From East to West, the Sahel is the region that encompasses this two-fold geological and climatological feature. It is a vast region, embracing four entire countries (Senegal, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, and Burkina; the whole of the non-desert portion of Mali and Niger; more than half the arable land in Chad, the Sudan, and Ethiopia; the Southern quarter of Mauritania; the Northern quarters of Ivory Coast, Ghana, Togo, Benin, Nigeria, Cameroon, and the Central African Republic.

Human geography shows that habitation in all these zones is, generally speaking, scattered. However, the dispersion varies greatly from point to point: density may be as low as a scant 0.07 per square kilometer, as in the Kano region of Northern Nigeria. It averages 10 to 15 inhabitants per square kilometer. We must not however, lose sight of the fact that the average conceals a multitude of sharp diversities. In Burkina, say, the very large villages in Mossi and Bobo territories do not engage in the same sorts of pursuits as you may encounter in the many

"tatas" and "soukhalas" in Lobi country, where the population is very thinly scattered. The same applies to Mali and Niger, the regions where you find the temporary shelters for off-season farming and the portable encampments of the Peul herders reflect a specificity stemming from the activity in which they engage, and distinguishing them from those in other regions who do other things. This close focus is important, because economic planning in the Sahel or anywhere else must reckon with the state of the local environment and its location. It is this very finely focused scrutiny of minute detail upon which depend, among other things, the nature of the various food crops and the transport infrastructures required to channel them to markets.

In analyzing the conditions which in recent years have brought severe food shortages to the French-speaking Sahel--Senegal, Burkina, Mali, and, to a lesser degree, Niger--the intent here is to understand the problems of a population now numbering some 25 million souls, who right now are using every ounce of their strength simply to survive.

We can do this most fruitfully if we eschew the purely mathematical process. That approach is quite limited, because it is physically impossible to gather and collate data on all human activities, even were we to confine ourselves to the economic ones. In Burkina, for instance, nine-tenths of the arable land, some 5 million hectares, is planted to food crops grown only to feed those who plant them (3). The same may be said of grain sorghum as for "fonio" (both are grains), of yams, taro, sweet potatoes and roots, of beans, peanuts (vouandzou), and truck-gardening, which is just beginning to develop. In this country, as in the other three studied, the future will depend heavily on the way the current food crisis is dealt with, which is in fact to say that it will depend on how the primordial role of agriculture is reconceived and restructured.

The first step will be to admit the soaring cost of grain imports and the existence of interactions, perhaps not those usually advanced, between farm exports and fresh food products for domestic consumption; that is a task all four of the countries studied will have to address.

In a second phase, some of the solutions widely proposed for dealing with the Sahel's problems will be presented, with focus on two overriding imperatives: first, the advantages that would accrue to this region through complete modernization of its agriculture, and, second, those to be gained by simply rousing from its dream of autarchy, with all the consequences that would ensue.

#### Grain Prices Soar While Imports Climb

The dominant trend in the past 25 years in Burkina, in Mali, in Senegal, and even in Niger, is the marked increase in grain imports,

the tangible evidence that domestic crops are increasingly inadequate to feed their own peoples.

For Senegal, the figures for 1960 (4) reporting imports of 145,000 tons of grain for which it paid 2,907 million Cfa, or 6.84 percent of the cost of all imports (42,500 million Cfa). In 1980, according to the Central Bank of West Africa (BCEAO), cereal grain imports rose to 451,873 tons and cost 24,230 million Cfa, or 10.9 percent of total import costs (222,256 million Cfa). By way of comparison, energy imports, which are themselves a severe burden on this country's budget, with 58,352 million Cfa, represent 26.25 percent of that total. But what must be emphasized is the fact that from 1960 to 1980, while total cost of imports had quintupled, that of grain had multiplied by 8, for a quantity multiplied by 3 and a percentage of total imports multiplied by 1.5, while the import share for petroleum products was multiplying by 5.3.

These figures have to be adjusted for this country, though, because most of the statistics for 1960 include data on Mauritania and French Sudan, which has since become Mali.

For Mali specifically, according to BCEAO for 1959 and 1980 (6), total cost of imports multiplied by 24, that of cereal grains by 427, for a quantity multiplying by 110, and the petroleum-import share held fairly steady, rising from 32.66 to 34.56 percent of the total in value.

For Burkina, again using BCEAO figures for 1960 and 1983 (7), total cost of imports multiplied by 45 percent, that of grain by 3,980, for a quantity multiplied by 1,400 and a percentage of total import costs multiplied by 90, and the import share for petroleum products holding the line at a mere 2.74.

In Niger, the increase in grain imports was more moderate. According to available figures for 1960 and 1981 (8), the total value of imports was multiplied by 19, that of grain by 57, for a quantity multiplying by 28, and a percentage of total imports multiplied by 2.8, while the import share for petroleum products was multiplying by 1.78.

On the whole, the cereal grain bill for the francophone Sahel countries has risen steeply, evidence of a worsening food shortage whose deep-set roots urgently call for study. Actually, this shortage did not suddenly emerge during the great droughts of the past few years. It is far more clearly the creature of the profound crisis that has gripped all the African countries since the early sixties. Many efforts have been made to find a way out of that crisis. All of them call for enormous expenditures.

#### Retail Prices for Non-African Grain Not Excessive

The economists have ventured the idea that the Sahel's food shortage could be eased by introducing grain crops wherever feasible--not specifically African grains, of course, but those that could be acclimated to Africa, and particularly to the Sahel. All the studies, though, run up against the formidable costs such introductions would entail.

#### Financial Cost

That cost is, first of all, financial. The action plan worked out by the World Bank for all Sub-Saharan African countries, which

aims at creating conditions for food production that would be self-sufficient in the long run, involves a section on expanding cultivation of non-African grains, including rice. Reaching that goal would mean raising considerable sums of money. By way of example, Switzerland's contribution to this plan is set at \$30 million spread over the years 1986 through 1990 (9).

In the Sahel, except for Mali and Senegal for rice, the retail price of non-African grains to the local growers practically precludes success in expanding them to any significant degree because it would be far too high.

#### Human Cost

Financial cost, though, is not the only one that must be counted. Increasingly, economists are including a human cost factor in their forecasts, which it is wise not to overlook. Identifying that cost enables us to find out things about how it is practiced in this region with its often underestimated potential, but which must not, however, be perceived as limitless.

While the Sahel has obviously not been naturally or historically attracted to growing the three great cereals--wheat, rice, and maize--we should look into the financial explanations that have been advanced to account for that aversion.

At the psychological level, it is enlightening to note that in all four countries studied, including Mali, which exports part of the rice it grows--121,000 tons in 1976-78 (10)--rice, seized upon as ideal to succor famine victims, has, alas! become the object of widespread speculation, black markets, and various and sundry patterns of trafficking, and that has somehow debased it, affectively and symbolically, in the eyes of most populations. In 1975, a quintal of rice went for 10,000 Cfa (220 FF) all over the Sahel, and that may have turned off some growers. Why would it come as a surprise that this grain--almost alien to Africa (11)--stands for little more than a survival food for use in hard times, just another unlovable novelty thrust upon them by the planners, a crop that would give a farmer little more than a hope of breaking even, given the decline in its emotional appeal? (12)

Wheat is of course grown in Northern Cameroon, where production as of the end of the 1979-80 farm year came to 1,600 tons (3). But this is merely the Sahel exception that proves the rule, and the figure is out of all proportion to those of other products, as well as with the market demand.

Senegal grows maize (50,000 tons in 1981). In Burkina and Mali, statistics on this product are always paired with those for sorghum (1,192,000 and 441,000 per ton in 1981, respectively, for each country), but wheat won't grow in Niger (3).

Rice, wheat, maize: clearly, the three quasi-universal cereal grains are unfamiliar to the Sahel and, except for rice in some

areas, they are not the ones that could make up for the rising cost of imports. On the other hand, the human cost of expanding sorghum crops would be relatively modest. Like rice in Southeast Asia, sorghum is the grain that is consubstantial with the Sahel. Serviced with rice or not, it will unquestionably be the people's choice for a long time to come, because the nourishment drawn from it not only sustains the body, but is believed to quicken the soul.

A social plant, sorghum in the Sahel is closely linked with the notion of authenticity, and its planting, growing, and harvesting is nothing short of a ritual cycle. Of course, like any basic food, grain sorghum, thanks to the nutritive value for which it is prized, must be considered in the context of the sauces that are served with it. Palm oil sprinkled on its leaves gives it a considerable energy boost and enhances the taste of the various dishes in which it plays the leading role. In the Sahel, meat is available only in very small amounts, and fish is all but non-existent. Sorghum, thoroughly pounded and requiring a long time to prepare, is consequently endowed with many virtues here.

Furthermore, in addition to its pride of place as nourishment, sorghum is used to make a beverage known as grain-beer. Laden with romantic symbolism because it lets human beings come closer to the supernatural and the mysterious, this beer flows freely at any major event in the villages, which are the geometric centers of all human activity in Africa.

The emotional attachment to a notion that has an equally deep-rooted link with an ancestral dietary tradition must not be overlooked by the planners, even though they might prefer the peoples of the Sahel to impute a bit more importance to "cash crops" and "income crops" (1) for which it would be bootless to seek a rite that could compare with those intertwined with grain sorghum. Is there any basic conflict, really, between these two patterns of farming? What, specifically, are the interactions between food crops like sorghum and income crops like peanuts and cotton? Does the deterioration of agriculture in the Sahel stem from over-planting income crops, allowing them to usurp the place of food crops? What is the precise cause of the decline of agriculture?

Before trying to answer these questions, it seems to me important to stop and think for a while: it would appear that, in the sense in which historian-philosopher Arnold Toynbee used the term, the people of the Sahel are facing a challenge : the challenge of population growth (2 to 3 percent per year for over 20 years). Nobody can be unaware that there is considerable dispute over this point, but, in all sound logic, it is clear that a population increasing at such a pace is not going to be physically capable of coping with its nutritional needs and, at the same time, clinging to a family-feeding and religious vision of the act of farming

on the one hand, and, on the other, to follow ancient farming techniques rooted originally in long periods of allowing land to lie fallow, plus ignorance of fertilizers. Europe and Asia weathered this problem in their time, and when they solved it they were rewarded with increased yields due to improvements in farming techniques. If Africa in general and the Sahel in particular refuse to accept this technological and sociological change, they will never solve their problem, no matter what else they may do.

### Interactions Between Income Crops and Food Crops(13)

#### Widespread Cutbacks in Income Crops

From available statistics, we can trace the curve of income crops in the Sahel countries. In the long term and for three of the four countries studied--Burkina, Mali, and Senegal--the curve is generally descending, with an additional sharp dip in the last few years, especially in 1983-84, owing to the worsening drought.

As a result, in Burkina in 1983-84, market offerings of shelled peanuts were close to zero, as opposed to 1,400 tons in 1982-83, following the drop in production. Offerings of this income crop, which used to be important in this country, came to 10,879 tons in 1966-67 (14), but the decline has been steady ever since. Offerings of first-quality ginned cotton had risen somewhat in 1982-83 and 1983-84, from 75,600 to 79,300 tons. It had hit 36,248 tons in 1969-70 (14).

While there has been some improvement in absolute values in subsequent years, the experts believe that this gain is far below the existing potential. In 1982-83 and 1983-84, sesame placements on the market declined from 3,990 to 3,717 tons--down 6.8 percent, following the drop in production. It should be noted that marketing of this income crop had reached 5,288 tons in 1969-70 (14). Shea butter, a product whose crop for sale in 1983-84 reflected the peak of the karite's triennial vegetative cycle with 66,700 tons marketed, certainly improved its performance over the 49,000-ton mark set in 1980-1981. However, market demand for this income product, which had been 20,819 tons in 1967-1968 (14) has shown very little improvement over the long term, considering the potential.

In Mali, 14,000 tons of unshelled peanuts were sold in 1983-1984 as against 27,700 tons in 1980-1981, in the wake of the falloff in production. In the past, marketing performance for this particular income crop had been far higher, since, according to nine estimates prepared by the BCEAO, peanut exports exceeded 50,000 tons in 1960 (15). As for unginned cotton, it did better in 1982-83 and 1983-84, up from 127,600 to 140,700 tons. It had reached 21,860 tons in 1966-67 (16). But, though there has been a rise in absolute value since then, the experts' view is that

its performance has been erratic and does not even come close to exploiting the existing market possibilities, given the fact that Mali has the peculiar advantage of being able to expand its cotton growing by adopting two different approaches--one for each of two disparate zones:

1) irrigated planting in the Niger River Delta; 2) dry planting in the Sikasso, Segou, and Bamako regions. For 1984-85, BCEAO forecasts a market decline for both these income crops, essential to the country's economy, reflecting the anticipated drops in production.

In Senegal, 358,500 tons of unshelled peanuts were marketed in 1983-84, as against 912,700 tons in 1982-83, a 60.7-percent drop. Of that total, 4,600 tons of table peanuts were sold in 1983-84, as against 13,700 tons the previous year--down 66.4 percent. Sales of this income crop, essential to the national economy, had come to 812,000 tons in 1960 (4). Sales of unginned cotton, production of which had begun only in the late sixties, dropped from 47,081 to 30,461 tons from 1982-83 to 1983-84, for a 35.3-percent loss. The decline in market offerings for both these income commodities was attributed to spectacular declines in production.

Generally speaking, and with a few exceptions, in Burkina, Mali, and Senegal, the record of these last few years, insofar as income crops are concerned, is lagging dismally behind the levels common during the sixties.

#### Parallel Lag in Food Crops

In three of the four Sahel countries considered, the curve for food crops, like that for income crops, has been steadily downward over the long term, with an acceleration analogous to the drop after the 1983-84 harvest owing to the worsening drought.

In Burkina, the maize harvest slumped from 111,294 to 71,874 tons from 1982-83 to 1983-84--down 35.4 percent. The rice harvest (unpolished) dropped from 27,261 tons to 19,300 tons, down 29.2 percent. In all, according to BCEAO, the food shortfall for 1983-84 would come to 117,700 tons.

In Mali, according to the same source, the (unhulled) rice crop is holding steady at 129,188 tons in 1983-84, as compared with 129,700 tons the previous year. The sorghum and maize harvest is down from 888,700 tons to 756,099 tons, a decline of 16.2 percent. In all, the food shortfall for 1983-84 could come to 300,000 tons.

In Senegal, the sorghum harvest was off from 585,223 to 351,800 tons between 1982-83 and 1983-84: 39.8 percent. The maize crop shrank from 82,268 to 60,594 tons, down 26.3 percent. The pea bean (niebe) crop slid from 13,425 to 12,858 tons, off 2.6 percent.

Only the (paddy) rice harvest increased, from 95,025 to 108,540 tons, up 14.2 percent. In all, the food shortfall, according to BCEAO, is 377,000 tons for 1983-84, as compared with 170,000 tons in the previous year. In these three countries, says BCEAO, supplies of food products marketed in the early eighties were less abundant than those available in the early sixties, even though the population had increased.

Clearly, the trend in food crops over the long term follows a curve that is parallel with, rather than counter to that for income crops. When income crops were soaring, there was no talk of drought, let alone of famine. Today, the numbers show us that there has been an across-the-board decline in income crops as opposed to the situation in the early sixties. The tragedy is that this decline, which is, unfortunately structural, rather than ephemeral, has dragged food crops down with it to the point where it is common practice these days to associate the concept of chronic food-shortages with the plight of the Sahel countries. Of course, the general decline of agriculture was aggravated during the periods of acute drought, as happened in 1973-74 and again in 1983-84. The economists, though, ought to factor it in as a permanent given when they sit down to make their long-term predictions and recommendations, even though, as is devoutly to be hoped, the spectre of drought will someday be exorcized. The fact of the matter is that the decline of agriculture is the root cause of deepening underdevelopment in this part of the world. There you have the reason why this process must be stopped: food crops must once again become the prime sources of the vegetable proteins human beings need in their diet. For this to come about, income crops, which can pull the rest of agriculture along after them, must be intensified in order to earn the hard-currency reserves needed for overall development.

What we need, in fact, is some sober observation of the fact that when a significant recovery occurs in income crops, it encourages the resumption of planting food crops and, once again, quickly insures the survival of populations. Once you have properly diagnosed the ailment, the remedy becomes obvious.

The twin findings in the Sahel prove that there are indeed interactions between the two kinds of farming, in the sense that the two are complementary, and not competitive. It is important to see and to act upon the knowledge that food crops decline or increase along curves that are parallel with those for income crops.

#### One More Piece of Contradictory Evidence: The Niger Case

In this context, the Niger case calls for separate scrutiny. Income crops are routine there, and are successfully grown in spite of sometimes adverse climatic conditions. True, the market for shelled peanuts in 1983-84 did not top 1,400 tons, as compared with 1,700 tons in 1981-82. That, though, was a cyclical dip, and not

a collapse, and, in any event, it is better than what Burkina reported for the same year.

As for raw cotton, it is worth noting that 1,800 tons of that particular income crop found a market in 1981-82, as did 2,009 tons in 1982-83 and 3,902 tons in 1983-84. To put it another way, between 1982-83 and 1983-84, the drought did not prevent the practical doubling of marketing figures for raw cotton. As for Niger's third income crop, niebe (pea-beans), 11,771 tons of them were sold in 1983-84, nearly tripling the 4,300 tons marked in 1981-82 (up 173.7 percent) (13).

However, during the same period, with the exception of 1983-84, when the drought was most severe, far from suffering from soaring sales of income crops, food crops ran up surpluses as they always had. Sorghum production reached 1,649,200 tons in 1982-83, home-grown pea-beans yielded 290,500 tons, and the (paddy) rice harvest weighed in at 51,500 tons. The decline reported for 1983-84 can be dismissed as negligible insofar as pea-beans are concerned (down 7.4 percent) inasmuch as the harvest totaled 268,900 tons, even so. The same applies to paddy rice (down 15 percent), yet its harvest somehow topped 43,800 tons. As for sorghum, with 1,684,500 tons garnered in 1983-84, it gained 21 percent over the previous year's crop. Consequently, says BCEAO experts, Niger's actual food production amounted to only 30,000 tons, a mere tenth of Mali's.

Economists are increasingly willing to admit that Niger affords an example as one Sahel country that has made the right choice: a voluntarist farm policy. Actually, in order to enable its people to feed themselves in spite of geological and climatic conditions at least as unforgiving as those of the other three countries studied, if not worse, it has, over the long term and unlike the others, persevered in its efforts to expand income farming, including such crops as cotton. By way of support for that particular commodity, the state has made strong efforts to provide sound advice through its extension agents, along with incentives in the form of guaranteed prices that allow the farmer a profit, and has conducted well-planned campaigns to spread the word and inform farmers of the simple techniques it requires. Ten productivity projects have committed 10 billion Cfa francs, or 37 percent of available funding for agriculture under its Interim Consolidation Plan (ICP) for 1984-85. Most of these programs have to do with income crops. The Nigerien government's concern with providing farmers with the maximum level of support is reflected in the logistical services it provides them in the area of placing their income crops on the market and even finding markets for their off-season crops--something of an innovation--which opens the way to salutary diversification. It is worth noting that the government's efforts to foster income crops have proved equally beneficial to food crops, which are rapidly gaining ground while elsewhere, as we have seen, food crops are on the decline. All of this goes to

show that the interactions cited earlier between income crops and food crops can just as well be stimulating as deleterious.

## Updating Agriculture

### Phasing Out Protracted Fallowing

Agronomists reckoned in 1970 (1) that it would take 3 hectares of sorghum to feed a family in the Sahel. Yields would inevitably be low because sorghum depletes the soil. Prior to the introduction and acceptance of fertilizers, which efficiently compensate for such depletion, the hard-headed Sahel peasant farmer adopted them, and continues to include them with fallowing in his practice. However, such adaptation to local conditions has its limitations. It is those limitations, those deleterious effects, rather than the alleged evils of income farming, that ought to be addressed up front whenever there is talk of soil deterioration in the Sahel. In reality, peasant farmers in the Sahel have realized that, in order to go on getting the good crops they were used to, they would have to let land lie fallow for three and sometimes four times as long as it took to bring in a crop, which can be anywhere from 2 to 3 or even 4 successive years on the same plot. In view of all that, fallow-time is extremely protracted, and it works to multiply by an identical factor the arable land needed to feed a population forced into itinerancy, a practice that aggravates overgrazing on the part of the nomadic pastoral peoples.

At the economic level, this adaptation to naturally hostile soils, whether it be for food crops or income crops, is not always the proper response to the problem. In some regions of the Sahel, in fact, demographic pressure is so intense that farmers are cutting back drastically on the time they allot to fallowing, even though doing so is detrimental to the present and future fertility of the soils. This is particularly true in the Serere country in Senegal, in Mossi country in Burkina, and in Bamileke and Kirdie country in Cameroon.

At the psychological level, fallowing involves yet another drawback: it gives the peasant the misleading impression that he has unlimited land in reserve, whereas in actuality he holds soil capital that must not be dipped into, come what may, particularly during a period of chronic drought like the one that has prevailed there for some 15 years.

Looking at the calendar and organization of farm work, fallowing introduces the additional disadvantage of declaring open season for the recrudescence of pests and parasites. That is one of the major bottlenecks to productivity growth. For one thing, it requires an enormous effort in clearing the land, which is a great bother because it must usually be done just as the land is to be brought under the plough, and constitutes a waste of time and energy for the farmer that is out of all proportion to the yield obtained in a region where the farm year is only 3 months long.

In this area, we again encounter the income-crop problem: income crops are compatible with a few months of fallowing, about the equivalent of sowing a cover-crop-- also known as "green Manure." Green manure is readily available to the farmer at all times, since it involves nothing more than plowing under the straw, roots, and other plant debris in his fields, be it derived from income or food crops.

Utilization of this "green manure," available at no cost and in abundance once the harvest is in, poses no technical problems. It makes it possible to regenerate the soil during the short period preceding green-up, and to go on farming the Sahel soils indefinitely without exhausting them, provided the proper crops are selected for rotation .

#### Discovering the Virtues of Chemical Fertilizers

The Central Economic Cooperation Fund (CCCE) in April 1985 (17) approved a 1.5 billion Cfa loan to Burkina, to provide at least partial financing for its imports of fertilizers, their testing, and management of deliveries so as to update farming practices, whether for food crops or not. Of course, this loan puts Burkina even deeper in debt, which means that it can be challenged, especially on grounds that it looks like a strong incentive dangled by the former colonial power in an attempt to bring what used to be Upper Volta back into line economically with all these other Sahel countries that are turning to fertilizers that are neither domestically produced nor cheap. Burkina, though, has launched a "fertilizer-sector project" calling for investments totaling 11 billion Cfa over a 4-year period (1985-88). Of this total, the World Bank and Aid are pledging 57 percent, the CCCE 13.5 percent, and the Aid and Cooperation Fund 6.8 percent. Yet, the reason--if any--why this example should be adduced is found primarily in some thoughts about the qualitative, rather than the quantitative considerations it implies. Even if, in the event, the Netherlands government were to chip in to finance the project in the form of supplies of fertilizer, the Burkinabe government is looking for fertilizers that are cheaper and better adapted to its needs than those currently in use. The issue clearly goes well beyond the context of diversification among trading partners in matters agronomic. The project contains a section on "fertilizer field-tests" on a portion of the still "unusable" lands that constitute a vast majority of Burkina's territory. It also contains a section on "encouraging the use of natural local phosphates," which would constitute a remarkable innovation and could even make room for building a fertilizer-production plant, provided, of course, that the plant feasibility study, also included in the proposal, arrives at a favorable conclusion in this count. Even so, whatever changes may come about will also be decided upstream, if at all. The project also calls for a credit system to fund an essentially food-oriented farming system, which would provide employment for more than 80 percent of the working population and produce something like a third of gross national revenues. The project also calls for beefing up national government services:

creating a customs service, a follow-up agency, training courses for accountants, and, in short, the minimal-cost array of a vital infrastructure to foster a completely redesigned agriculture.

### Scout out Likely Slots for Income Crops

In 1983, the Central African Tobacco Company (SCAT), which is responsible for advising and assisting tobacco growers, decided in 1983 that planting "wrap tobacco," otherwise known as growing the particular leaf used as the outer coating of cigars, would be a profitable switch, and never mind that it was as alien as could be to the local options. On the face of it, this choice was open to criticism: not only because there is no solid indication that it would initially be compatible with the tobacco-growers' incentives, but also because it would involve both financial and human constraints. The upshot is that a financial restructuring of this particular branch of agriculture, which dates back beyond living memory in Central Africa, becomes imperative, and that may entail sacrifices on the one hand, and, on the other, a change in the orientation of industrial investment across the board. Even so, SCAT could find, downstream a bit, thanks to this plan, a chance to cut its own operating costs, a move that is always, ipso facto, a welcome windfall. Moreover, the change might make room for an overdue updating of tobacco-mosaic disease treatment centers. Yet another side-effect might also emerge: improvement in transport facilities for extension services and for regular collections of the new product. Still in this same context, we should also be seeing some expansion of the highway crews in the affected region, which would be anything but unwelcome. The fact is that one of the most painful and intractable problems besetting the Sahel and all of Africa is the inadequacy of its transport infrastructures. Most of the bridges across its streams and rivers are crudely built and dangerous. L'ESSOR DU MALI on 22 February 1975, reported the loss of 1,200 pounds of peanuts, a recurrence of analogous losses in 1973 and 1974 in the Kayes region, owing to growers' inability, while the rivers and streams were in flood, to get their crop to the nearest storage facility. These rickety bridges and crotchety ferries--where there are any--require round-the-clock attention. That is why the presence of inspectors along the tracks and roads that follow the river-banks is a guarantee of profitable sales of crops when the long-awaited "tides" come. This is also the reason why any development program for an income crop at a given place generally includes a section on "improved transport infrastructures" upstream and down. To get back to tobacco-growing in Central Africa, the CCCE loan to the Central African Republic in 1985 (850 million Cfa)(18) will certainly have to be repaid. However, completion of the project it makes possible will bring Central Africa a substantial return in hard currency. Lastly, experts estimate that the "wrapper-leaf" tobacco project should mean a 6.5-percent rise in growers' earnings, and that is truly remarkable in times of economic crisis.

## Updated Agriculture as Development Engine

Between the 8th and 12th parallels of North latitude, cotton is the mighty income crop that has, throughout history, helped to modernize all of agriculture. Actually, cotton-growing is an enterprise fraught with hazards, one requiring vast amounts of readily available mineral fertilizer. That same fertilizer, though, is vital not only to bountiful yields of cotton, but, by way of its after-effects, to sideline food crops such as yams, manioc, maize, sorghum, pea-beans, etc., according to region. The other effect is improvement in all farming practices through the adoption of the simple but essential discipline ranging from scrupulous observance of planting dates and patterns to their optimal density, by way of timing their chemical treatment, all are rules whose effect is to improve the farmer's cash earnings as a result of higher yields.

In the second phase, this cash income could be used to buy draft animals and to develop the practice of harnessing them to the plough. That would make it easier to turn furrows and to weed and cultivate, and do it a lot more quickly than it can be done with a hoe. Once the soil can be better prepared with less work and in less time, it would become feasible to bring more land under cultivation, whether for income or food crops. At the same time, yields would be greater.

A third phase is reached when the farmer needs carts to transport his harvests. The need to resort to farm loans is not far distant. At this point, the banks get a chance to expand. In fact, the banks come to rely on a farm base that has changed its practices and whose problems transmogrify into an astounding reel of question-marks. How did you get enough fertilizer to expand your planting beyond what you farmed last year? How do you pay for the pesticides you need to insure respectable productivity, which is your one and only source of money to repay the loans for new seed? How to pay for the spare parts indispensable to avoid having to go to the repair shop when your machinery breaks down, when to do so meant, just last year, wiping out your anticipated profit and having to do the unthinkable: dip into the family savings?

In Senegal, in Burkina, in Mali, and in Niger, they are beginning to ask these very questions, even though the change they evoke is more clearly applicable to a non-Sahel country like Ivory Coast. There are three parts to the ante these four countries must put up to get into the agricultural modernization game:

- 1) turn around the steady process of worsening food shortfall as quickly as possible, so as to feed not only the country people, but those in the cities as well, who include the future development mavens who may come back home some day as managers, as craftsmen, as agronomists, or even as farmers.

2) Provide the state, which is responsible for the survival of its citizens, with a financial resource that is neither stable nor declining but, if possible, accruing from year to year, so as to help offset the trade deficit, resorting to whatever will open the way to increased production of food commodities for export.

3) Offer a chance to make more money to the grower who is ready to adopt all the latest innovations if he is sure he will gain by doing so, like the peanut-farmer in Senegal who, despite the drawbacks inherent in this quasi-single-cropping for income, in 1981 had an individual income higher than those of producers in any of the other four Sahel countries (19).

### Forget About Self-Sufficiency

#### Take Better Care of Crops

The concept of post-harvest care for the land, mentioned earlier in connection with green fertilizer, a readily available substance for preparing the land for the next crop, could be re-examined in the Sahel context from another angle: that of combatting natural wastage. Whether we are talking about food crops or income crops, many farmers seem to find it normal that, once each crop is in, their granaries must pay the "pest-tax," which can run very high. The spoilage factors at work on stored crops are in fact numerous: uncontrollable biochemical spoilage of poorly dried products, swift contamination by moulds, massive destruction by insects and rodents, attacks by vermin, invasions by funghi, and proliferation of a myriad forms of rot.

The phenomenon is universal. According to studies conducted in Asia (20), rice losses in that part of the world affect 10 to 30 percent of the harvest, which means "not enough to eat" for several tens of millions of people. For legumes and cereal grains, the worldwide loss could amount to 30 percent of harvests, or enough to feed 168 million consumers. For fruits and vegetables, the losses reportedly run from 50 to 80 percent of harvests (20).

In the Sahel, solutions might be found in improvements to traditional village granaries, in building warehouses with corrugated iron roofs and walls, and using plastic containers.

Routing utilization of packaging materials, ongoing resort to simple containerization techniques located as close as possible to the farms in the area might prove a way to save the precious crops that have been tended and harvested with so much sweat and tears. If this were done, we could count from now on on being able to store, for as long as need be, tons of food and all sorts of farm products in vacuum packs. This would let the Sahel hope for major progress. Provided, however, that use of these simple techniques is voluntarily accepted by the farmers. That, in turn, is going to mean making them aware of the problem via a strong extension

program because, here again, any such changes in behavior must be suggested, not imposed. Everybody knows that, in the farming community, in whatever latitudes, such changes are slow indeed to take root.

Post-harvest activities including processing the farm products coming out of the silos. This phase has to do essentially with the women. In the Sahel, until quite recently, few technical improvements had been introduced into this tedious and wasteful chore, which consists of crushing and pulverizing, in a mortar or with a heavy tamper, of pressing, soaking, rinsing or filtering the sorghum seed through a sieve to make millet beer. Small mechanical mills might prove a salutary innovation. Here again, though, nothing must be thrust upon the people: you must not hurry them, and you may even have to wait until they ask you for it straight out before you introduce it in quantity which, technically speaking, would be no problem at all.

Efforts put forth in the matter of processing harvested crops can be as rewarding as improvements in storage facilities.

Cristophe Naigeon (20) cites the example of Nigeria where, at the start of the sixties, efforts at harvest protection, which cost something like \$450,000, had averted peanut losses worth \$850,000, a figure that would translate into three times that much if you factored in the price of peanut oil.

#### Harvesting to Sell

Such efforts raise the question of the purpose of farming in the Sahel. In fact, this enormous region of Africa has labored far too long and vainly in pursuit of self-sufficiency. During the pre-colonial era, autarchy meant relative prosperity and a head-start over the savannah and forest regions. Today, the forest and coastal regions have waxed rich, and the Sahel's pursuit of autarchy has become the heavy price of its withdrawal into itself, and an aggravating factor in its spreading poverty.

The remedies for this impoverishment are at hand in the region itself. We know now that recovery is attainable through freedom for income farming. However, reliance on the measured and modernized planting of such food crops as sorghum can also prove beneficial. There are in fact places thousands of kilometers away from where sorghum grows, places in which this down-home food would be enthusiastically welcomed by expatriate Sahel families on the coast, in Europe, or on any other continent, if only post-harvest processing were properly done. Shipping sorghum by air to 6,000 kilometers from where it was grown is technically feasible, and could prove economically profitable. However, it should be at least as feasible and remunerative to ship it 60 kilometers, if necessary, to places where torrential rains have heavily damaged if not totally destroyed the crop, whereas here there is a temporary surplus, and the vagaries of the climate, by definition unpredictable, could turn the situation around, come next planting. To

do this, marketing facilities for food crops to match that provided for income crops, ought to be improved so that the Sahel can break a way out of its current autarchy, domestic as well as external.

Crop specialization according to regional capacity would allow rational planning for domestic marketing.

#### Draw on Each Region's Specific Potential

The Permanent InterState Commission for Drought Control in the Sahel (CILSS), of which Burkina, Cape Verde, Gambia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, and Chad are members, is custodian of invaluable knowledge and information as to what the Sahel peoples stand to gain by specializing in growing crops that thrive best in their region. CILSS' inter-State mission empowers it-- in addition to its involvement in South-South cooperation, about which there has already been altogether too much talk--to reach some conclusions from the fact that, for the Sahel countries, there are wide variations in their situations from one region to another. CILSS experts know, and are telling others, that within any one country, each region has its own special calling, its own uniqueness. In Senegal, even as the desert is spreading in the North, and hunger already threatens the River region, down in Sine-Saloum (southeast of Dakar) and in the Casamance (in the South), the granaries are almost always full. This is why CILSS is trying to provide the rural development people with the most complete and minutely detailed information as to which specific crops will do well in the specific agronomic conditions of each region. Reliable photo-cartographic data for each region have readily available ever since introduction of the airplane for the purpose. In the last few years, satellite mapping has greatly enhanced the process. What remains to be done now, though, is to get all the data into the hands of the people who need and can use them. In view of its reliability, its modest cost, and the capacity of portable mini-computers that can now operate on power from an automobile generator or battery, from solar cells, or from a gas-powered mini-generator even more compact than those now used to screen motion pictures in remote areas, it is now perfectly feasible to train local research people to specialize in computer analysis, and make them responsible for gathering and synthesizing all data from the photo-maps of each region, thus associating evaluation with precision, both in relation to production and in relation to the environment. CILSS has a mandate to train such local people for this kind of research. They would contribute enormously to far more accurate and specific knowledge of the various and sundry regional characteristics and their soil capacities and thereby make it possible one day to garner harvests more substantial than those they reap these days.

The overriding imperative for Sahel--abandoning the dream of autarchy that is strangling it--must not be put off till the advent

of a new era, when this vital knowledge has osmotically spread to and been absorbed by the people is can benefit. Then there are problems of sheer survival which also require us to compile a syllabus of lessons to be learned about regional peculiarities within each country, since recognition of the regional facts is at once one of the problems and one of the solutions pertinent to the tragedy the Sahel has suffered for many years. This means citing the case of Mali, which, in 1973, shipped 40,000 tons of grain to the North to insure the survival of the drought-stricken populations there pending the arrival of food aid from abroad. Those 40,000 tons came from the Bougouni-Sikasso region in the southern part of the country, where the local farmers rotate their crops between grain and cotton, under the sponsorship of the French Textile Fiber Development Company (CFDT) (19).

#### Breaking the Vicious Cycle of Food Aid

However, the matter of food aid, foreign or not, and that of regional specialization are far more intimately linked than this example would indicate. In 1982 (21), three French non-governmental organizations (NGOs)--Brothers of Man, Man's Earth, and Peoples Together, financed what they called a triangular operation in Upper Volta (now Burkina). What they did was to earmark part of the food aid the country received to improve domestic marketing, which they saw as the only way to transfer crop surpluses from the thriving regions to those that had no harvests that year. Similar operations are planned now by ONGs in Mali, Niger, and Senegal, at a combined cost of 8 million FF. In fact, according to LE MONDE for 25 May 1985, the evil effects of built-in or chronic food-aid addiction are numerous: they encourage corruption and influence-peddling, discourage local producers, and bring pressure to bear on international negotiations, not to mention undermining the dignity of its recipients, whom it transforms into charity cases... There is something that the public in industrial countries is often unaware of even though it is increasingly sensitive to the problem of hunger in the Sahel: it is that, two times out of three, food aid to the Third World is sold by the government of the recipient country. This sale of donated food helps them cope with budget and trade deficits, which are often very large, and replaces financial aid that is not always to be counted on. Even though the selling price of the donated food is usually below going prices on the market, it is not always the neediest--in this case, the farmers in dire straits--who get it. It goes, as a rule, to city-dwellers. These tend to be people who earn regular wages or salaries, and are therefore closer to the influx of cash into government coffers in the wake of such sales. Another thing the public in industrial countries is unlikely to know about is the unconscionable delay, often more than a year, in delivery of food collected for the Third World, a scandal recently reported by the EEC's Audit Office (21). The ONGs mentioned earlier are calling now, not for abolition, but for improvement in

food-aid programs which, according to them, could be made into so many "tools for the right of peoples to feed themselves," on condition that they be re-designed from scratch. The truth is that these programs are justified only if they really help support the farmers. In the Sahel, they need to organize to boost their output, to get fair, remunerative prices, to have access to markets where they can sell what they grow and buy what they need. The goal of these ONGs is to find some way in which 4 percent of the sums currently spent on transferring food from the South to the North could be earmarked for marketing, within each State in the South, of its local products. The advantages of these triangular operations, tantamount to de-facto equalization among the regions of a given country, are numerous: they would withdraw the bolt of autarchy from the doors, including those of the most remote regions; they would not force people to alter their dietary habits; they would expedite delivery and cut the costs of transport. Most important of all, once assured that they could market their surpluses, farmers would be motivated to produce more the following year, to increase their earnings.

### Conclusion

The suffering in the Sahel has led some to see in the link between food crops and income crops a perverse and mischievous nexus they perceive as the root of all the evils besetting this region. Pushing that logic to its limits, some have even called for banning income crops in favor of food crops so that the farmers could play their proper role as nurturers and assure the survival of people unnaturally starving because of the insatiable greed of Westerners and of the animals they raise to provide themselves with meat. There are those who argue that resumption of trade should be made subordinate to prior achievement of self-sufficiency, which can be obtained only by a return to ancestral farming practices, by what amounts, basically, to reinventing what is assumed to be the Golden Age.

That analysis can be dangerous. And could one not gain profits from such income crops as peanuts, tobacco, etc., which would prove not only sources of substantial profit but very good, too, for food crops, which would at last begin to be paying propositions once they were fitted into modern marketing circuits, and open the door to technologies that could unquestionably adapted to food crops as well?

The mounting costs of food imports, particularly grain imports, to the Sahel countries, remarked at the beginning of this study, is in large part attributable to the fact that population growth (up 3 percent per year on the average throughout the region), a factor that can be beneficial in itself preceded rather than following agricultural development, which is still largely unaccomplished. That development, the sine qua non of any real economic

takeoff in Africa, can still be accomplished thanks to income crops, whose power as an incentive to food crops has been demonstrated.

To take an example--not from the Sahel proper, but not far from it--look at Cameroon, where the words "coffee" and "cacao" may soon supplant peanuts, cotton, or tobacco, and where the central issue is the existence or non-existence of agriculture conceived of as the basic economic activity in a country that has opted for modernization. In that country, in fact, at the time of approving operating and investment budgets for 1985 submitted by the farm cooperative of coffee- and cacao-planters in Nde (in the western portion of the country)(22), regional Prefect Jean-Calvin Boog lamented the drastic decline in production of arabica coffee, due not only to the drought but in equal measure to the lack of attention paid to plant health and to replanting the coffee plantations, thereby providing yet another reaffirmation of the fact that, in farming, nothing is ever done once and for all, and that this vital activity demands care at every instant.

The national option for modernization, however, did allow the transfusion of 175 million Cfa francs into the "Peasants' Bank" in the region, with an eye to increasing farm productivity and improving housing. The budget proper puts the requisite investments at 59,730,000 Cfa francs. The money is to go to buy a truck, office equipment and materials, 300 storage pallets for chemical products, and, above all, for replacement of the Bangangte warehouses, destroyed as too dilapidated when the Yaounde-Bafoussam highway was built.

The total of these investments, which will be productive in the long run, comes close to the 12,601,909 CFA franc surplus from coffee and cacao sales in 1983-84 (22).

The figures speak for themselves. A lot of things become possible in such a context, from simple barter to more sophisticated trading. Some sort of communicating vessels could also be envisaged between income crops--sources of abundant profits-- and the much-desired food crops as assets to be carefully husbanded against a rainy day and...out of perfectly legitimate hankering for more, or to an even greater extent, between more traditional kitchen-gardens and new fields planted with improved seeds.

It is by no means certain that a different choice, a non-modern one, would offer so much flexibility or open up so many brand-new prospects.

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CSO: 3419/169

ANGOLA

#### ITALIAN JOURNALIST ACCUSES MPLA OF DISINFORMATION CAMPAIGN

Lisbon O DIABO in Portuguese 14 Jan 86 p 18

[Text] "One thing that made me feel humiliated as a journalist every day during my 2-month stay at the Angolan 'front' was to listen to Western radio broadcasts and find that all their information was contradicted by the reality I was observing." So wrote journalist Lucio Lami in the Milan daily newspaper IL GIORNALE as he concluded his reportage on the People's Republic of Angola.

"Most of the news leaving Angola for Europe is censored in Luanda," alleges Lucio Lami, and he cites as an example the news report concerning the unsuccessful offensive launched against UNITA by government forces last summer. That report spread falsehoods to the effect that Jonas Savimbi had fled to the Republic of South Africa and that the Soviet helicopters shot down in that encounter had been downed by South Africans.

Another example of the disinformation campaign being carried on by the MPLA is cited in Lucio Lami's report: "The UN delegates who visited Angola to verify the damage caused by the South African incursion were shown a bridge over the Zambezi River in the vicinity of Cazombo that had been destroyed, but in fact, that bridge had been dynamited 2 months earlier by the government troops themselves. This form of disinformation is not new--it has been yielding good results for 10 years."

The journalist also denies that the Soviet military on assignment in Angola are there only as "advisers": they are "at the side of every high-ranking Angolan official right up to the Supreme Defense Council. The man at the side of President Eduardo dos Santos is General Constantin Schacknovitch."

Lucio Lami adds: "It is also false that the Cubans are in a hurry to return to their country. Luanda is in the process of naturalizing the oldest ones--the veterans of the revolution--and granting them land where they can settle with their families, like the former colonists."

#### Strange Support for Marxist Regime by Democracies and Capitalism

The Italian journalist also asserts: "It is false in the extreme that the Soviets and Cubans concern themselves with Angola's economic recovery. On the

contrary, Angola is being pillaged just like Afghanistan. The Soviets are taking the minerals and lumber, and their ships are taking the fish from the sea, just as they did in Somalia before they were expelled from there. For their part, the Cubans are pillaging the 'pacified' villages and loading their freighters with household utensils, vehicles, bicycles, and even the windows from houses."

He emphasizes: "It is also deceitful to say that South Africa has nothing to fear from Angola and that it must be condemned whenever it attacks SWAPO. The Namibian guerrillas are under the direct control of the Soviet Union, and they receive their military training in the heart of Angola. Two infantry brigades and two motorized brigades have already been organized and equipped with Russian weapons that were brought in on Soviet and Yugoslav freighters."

Lastly, Lucio Lami focuses on the paradoxical situation created by the support that a communist regime such as the MPLA is receiving from democratic and capitalist sources.

"Gulf Oil pumps up 80,000 barrels of petroleum daily in Cabinda under the protection of Cubans. Spain sells cargo planes to Luanda, which converts them into troop transports. France supplies Gazelle helicopters and trains pilots to fly them. Peaceful Switzerland sells its PC-7's--training aircraft that can be converted into light bombers--to Angola. Italy provides help in the form of money and various foodstuffs to combat a drought that never existed.

"All those people are very concerned with the hullabaloo over apartheid--too concerned to hear the truth concerning Africa's Afghanistan, which is what Angola is in the process of becoming."

The situation described by IL GIORNALE is not news to us. It is valuable, however, as testimony to the serious ambiguity which distorts, thanks to the Western democracies, their political classes, and those responsible for their media, the understanding of what is happening in Angola. Perhaps the upcoming visit by Jonas Savimbi and his meeting with President Reagan, already announced, will be able to contribute to a clarification that is growing steadily more necessary and urgent.

11798  
CNO: 3442/125

ANGOLA

BRIEFS

CHIPENDA ALLOWED BACK IN COUNTRY--Luanda--A top member of the rebel National Front for the Liberation of Angola has been allowed back into Angola from Lisbon to attend the funeral of his mother, government sources said yesterday. They said Mr Damel Chipenda, who defected to FNLA from the country's ruling MPLA Party in 1973 and has been living in Portugal since then, returned home last week. The government allowed him back on humanitarian grounds and he attended his mother's funeral last Thursday, the sources added. He is expected to fly back in the next few days. The FNLA, a right-wing movement, has aligned itself with Dr Jonas Savimbi's UNITA in fighting against Angola's Marxist government. [Text] [Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English 20 Feb 86 p 11] /12851

OIL INDUSTRY DEVELOPMENTS--PETROGAL will resume petroleum operations on Angola's Platform 4 and will also have access to offshore zones as a result of agreements signed this week during the visit to Lisbon by Angola's minister of petroleum and industry, Pedro Van-Dunem ("Loy"). A Portuguese consortium will also take charge of the project to raise the height of the Cambambe Dam--a project that was frozen 2 years ago. In 1983, the cost of the work was estimated at 15 million contos, half of which was to be paid for with petroleum deliveries. Export financing was to take care of the rest. Cooperation in other sectors was also agreed on during this visit, and it was also agreed to reactivate the Portuguese-Angolan Joint Commission during the next quarter. A childhood friend of President Jose Eduardo dos Santos, "Loy" received a lightning promotion in December, when he joined the MPLA Central Committee and was appointed a member of the Politburo. [Text] [Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 24 Jan 86 p 20] 11798

CSO: 3442/125

BENIN

AGREEMENTS SIGNED WITH ISLAMIC DEVELOPMENT BANK

Cotonou EHUZU in French 14 Jan 86 pp 1, 8

[Article by Ladislas-Prosper Gbaguidi]

[Text] At a solemn ceremony held in the conference room of the Ministry of Planning and Statistics on Friday, two major agreements were signed concerning studies financed by the Islamic Development Bank (IDB). The agreements involve two projects of vital importance to our country: 1) technical studies for the completion of and drafting of the call for bids relating to the project to pave the Savalou-Djougou-Porga road, 425 km in length and costing 32 billion CFA francs; and 2) technical studies for construction of the hydroagricultural project in the Niger Valley, covering 10,000 hectares and costing 15.21 billion CFA francs.

The two agreements were signed by the minister of planning and statistics and the minister of equipment and transportation, comrades Zul-Kifl Salami and Girigissou Gado, representing the People's Republic of Benin, and General Manager Saidane, representing the SCET-Tunisia-Turkpak and the SCET-Tunisia-Nespak. Also present were the ambassadors of countries belonging to the Islamic Development Bank assigned to Cotonou, particularly from Algeria, Egypt and the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, in addition to various officials from the ministries involved.

Following the signing of the two agreements, the minister of planning and statistics, the representative of the SCET, Turkpak and Nespak and the secretary of the Libyan People's Bureau, Moustapha Abousseta, each spoke to praise South-South cooperation, which has enabled the Islamic Development Bank to finance several projects of vital interest in our country.

Salami reviewed the five financing agreements that have just been signed with the Islamic Development Bank only a year after our country joined that financial institution, to wit: 1) construction of the basic agricultural poly-technical complex in Natitingou; 2) the integrated rural development of Oueme Province; 3) technical studies for and completion of the Savalou-Djougou-Porga road; 4) hydroagricultural development of the Niger Valley; and 5) the importation of oil products for some 2.25 billion CFA francs.

In addition to these five, another agreement relates to research concerning underground water in the People's Republic of Benin.

According to Salami, IDB aid to the Benin economy amounts to some 7 billion CFA francs to date.

This is why, speaking on behalf of our great comrade in struggle, President Mathieu Kerekou, he wished to express his sincere thanks to the leadership bodies of the IDB, particularly its president, Dr Ahmad Muhammed Ali.

Abousseta spoke on behalf of the Islamic countries accredited in Benin and praised this fruitful cooperation between their countries and the People's Republic of Benin.

Saidane promised to do everything to be worthy of the confidence placed in his company.

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CSO: 3419/202

BOTSWANA

BRITISH UNIT TO TRAIN DEFENSE FORCES

Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English 14 Feb 86 p 3

[Text] LONDON. — Britain's Ministry of Defence yesterday refused to disclose details of a training exercise in Botswana reported to involve 90 members of the elite Special Air Services.

A report in the Guardian newspaper said the SAS contingent would train Botswana's forces in techniques to resist future South African raids and curb infiltration by guerrillas fighting the Pretoria government".

The Botswana government announced what it called a "joint training exercise" and in London the Ministry said details were confidential. "The British Army conducts training in countries throughout the world. It routinely provides assistance," was all that a spokesman would say.

The Guardian report said the SAS would train Botswana forces at a remote desert area in the north of the country, and that the exercise would involve Royal Air Force C-130 Hercules transport aircraft

Quoting reliable

sources, it said the training would begin in two weeks and advance elements of the SAS were already in the country.

The Guardian report said: "It is conceded that the 3,500 man Botswana Defence Force would stand little chance in a stand-up fight with the powerful South African military machine. However, it is hoped that the SAS training will give the Botswanans the means to make it expensive for South Africa to repeat the raid on Gaborone which it conducted last June 14."

The Guardian quoted its sources as saying that after about six weeks' training "the BDF might in future be able to do such things as surround part of a South African raiding force by being able to react more swiftly."

The sources added that the Botswana troops would be trained in another SAS speciality, conducting sabotage operations deep inside enemy territory, the report said.

Sapa.

/12851  
CSO: 3400/1141

BOTSWANA

BUDGET SHOWS RECORD SURPLUS FOR THIRD STRAIGHT YEAR

Johannesburg THE STAR in English 19 Feb 86 p 7

[Text] **GABORONE** — Presenting a Budget that must be the envy of neighbouring South Africa, the Botswana Minister of Finance has offered his country a record surplus for the third year running.

This despite the fact that Mr Peter Mmusi also announced a salary increase for civil servants running at between 20 percent for the lowest paid staff to 15 percent for the higher grades.

The increase is well ahead of the inflation rate in Botswana which Mr Mmusi said had averaged at 10.4 percent in 1985 — compared with South Africa's 17 percent.

**INCREASES**

The Budget decision means that all salaries in the country will tend to increase by between 15 and 20 percent.

Mr Mmusi told the National Assembly that estimated revenue for the 1986/87 financial year would be R1 437 million, and the surplus would be R350 million.

In 1984/85 the surplus had been R225 million and in 1985/86 it had been R290 million.

Stressing fiscal discipline, Mr Mmusi said the country had reserves which would cover 14 months' worth of imports.

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CSO: 3400/1141

BOTSWANA

BRIEFS

SATUCC'S LEADER RESIDENCE PERMIT CANCELED--Mafikeng--The Botswana Minister of Home Affairs, Mr Englishman Kgabo, has cancelled the residence permit of the executive secretary of the Southern African Trade Union Co-ordination Council, Mr Chakufa Chihana. [Text] [Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English 20 Feb 86 p 10] /12851

CSO: 3400/1141

CONGO

## POINTE-NOIRE PORT ACTIVITY GROWS STEADILY

Brazzaville MWETI in French 21 Nov 85 p 3

[Article by Felix Ipossi]

**Text]** General traffic at the Pointe-Noire port rose 10.4 percent in 1984: 9,244,333.3 tons compared with 8,375,506.1 tons in 1983, according to the 1984 Annual Report recently published in Pointe-Noire. Thus it is that the port's role as a gateway to the world and the driving force of the national economy is further confirmed.

A detailed analysis of the report does in fact show remarkable fluctuations compared with 1983. Exports total 640,372.9 tons, or an export-import ratio of 4.83 compared with 5.21 in 1983. Bulk liquids in both directions total 5,795,383.2 tons, compared with 5,246,552.5 tons in 1983, an increase of 10.5 percent. These mainly include oil products: 5,780,803.4 tons, of which 5,394,325.7 tons are crude oil, representing 58.4 percent of all traffic. This is an increase of 12.3 percent over the previous year. Solid bulk items are also up: 2,176,148.7 tons, compared with 2,040,855 tons in 1983 (6.6 percent). Among the solid bulk freight is manganese ore, with 2,166,819.4 tons, compared with 2,022,616 tons last year (increase of 7.1 percent), representing 99 percent of that traffic.

Miscellaneous goods: 1,156,284.5 tons, compared with 915,438 tons in 1983, are up 26.3 percent. Ordnance and supplies, which amounted to 116,516.7 tons this year, compared with 172,660.6 tons last year, again show a major drop, down 32.5 percent. The peak in traffic in April, with 914,407.3 tons, is the record in monthly activity at the port.

Under the heading "Ship Movements and Docking," the report notes that in 1984, 1,203 departed, compared with 1,249 the previous year, a drop of 3.6 percent. This drop is distributed among the following types of vessels: those carrying timber, 69 compared with 85 in 1983; ore and manganese ships, 96 compared with 103; oil tankers, 34 compared with 39; and cold-storage ships, 42 compared with 55.

In addition to the normal traffic, the Pointe-Noire port received some 1,518 small offshore vessels serving Spanish shrimp boats, compared with 1,907 in 1983. These figures do not take into account the local fishing boats, whose

comings and goings are not recorded. The report also states that among the 42 foreign vessels noted at the port in 1984, 5 represented over 50 percent of all ship movements. Maltese, North Korean and Swedish flags have dominated the Indian, Kuwaiti, Romanian and Turkish flagships, which were not seen this year. Classification of vessels based on customary criteria relating to the number, tonnage and tonnage of goods is as follows:

#### Movement of Ships

French, 16.9 compared with 19.3 percent in 1983; Panamanian, 14.2 compared with 15.7 percent; Greek, 8.5 compared with 7 percent; Togolese, 7.7 compared with 3 percent; Liberian, 6.9 compared with 7.6 percent; Gabonese, 5.8 compared with 7.6 percent; Norwegian, 4.6 compared with 5.7 percent; Soviet, 4.3 compared with 3.9 percent; Danish, 4 compared with 5 percent; and American, 3.7 compared with 2.8 percent.

#### Tonnage of Goods

Greek, 23 compared with 22.7 percent in 1983; Liberian, 19.6 compared with 20.7 percent; American, 14.3 compared with 11.1 percent; Panamanian, 7.8 compared with 6.5 percent; French, 6.6 compared with 7.1 percent; Spanish, 5.6 compared with 4.5 percent; Singapore, 4.3 compared with 5 percent; English, 4.2 compared with 1.6 percent; Danish, 2.2 compared with 2.5 percent; and Soviet, 1.8 compared with 1.7 percent.

#### Goods Traffic

In the goods traffic section, the report shows that entries are up 17 percent (640,372.9 tons, compared with 547,261.1 tons in 1983). This increase is essentially due to an increase in imports of food products: 173,790.4 tons, compared with 154,266.8 tons in 1983, or an increase of 12.7 percent; building materials and metallurgical products, 157,405 tons, compared with 135,551.5 tons, or an increase of 16.1 percent; and chemical products, 48,605.1 tons, compared with 45,403.6 tons, an increase of 7.1 percent. The increase is also due to the traffic in transshipment container traffic appearing in September 1984.

In contrast, imports of agricultural products, energy and mineral products, as well as industrial products show drops of 4.1, 13.1 and 3.7 percent respectively compared with results of the previous year.

A more detailed analysis shows: a major increase in rice imports: 11,727.6 to tons compared with 4,612 tons in 1983, and cement, from 50,372 to 87,798.5 tons; a net decline in local fishing traffic (down 14.3 percent), while imports of frozen fish are up 14.3 percent.

Departures are up 8.5 percent over the previous year. Totaling 3,093,118 tons (not including crude oil), they represent 33.5 percent of the port's total traffic. Wood exports, totaling 459,592.2 tons, compared with 363,111.3 tons in 1983, are up 26.6 percent.

Manganese traffic went from 2,022,616 tons to 2,166,819 tons, or an increase of 7.1 percent. Bulk hydrocarbons totaled 340,281.8 tons, compared with 366,055 tons, a drop of 7 percent from 1983.

Consequently, despite the national economy's lack of movement in 1984, the Pointe-Noire port maintained its form and strengthened its role, thanks to its modern equipment which increased its transit capacity. With the end of the realignment of the CFCO [Congo-Ocean Railroad], the general management of the Trans-Congolese Communications Agency (ATC) expects even greater progress.

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CSO: 3419/202

CONGO

#### REORGANIZATION OF PARTY STRUCTURE REPORTED

Brazzaville MWETI in French 21 Nov 85 p 3

[Text] The Politburo of the Central Committee of the PCT [Congolese Labor Party] met at the Palace of Congresses yesterday, presided over by Comrade Denis Sassou-Nguesso, chairman of the PCT Central Committee. During the meeting, the Politburo proceeded to reorganize the departments of the Central Committee Secretariat and set forth guidelines for adapting propaganda, press and information activities to the requirements of the Structural Readjustment Program (PAS) adopted by the Central Committee at its second regular session.

Concerning this reorganization, the Politburo, applying the decision drawn up by the third regular session of the Central Committee which had recommended a reduction in structures at the party and government levels, did away with ten divisions of the departments of the Secretariat. Based on the new organization, the Politburo appointed comrades to head the divisions. Their names follow.

#### Chairmanship of the CC

Defense and Security Division: Maj Guy-Pierre Garcia, member of the PCT CC.

#### Permanent Staff Department

Administration and Personnel Division: Comrade Norbert Ngoua, member of the CC. Study and Research Division: Comrade Jeanne Dambenzat, member of the CC. Finance and Material Division: Comrade Jean-Pierre Tsiba. Archives and Documentation Division: Gabriel Mokandza. Revolutionary Court of Justice staff: Comrade Alphonse Popossi Nanziba.

#### Department of Organization

Life of the Party Division: Comrade Boniface Bouka, member of the CC.

Study and Research Division: Comrade Fulgence Milandou, member of the CC.

Cadres and People's Power Division: Comrade Andre Ekou.

#### Department of Activities of Mass and Social Organizations

CSC [Congolese Trade Union Confederation] Division: Comrade Sulvestre Mbongo, member of the CC. URFC [Union of Congolese Revolutionary Forces]-UNEAC

Association: Comrade Jean Royal Kississou Bona, member of the CC. Study and Research Division: Comrade Jean Oba-Bouya

#### Foreign Relations Department

Division of the Communist and Socialist Parties: Comrade Jean-Pierre Nono, member of the CC. Division of Liberation Movements, the National Committee for Refugees, Studies and Planning: Comrade Alphonse Gangouo, member of the CC. Division of African Progressive Parties, International Organizations, Democratic, Bourgeois and Liberal Parties: Comrade Metoutham.

#### Department of Ideology and Political Training

Study and Research: Comrade Sever Sianard. Ideology Division: Comrade Jean Louis Taty. Politican Training Division: Comrade Joe Jean Christophe Mouissou. Advanced Party School, director with the rank and prerogatives of division head: Comrade Prosper Martin Ngakeni.

#### Department of Education

People's School Division: Comrade Jeannette Ganga-Zandzou. People's Education and Culture Division: Comrade Sylvain Bemba. Scientific and Technical Research Division: Jean Prosper Koyo.

#### Department of Press, Propaganda and Information

Propaganda and Orientation Division: Comrade Elorian Kiakouama. Agitation, Publishing and Documentation Division: Edgard Diaouka Bembala, member of the CC. Censorship Division: Comrade Ludovic Eckomband. Central Organ of the Etumba Party, director with the rank and prerogatives of division head: Comrade Dominique Mbango.

#### Department of Agrarian Land Reform and Cooperative Promotion

Rural Development Division, in charge of studies: Comrade Marc Kani. Cooperative Promotion Division: Comrade Jean Pierre Madeke. Agrarian and Land Reform Division, in charge of the environment: Comrade Dominique Baseyila.

The Politburo issued instructions so that the department in charge of the UJSC-JP [Union of Congolese Socialist Youth-Pioneer Youth] will not be organized into division, but have a flexible structure. The secretary of the CC heading the department responsible for the UJSC-JP, acting as first secretary of the Union, has available for his activities the entire CC of the UJSC-JP, the number of whose departments is reduced from 20 to 16.

Comrade Joseph Kouka Gampo, formerly head of the Study and Research Division in the Permanent Staff Department, was named political adviser of the member of the Politburo and permanent secretary in charge of organization.

Comrade Jean Pierre Poaty, formerly head of the Study and Planning Division of the Department of Agrarian and Land Reform and Cooperative Promotion, was named adviser to the staff of the head of that department.

The Politburo then turned to the activity of propaganda during this period of the Structural Adjustment Program. It should be recalled that the PAS is actually a sum of painful measures, but measures that are essential due to the current economic situation. During this period, there will be a break in accomplishments that will require comrades to react in terms of their challenged interests. It is therefore important to cultivate and strengthen the revolutionary convictions of members facing fallacious rumors of all kinds. Propaganda must therefore be adapted to this special situation. This is why the Politburo has designed certain urgent activities to be carried out with priority during the period of the PAS, in order to make it possible to face victoriously all those who thought the time propitious for doing harm to the Congolese revolution.

The Department of the Press, Propaganda and Information has been instructed through its specialized committee to do everything possible so that the execution of such measures will come about as soon as possible.

Structures having an impact on propaganda activity, whether they be of the party, the UJSC-JP, mass or government organizations will have to work together to accomplish all the missions assigned by the party and its leader, Comrade Denis Sassou-Nguesso.

Immortal glory to Comrade Marien Ngouabi! Long live Comrade Denis Sassou-Nguesso! Everything for the people and only for the people!

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CSO: 3419/202

DJIBOUTI

ARMY EVALUATED AT TRAINING MANEUVERS

Djibouti LA NATION in French 12 Dec 85 p 2

[Text] For a little less than a month, more than 1,200 men from the National Army were engaged in the operation known as the "annual camp." A regimental camp established at Djallelo. All of the units represented in the field participated in joint activities and underwent intensive training, both by day and by night. The participants' efforts involved combat, firing, instruction in "mines and booby traps," maintaining order, physical training and endurance. The maneuver completed, the men arrived in Djibouti following a long commando-style march.

December 4 was marked by numerous firing demonstrations and combat exercises at the Ali-Faren pass and in the shooting practice camp at Myriam, in the presence of the head of state and several dignitaries from the republic and from friendly countries. These exercises of great mobility, for which modern equipment was deployed, enabled President Gouled to appreciate the true operational level of our young army.

On this occasion, the head of state delivered a speech which emphasized the considerable importance of the AND [Djibouti National Army].

"It is with pride and admiration that I witnessed the firing and combat exercises carried out before me." President Gouled then continued with these words: "The enthusiasm, the competence and the rigor that I have discerned are proof of success." The head of state also wished to thank all of the nation's officers and technical assistants who, either directly or in their everyday activities, contributed to this success. He also took this opportunity to thank the French forces who have given their support "today as on other occasions as well." In emphasizing the support Paris has provided to our army, President Gouled underscored that an important effort had been agreed to concerning cooperation with France.

Finally, the head of state wished to reassure our servicemen concerning their social conditions. "As commander-in-chief of the armies, I am fully aware of the particular constraints of the soldier's profession. I know that it has its sacrifices as well as its glories. This is why, in spite of the current rigor and austerity, I see to it that much attention is paid to your working and living conditions: the future construction of housing units, better clothing, or simply, the revision of certain regulatory texts.

For his part, General Ali Mehidal Waiss spoke at length on the operation at the regimental camp:

"The training of our forces requires that we assemble periodically. This is why most of the National Army has been gathered for 3 weeks at the Djallelo camp where it will spend a month in total. This undertaking, as you may suspect, posed numerous problems and required great effort from all. Indeed, it was necessary to reconcile this training imperative with the permanent responsibility of our missions at the borders and in the garrisons.

"In the course of my many visits and inspections, I was able to appreciate the great progress made, but I do not delude myself: Our objectives have been only partially achieved and our operational capacity has not reached the level that I demand of a professional army. We still have a long road ahead of us and that is why I have decided that following this operation and as soon as equipment is restored to working order, the effort will be pursued. Until February, the basic units, including the GCF [Frontier Commando Group], will proceed on a rotational basis, with survival training [nomadisations] throughout the country, in particular along our inland and maritime borders, from Loyada to Moulhoule. These survival training trips will for the most part be carried out on foot, for improved physical fitness, especially for a better knowledge of the terrain and population, and also to economize fuel and equipment. At the same time, the units are to take advantage of the operations to continue their practical training, particularly in combat and firing. However, for this, it is indispensable that the National Army acquire additional instructional means, in particular munitions.

"The combat exercise and the firing demonstrations that you have witnessed attest, I believe, to our units' good operational capacity and to the excellent cooperation prevailing between the National Army and the French Forces of Djibouti."

The chief of staff of the armed forces then presented to the president the principal lessons and observations inspired by the camp operation and the morning's exercises.

"First, on the subject of equipping our forces, as you were able to observe at Ali-Faren, modern combat in this type of terrain requires a large airborne and anti-tank capacity. And this is true of practically all of the Republic's territory. It is therefore imperative that we continue to equip ourselves in this connection, if we wish to remain credible.

"Further, training the army requires appropriate and extensive instructional means. Shooting practice, for example, is not possible without munitions. These are of course very costly, but the country must consent to this considerable sacrifice because it will have an effective army--the guarantor of its security and its liberty--only if the means necessary to its training are provided to it.

"Finally, I have observed time and time again that action, training--even when grueling--were infinitely beneficial to the morale and discipline of our men.

It is in the field, actually performing the work of armed service, that the soldiers, that we are, feel useful and effective. The annual camp operation is therefore of immense value to the National Army."

General Ali Mehidal took the occasion of this large gathering of the army to assert once and for all, and to stress, its apolitical nature. "The soldiers who make-up the army come from different horizons, and it is the army which has been the melting pot of their union and strength," he stated. "This union, this strength, the arms which they serve, can only and will only be used solely to serve the nation."

"I must also underscore here the exemplary nature of the cooperation we maintain with the French army. The assistance provided to us by our military technical assistants as well as by the French forces stationed in Djibouti, has always been frank, amical and particularly effective. Our armies are suited to work together, as in this morning's exercise, for the same ideal: the defense of the fundamental values of our peoples."

Finally, the general wished to thank the commissioners of the republic and the local authorities, who offered all the support necessary to hold the operation, and all those, including the French forces, who provided their assistance in order to enable our army to achieve its objectives.

12413/12859  
CSO: 3419/166

IVORY COAST

#### CACAO PRODUCTION IN 1985-1986 TO DROP

Abidjan FRATERNITE MATIN in French 5 Dec 85 p 8

[Article: "Cacao: No Record Production This Year"]

[Text] "There is to be no record cacao production this year in the Ivory Coast. In view of present realities, the size of the harvest will in fact show a drop now estimated at more than 50,000 tons." This revelation was made to us yesterday morning by Norbert Kouakou, director of the Stabilization Fund.

With this, he put a definite end to the tendentious rumours which have been circulating since last July in international business circles about an extraordinary volume of production in the Ivory Coast, something which, for the speculators, would have the automatic effect of lowering the world-market price per kilogram of cacao.

The Ivory Coast, as premier world cacao producer, is of the highest interest to speculators on the London, Frankfurt and New York exchanges. But when the speculation aims primarily at disinformation for buyers in order to better exploit producer countries by effecting a scheme of unjustified price cuts, the Ivory Coast cannot keep silence in such circumstances.

And, since there has been nothing but manipulation of fantastic figures on Ivory Coast cacao production since last July, we asked the director of the Stabilization Fund, Norbert Kouakou, to give international opinion an idea of this year's Ivory Coast cacao realities. In the very short interview he gave us, the director of the Stabilization Fund stated that the size of the 1985-1986 cacao harvest will show a drop relative to last year that will certainly exceed 50,000 tons. What are the reasons underlying this unexpected fall in Ivory Coast production? Let us here follow Norbert Kouakou's remarks.

"Since July the cacao marketing corporations have been rivaling one another in their imaginativeness as they have fed the international market with information on the prospects for the Ivory Coast harvest and on the progress of marketing operations. Some of them are announcing with assurance a volume of production higher than that of the 1984-1985 season. Others are publishing purchase figures every week that have no relationship to the business realities.

"The facts presently available on the 1985-1986 cacao harvest, gathered from various sources (land-registry, research and forecasting organizations,

exporter and purchaser organizations) do not warrant this outsized dose of optimism. Quite the reverse: they all lead to the belief that the 1985-1986 harvest will show a decline, relative to 1984-1985, which seems likely to exceed 50,000 tons. Four basic reasons underlie this disquieting prospect:

--The unfavorable trend in the curve of recorded purchases. As of 30 November 1985, the volume of purchases amounted to 150,000 tons, as against 207,000 tons at the same point in the last season, which represents a 32.44 percent drop. At the same date, the purchases of the period 25 through 30 November came to 21,000 tons, whereas those of the corresponding period in 1984 [as published: 1985] reached 34,000 tons;

--The mediocre prospects of the main producing areas (West, West-Central, South, Southwest, East). These zones, which represent 80 percent of production, now show a retreat of 24 percent compared to 1984-1985;

--The low survival rate of the nibs. Compared to the survival rate observed in October 1984, this season's shows a 20 percent drop;

--The purchase period.

"While harvesting operations stretch over the whole duration of the season, those being carried out at present, in light of the size of the fruit and the proportion of small fruit, will come to an abrupt stop starting at the end of February 1986.

"In sum, the combined effects of the persistent rains in the cacao areas and the need for a pause in the production cycle after the spectacular 1984-1985 jump will without any doubt be felt in the size of the 1985-1986 harvest.

"Ignoring the consequences of these phenomena, certain analysts have maintained figures reflecting their own desires but in no way corresponding to the legitimate effort to seek the information needed for a proper evaluation of market statistics."

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CSO: 3419/171

KENYA

TAX EVASION SCHEME UNCOVERED IN NAIROBI

Nairobi THE SUNDAY TIMES in English 2 Feb 86 pp 1, 24

[Text] A firm of auditors in Nairobi is allegedly helping businessmen to evade income tax and in the process the government is said to be losing millions of shillings.

Subsequently, a Nairobi Asian businessman said to be one of the beneficiaries in the behind-the-scene deals, is reported to have fled the country, leaving unsettled tax arrears amounting to Shs. 2.5 million.

The Asian who is suspected to be a British national left the country soon after the income tax department gave him seven days to clear his tax arrears or "a serious action" will be taken against him.

The Principal Collector with the Income Tax Department, Mr S.M. Kariuki, told THE SUNDAY TIMES that he had launched investigations into reports that some bogus companies of auditors were helping businessmen to evade or waive taxation on commission.

THE SUNDAY TIMES received reports and names of several companies behind the deal in which the government is feared to have lost millions of shillings.

The company involved has allegedly helped two companies to evade taxation amounting to Shs. 80,000 and another amounting to more than shs. 70,000.

An enforcement officer with the income tax department, Mr Ochieng' Othuon, giving a report about one of the said companies said: "The taxpayer rang in response to our call and said a banker's cheque for shs. 50,000 could not be obtained because a cheque the company had presented to their bankers from their client had come back unpaid due to unknown circumstances."

The racket, THE SUNDAY TIMES learnt, involves reducing the figures payable by a tax payer and then a commission of 10 percent of the tax being originally demanded is paid to those behind the racket.

Now Mr Kariuki has vowed to investigate the matter further and bring the culprits to book. He told THE SUNDAY TIMES that he would personally go to the department where all the files of companies are kept for taxation purposes.

It was not, however, clear whether such a racket involving a large sum of money would succeed without the assistance of some officials.

Ochieng' Othuon said: "My duty is only to demand payments for the figures put in the file by the assessors. I cannot go beyond that".

To establish how the mechanism works, however, Mr Kariuki said he would peruse all company records. "Those engaged in illegal practices would be caught up in the mess," said Kariuki.

A month ago the attention of the principal collector was drawn to a case involving a company from which the income tax department was demanding shs. 800,000, but a firm of auditors allegedly helped the businessman concerned to pay only shs. 80,000 on a suspicious deal.

Kariuki over the weekend told THE SUNDAY TIMES that for a whole month he has been searching records to establish what methods was being used.

But as Mr Kariuki was investigating the matter, THE SUNDAY TIMES learnt that the Asian businessman who owed Shs. 2.5 million tax arrears had fled the country after the tax department had given the businessman seven days ultimatum.

The Asian businessman is suspected of being a leader of a smuggling ring. At one time his home was raided by the police and officials of the customs department who impounded goods worth millions of shillings allegedly imported into Kenya illegally.

It is further understood that a brother of the said Asian, fled the country two years ago having swindled local businessmen of goods valued at shs. 25 million.

Documents available to THE SUNDAY TIMES showed that for the years 1983 and 1984 the Asian businessman had failed to pay taxes amounting to Shs. 2.5 million.

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CSO: 3400/1165

KENYA

BRIEFS

TEA PRICES DECLINE--Tea prices on the international market last year showed a marked decline after the all-time high of 1984 but the 29 million kilos increase in Kenya tea production helped to offset the decline in prices in 1985. Kenya sold a total of more than 72 million kilos of tea at an average price of SH. 26.09 per kilo in 1985 as compared to slightly over 55 million kilos in 1984 at an average price of SH. 40.41. Climatic conditions remained favourable with a dry spell at the beginning of 1985. This did not affect the water tables resulting in an increase for the first three months of the year compared with the same period in 1984. However, a report by the African Tea Brokers in Mombasa for the year just ended noted that the long seasonal rains which arrived on schedule in April coincided with some factories producing "very disappointing qualities of tea," a situation which was rectified with the return of colder temperatures in the following months. Qualities sold through Mombasa auction showed a 30.6 percent increase to the tune of 16.88 kilos, meaning Kenya was able to offer more tea at the auction. [Text] [Nairobi DAILY NATION in English 15 Jan 86 p 10] /12851

FRUIT ROTS AT AIRPORT--Tons of fruit and fresh vegetables are rotting at Jomo Kenyatta International Airport, Nairobi. The products which are intended for export are being offloaded due to lack of cargo space among the regular carriers that land at the airport. This was said yesterday, by the chairman of the Fresh Produce Exporters Association, Mr S.K. arap Maru, during an interview with the NATION yesterday. Mr Maru said the situation had become critical since the beginning of this month as the cargo space has fallen while the exportable produce has increased. Last year was a favourable year for the horticultural industry compared to 1984, as there was a drop in offloads of 70 percent, thus giving encouragement to the farmers. In 1984, over 50 tons of horticultural produce was offloaded and hence wasted, weekly. The crunch has been brought by a number of factors: (1) Scheduled flights -- Lufthansa and British Airways -- are now flying direct to Europe from Johannesburg. This means that any space they would have made available to the Kenyan horticultural exporters is now lost. The two airlines have extended some assistance to the

industry by Lufthansa introducing a cargo plane on Mondays and British Airways flying a Tristar on Tuesdays, but this is far below the weekly space that the airlines provided before switching to the direct Johannesburg-Europe schedules; and (2) The introduction of an Airbus by Kenya Airways has worsened a situation that was "already jutting," said Mr Maru. "The capacity of the Airbus, unlike the Boeing which still carried 4-5 tons, after full passenger boarding is nil." Mr Maru argued that as a national carrier, they (Kenya Airways) should show the lead to the foreign carriers. He suggested that Kenya Airways should look into ways of acquiring a freighter, especially during the tourist peak season, otherwise, the farmers will be ruined financially and the country is losing valuable foreign exchange. [Text] [Nairobi DAILY NATION in English 14 Jan 86 p 24] /12851

DROUGHT EFFECTS OUTLINED--The 1984-85 drought in Kenya threatened the food security of as many as three million people, according to a paper presented yesterday to a seminar at Nairobi's Norfolk Hotel. The paper: "Food policy formulation and implementation in Kenya", said 25 percent of rural population live on lower rainfall "semi-arid" lands while almost 75 percent of the total rural population growth during the 1969/79 period was absorbed in higher potential lands. With a population growth of four percent, said the paper, migration to semi-arid areas in the country is a certainty. A survey of drought-affected families carried out in the country by the Central Bureau of Statistics and the National Environmental Secretariat in early 1985 revealed that about 60 percent of those interviewed in the driest regions had at least a member permanently employed outside the household. In addition, the paper said, 21 and 37 percent of the household members reported, left their homes during 1984 due to the drought. The paper said there has not been an upward trend in maize yields since 1975. "Improvements in maize output per hectare are obviously necessary to achieve national maize self-sufficiency as well as minimise the conflict between maize production and other food economic policy objectives," said the paper. Calling for high priority to be accorded to maize research programme, the paper said research resources are scarce and must be allocated to increase productivity in high-potential agro-climatic zones of Central and Eastern provinces and in similar zones in Western Province. The paper, which was presented by Mr K.W. Gitu, an agricultural economist, said focusing large amounts of research resources on areas such as the marginal cotton zones is likely to provide low marginal returns. [Text] [Nairobi DAILY NATION in English 6 Feb 86 p 5] /12851

GANZE WATER PROJECT LAUNCHED--The government has since independence intensified its efforts to supply clean water to all parts of the country. This was said by the Minister for Water Development, Mr Paul Ngei, when he commissioned a multi-million Ganze water project in Kilifi district. Ngei, who was accompanied by the Minister for Information and Broadcasting Mr Katana Ngala, his permanent secre-

tary Mr J. Kiti and his Assistant Minister Mr Edward Kiptanui, among others, said that there was need for people to apply harambee work whenever called for in order to speed up development in the rural areas. He said the project which was earlier planned to cost 47 million shillings would now cost about shs. 11-million because of the harambee element by the wananchi who come forward to supplement government efforts. Ngei paid tribute to the local residents for digging trenches while water technicians laid the pipes from Silale water point to Ganze chiefs office, a seven kilometer distance. Ngei directed his officers to connect the pipes along the Ganze/Bamba water line within a week to avoid wastage or burst. He disclosed that water would reach Bamba trading centre during the 1986/87 financial year. He requested wananchi to prepare trenches from the main pipeline for connections to their homes. The minister said that eventually the water project would cover the whole division which lacked water during the drought seasons.

[Text] [Nairobi THE KENYA TIMES in English 21 Jan 86 p 3] /12851

DEVELOPMENT AID FROM ITALY--Kenya will receive grants totalling more than shs. 700 million from the government of Italy in support of various development projects in the country this year. The Minister for Finance, Mr George Saitoti, signed a part of the commodity aid protocol on behalf of the government while the Italian ambassador to Kenya, Mr Gian Luigi Valenza, signed on behalf of his country a grant of over shs. 500 million. Already 20 tons of fertiliser valued at shs. 97,200,000 has arrived at Mombasa while 20 tons of rice worth shs. 113,400 and 20 tons of edible oil worth shs. 81 million will arrive at Mombasa in March and April this year. Saitoti thanked the government of Italy for the support they had given to Kenya. He said the donation would assist the Kenya government to achieve the objective of improving the economic welfare of the needy people. He said the fertiliser would be distributed in the rural areas for application to produce food and cash crops. He added that the donation would go along way in increasing productivity mainly of the small-scale farmers. Saitoti said the fertiliser had come at the right time and farmers would use it during the long rains expected very soon. The grant would also reduce the fertiliser deficit which was facing the country this year. He said all these commodities would not only be a relief, but would translate into counterpart funds which would be applied to food production support through the Kenya budget. The Italian ambassador informed the minister that apart from the assistance, the Italian government would donate various goods worth shs. 3,200,000 to non-governmental organisations and provide a grant of shs. 137 million for construction of food storage. Valenza said another shs. 17 million to buy lorries, and shs. 25 million to buy hospitals would be forthcoming. He thanked the Kenya government for maintaining a good relationship between the two countries and hoped that the close ties would continue to grow from strength to strength. [By Richard Keya] [Text] [Nairobi THE KENYA TIMES in English 1 Feb 86 p 9] /12851

CSO: 3400/1165

MOZAMBIQUE

NIASSA PROVINCE LEADER URGES GREATER COOPERATION BETWEEN SECTORS

Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese 7 Jan 86 p 2

[Article by David Filipe: "Mariano Matsinha calls for better coordination for war economy"]

[Text] Maj Gen Mariano Matsinha, leader of the province of Niassa, told the provincial cadres of the party, the government, the ODH [Democratic Mass Organizations] and the FDS [Defense and Security Forces] that better coordination between all sectors will make it possible to create conditions for the implementation of a real war economy.

Speaking at a reception given on the occasion of New Year, he urged that "we must be capable of coordinating a single leadership, along with all planning and sector-oriented execution so as to hit the same target together; this implies the need for the party and the defense security agencies to be informed in advance of the government's plans, in terms of where and when these plans are to be carried out so as to guarantee their effective action."

Mariano Matsinha, who thought that the indexes achieved at the various education levels in 1985 were rather low, said furthermore that the overall figures attained during that same period of time in the field of health are markedly inferior to those achieved in 1984.

In the field of industry, Matsinha said that various smaller projects with a short-term social impact took shape in 1985 in Niassa and that there are already 22 carpentry cooperatives throughout the province, along with 5 tailor shops, 2 shoemaker shops and an undetermined number of blacksmith shops. He felt that these small efforts, which are important because of their great usefulness in the community life of the people, also include the training of members of the population in spinning and weaving of cotton remnants, using tools produced locally, along with training in how to make pottery articles, soap, and canned tomatoes, among other things.

In his speech, the Niassa leader also said that, due to a generally negative economic situation in 1985, the financial situation also showed a deficit; he then pointed out that purchasing power continues to be rather fictitious because there is no correspondence between available goods and the money in circulation.

"This situation," he said, "will continue to impose great sacrifices upon us along with a need for developing the organizational and operational levels of our agencies in depth, the rationalization of available resources on the basis of realistic planning, so that we may increase our output and upgrade the metical."

Mariano Matsinha also admitted in his speech that the relative conditions of tranquillity which we were able to create in Niassa in 1985 were not accompanied by the regular supply of all of the necessary production factors. In his opinion, this situation can be attributed to the current economic problems encountered in the province; in this connection, armed banditry has been the main factor, in addition to the fact that rather deficient working methods are still being used, plus the lack of better coordination in some activity areas.

As a consequence, the government agriculture, cooperative and private sectors are in serious trouble while the family sector, although affected by several of these problems, did manage to increase the cultivation and production areas and achieved levels considered rather positive, especially in the districts of Majene, Sanga, Lucheringo, Muembe, N'gauma and Lichinga.

"If it had not been primarily for the fuel shortage and the rather inadequate motor pool available for transportation, it would have been possible to sell and ship considerable quantities of our output in 1985," the Niassa leader added.

5058/12913  
CSO: 3442/113

MOZAMBIQUE

BRIEFS

NEW EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTE CREATED--The Higher Pedagogic Institute has been established in the city of Maputo and, according to one of the latest issues of BOLETIM DA REPUBLICA, its charter was also approved. The Higher Pedagogic Institute which has thus been created was intended for the training of higher-level education technicians and instructors, as well as refresher and advanced training courses for them. This institute is directly under the Ministry of Education. This institute sprang from the principle that teacher training with solid political-ideological, scientific-technical, psychological-pedagogic, and methodological skills is an essential requirement for improving the quality of education and the output of the school system in the context of the country's economic and social development. For this purpose, the National Education System has taken steps so that the training of education technicians and instructors for secondary and middle schools may include a higher-level course; this is why it became necessary to create a higher education institution expressly oriented toward this goal. [Text] [Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese 7 Jan 86 p 2] 5058/12913

SOVIET COMMITTEE INCREASES SUPPORT--The CSSAA (Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee) has planned a vast effort for this year in support of the peoples of southern Africa, AIM (Mozambican Information Agency) was told in Moscow by CSSAA Secretary, Vladimir A. Tsvetkov. "We are going to send emergency humanitarian aid, including beds and blankets, to the South African and Namibian refugees in Tanzania," he said. In coordination with AAPSO, CSSAA will take part in an anti-"apartheid" conference to be held during the second quarter in the Western countries." We conceived this initiative on the basis of the relations we have with 30 support organizations for southern Africa. We are training cadres for the ANC and SWAPO in our educational institutions. In our hospitals, we treat freedom fighters from Africa and Namibia. CSSAA has guaranteed aid for the Namibian and South African refugees in the Front Line States and we are sending teaching material there," said Tsvetkov. "We have ever closer bonds with AMASP (Mozambican Association for Friendship and Solidarity with Peoples)." Contact with Mozambique is a long-standing affair. "The first delegation to visit the areas liberated by FRELIMO during the armed struggle was made up of members of our committee and we even had the honor of receiving here Eduardo Mondlane, the first president of FRELIMO, in response to our invitation," he added. Tsvetkov said that there are regular contacts between CSSAA and AMASP, along with an exchange of delegations. A CSSAA delegation returned from Maputo several days ago; it had been discussing the matter of cooperation and it "expressed Soviet support for the struggle of the Mozambican people." "Last summer," he said, "we received an appeal from the mass organizations of Mozambique to help the regions that had been stricken by the drought and by banditry. We responded by sending material in a ship." [Text] [Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese 7 Jan 86 p 2] /12913

NAMIBIA

PROMINENT NATIONAL PARTY MEMBER'S SON JOINS SWAPO

Johannesburg THE WEEKLY MAIL in English 10-16 Jan 86 p 1

[Article by Gwen Lister, Windhoek]

[Text] THREE young white Namibians, including the son of a prominent National Party member, have refused conscription into the SA Defence Force, gone into exile and joined Swapo.

Hanno Rumpf, son of prominent NP member and Gobabis farmer Ernst Rumpf, said he had written to the SADF stating his refusal to serve in the army on the grounds of his political convictions.

"I am well aware that my membership of Swapo is an embarrassment ... it is imperative that white Namibians realise that there are more white members of Swapo than they would care to admit," he said.

He added that he had left the country because he refused to do military service "in an army which is the instrument used by the apartheid state to suppress the rightful political, social and economic aspirations of the majority of the Namibian people".

The former Rhodes students said he would be back in Namibia as soon as true independence had been won.

Wilfred Brock and Steve Scholtz,

also born Namibians, left the country in December to avoid the January 6 call-up.

Brock said he was not prepared to serve in the army and to assist in the occupation of Namibia. The SWATF and the SADF could not be separated, he added, because the SWATF was "not a genuine Namibian army".

The departure of the three young men is bound to send shockwaves through Namibia's white community, particularly in the conservative white farming district of Gobabis, home of Hanno Rumpf.

All three men have joined Swapo.

On January 6, 2 000 Namibians started their military training. It is not yet known how many failed to report for their military call-up.

In response to queries, the SWATF reaffirmed this week that political objections to military call-up were not valid grounds for exemption.

/8309  
CSO: 3400/1171

NAMIBIA

**SWAPO GIVES NOTICE of PLANS TO BREAK LAW**

Windhoek THE WINDHOEK ADVERTISER in English 30 Jan 86 p 4

[Text]

**SWAPO has given notice it is going to be active inside Namibia this year "law or no law".**

This was said by the party's deputy national chairman, Mr Daniel Tjongarero, yesterday, addressing a press conference to condemn "the violent behaviour" used by police to break up a Swapo youth rally in Katutura on Sunday.

Two of those hurt on Sunday showed their injuries to newsmen.

Mr Peter Nanjemba had stitches on his forehead and crown and numerous welts criss-crossing his back, while Fransina Kayele also had stitches across her forehead as well as other body injuries.

The "brutality" used to break up yet another meeting was an attempt "to mete out justice before people appear in court," Mr Tjongarero said.

Allegations that some people arrested and assaulted on Sunday are still missing were discounted by SWA Police liaison officer Inspector Kerie du Rand today.

"They are just trying to put the police in a bad light," he said, adding it was possible onlookers had mistakenly been picked up but were released again.

The police were not holding anyone, he said.

Asked if confrontations between the police and Swapo were going continue, Mr Tjongarero said "We are not going to stop holding meetings, law or no law".

Mr Tjongarero said while on the one hand Swapo was invited to reconciliation talks on the other hand "they bar us from speaking to our people".

Swapo member Anton Lubowski said the reason why the case involving the 58 arrested on Sunday, as well as two other cases involving Swapo members had been postponed to May 5, was because of a pending case to test the Prohibition and Notification of Meetings Act against the Bill of Rights.

/9317

CSO: 3400/1110

NAMIBIA

VETERAN SWAPO LEADER REJECTS THREATS BY CABINFT

Windhoek THE NAMIBIAN in English 7 Feb 86 p 1

[Article by Sue Cullinan]

[Text]

**VETERAN SWAPO leader Mr Eliaser Tuhadeleni has strongly denounced remarks made by two interim government ministers following a Swapo demonstration in Katutura last Sunday.**

Noting Mr Tuhadeleni's presence at the gathering, Cabinet Chairman Mr Moses Katjiuongua, was reported to have said that Mr Tuhadeleni and other former Robben Island prisoners had been released as a 'gesture of goodwill', but that this did not give them a licence to become involved in political activities.

Mr Tuhadeleni said his release from prison was not conditional, and neither had he requested it.

He would continue his activities

on behalf of Swapo, he said, whether he was threatened or not.

Mr Tuhadeleni said Swapo was involved in a struggle against South Africa, and it was not the organisation's intention to 'do battle' with Messrs Katjiuongua and Kozonguizi. The two were, as members of Swapo, formerly opposed to South Africa. He said, but now it appeared they had firmly placed themselves in South Africa's camp.

Mr Tuhadeleni said Messrs Kozonguizi and Katjiuongua had to understand that Swapo would carry on with the struggle to free Namibia 'whether they liked it or not', and whether or not he and other Swapo members were jailed or imprisoned in the process.

/8309

CSO: 3400/1171

NAMIBIA

**SWAPO TO HOLD 'EXTENDED CONFERENCE' IN APRIL**

Windhoek THE NAMIBIAN in English 7 Feb 86 p 1

[Text]

**SWAPO WILL hold an 'extended conference' on the last weekend of April this year. This was confirmed by Swapo Joint Foreign Affairs Secretary, Mr Niko Bessinger, in an interview this week (Inside).**

Mr Bessinger said that the National Executive had decided that the various regions would nominate representatives to vacancies in the national leadership.

The venue of the conference would not be confirmed for 'security reasons', and until new leadership had been elected, both Mr Bessinger and Mr Dan Tjongarero, Vice Chairman, would be responsible for Publicity and Information.

Mr Bessinger did not dismiss suggestions that a complete leadership reshuffle may result.

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CSO: 3400/1171

NAMIBIA

KATJIUONGUA CRITICIZED FOLLOWING ATTACK ON PRESS, SWAPO

Report on Chairman's Attack

Windhoek THE NAMIBIAN in English 7 Feb 86 p 4

[Text] **INTERIM Government Health Minister, Mr Moses Katjiuongua, launched a bitter attack on sections of the press and Swapo at a press conference on Tuesday in which he 'seriously warned' instigators of violence and public disorder 'and all other troublemakers'.**

He also said the interim government was working on 'the specifics of a total national strategy' to achieve change and progress in the country.

Much of his press conference was devoted to Swapo President Sam Nujoma and 'some of his followers', and he took Mr Nujoma to task for calling on his supporters to make the country ungovernable.

Referring to last Sunday's meeting in Katutura, Mr Katjiuongua said this was not an isolated incident. The attempted meeting was in celebration of the International Year of Peace, and Mr Katjiuongua said the interim government had information that 'attempts were under way to instigate consumer boycotts, boycotts of schools and strikes'. This had failed, he said, because the broad masses did not respond.

Mr Nujoma and his followers were 'worried', he said, because Namibia enjoyed relative peace and tranquility, parents did not want to see school boycotts, the release of political prisoners had taken the 'wind from their wings', while the interim government 'had the power' and stood a good chance of changing things in the country.

Mr Katjiuongua also dealt at length with last Sunday's meeting, but The Namibian will not report the details because of the sub judice rule.

Mr Katjiuongua then went on to make the allegation that 'a certain newspaper is busy fanning the flames of unrest by overexposing the unrest in South Africa and other parts of the world'.

'The overexposure and deliberate negativism towards the transitional government do not only defeat objectivity, but can also be seen as scene-setting for civil unrest in this country. Those concerned are advised to be careful. Foreigners have the right to live here and to seek employment in our country but they do not have the right to organise or instigate disunity or unrest here'.

Mr Katjiuongua warned that 'we want the instigators of violence and disruption to know that we cannot allow ourselves to be intimidated by you and we warn you not to fight battles that you cannot win'.

'We will leave no stone unturned to ensure that troublemakers do not succeed. Opportunists and full time disrupters should not be allowed to run amok and leaders who instigate violence and disruption will not be allowed to stand on the fringes or to hide in the backrooms while commissioning acts of illegality'.

When the press questioned Mr Katjiuongua, he would not reveal which newspaper he was referring to in the attack.

### Editorial Responds to "Threats"

Windhoek THE NAMIBIAN in English 7 Feb 86 p 10

[Editorial: "A Call for Restraint"]

[Text]

**UNLIKE OUR CRITICS** in the interim government, this newspaper is not afraid to stand up for its beliefs.

Unlike the self-appointed leaders politicians of the Tintenpalast The Namibian has always stood up for its principles. Therefore we reject with contempt, the utterances of Mr Moses Katjiuongua, interim government Chairman, concerning 'tit for tat' and other veiled threats against the people.

For those with conveniently short memories our political principles have always been to call for the implementation of UN Resolution 435 as the only just and internationally recognised basis for Namibian independence - hardly a contentious political stance given even the South African government's own acceptance of the UN plan. We have on several occasions reiterated our commitment to freedom of the press and reporting fairly and accurately on the events in this country and elsewhere. Neither do we believe one can 'wish away' situations of unrest or civil strife by merely ignoring them. This newspaper believes that an informed public is the best defence against authoritarian excesses, and in the interests of democracy.

So where then is the controversy? We have not and will not advocate violence, and have consistently called for a peaceful settlement to the Namibia issue.

But somehow in the eyes of those presently in government that is not enough. It is not enough to tell the truth or be objective.

To expose the reality behind the rhetoric of the interim government. To show how the words of 'reconciliation' end in the recoil of tear-gas launchers and police batons in the streets of Katatura.

Such objectivity is described in the latest speech of interim government chairman Moses Katjuonga as 'deliberate negativism' and anyone doing so had better be 'careful'.

Well let us give our reply to such barely veiled threats and the totalitarian attitudes from which they arise.

We are not intimidated by the threats of someone who is too frightened to publically expose his own intolerance and name his opponents by name.

We are not and will not be frightened into suppressing the truth about what is really happening in this country under this interim government.

We will not cut our journalistic conscience to suit the fashion of anyone and certainly not the self-elected 'representatives' on the current interim government.

If the truth is a hard medicine for the interim government to swallow we suggest they redouble their 'efforts' to bring about the implementation of UN Resolution 435 and test their popularity with the Namibian people in free and fair elections.

### Columnist Scores Chairman

Windhoek THE NAMIBIAN in English 7 Feb 86 p 11

[Article by Gwen Lister: "Political Perspective"]

[Text] **WHAT'S A MAN** with a Swedish passport doing in castigating 'foreigners' in Namibia, while he got succour on foreign soil? Interim government Chairman, Mr Moses Katjiuongua, has adopted a 'barely-to-be-tolerated' attitude towards the 'foreigners' of his choice, and on several occasions has warned them to tow the line, or else!

The question is: who is a 'foreigner?'. According to Mr Katjiuongua's definition, there are those who are 'acceptable' and those who are not.

Mr Katjiuongua is also generous in his seemingly oblique references to 'deportation'. And I quote: 'Those concerned are advised to be careful. Foreigners have the right to live here and to seek employment in our country but they do not have the right to organise or instigate disunity or unrest here'.

#### 'FOREIGNERS' AND 'FOREIGNERS'

**WHILE MR KATJIUONGUA** is willing to have himself pictured in his Party mouthpiece next to the late Mao Tse-Tung, when he postured as a radical in European socialist circles, he has the audacity to threaten those he terms 'foreigners'.

His hypocritical attitude is also manifested in the fact that in a recent court case, he supported the further detention without trial of Namibians, and this despite his professed commitment to a Bill of Rights.

His own sudden change from Maoism to 'born-again conservatism' must stand as an example of what appears to be political opportunism.

Many of those he now refers to as 'foreigners' were once working in the same political direction as he was not so long ago, namely the implementation of Resolution 435. Mr Katjiuongua's attitude towards those same people is indicative of his general intolerance and his attitude of 'tow the line, or else' towards his critics.

#### NOT IN LINE WITH 'RECONCILIATION'

**MR KATJIUONGUA'S PRESENT** aggressive stance is not in line with his present stated policy of 'reconciliation' and neither does it indicate any of his former professed revulsion to such evils as detention without trial.

He is a person who once called this country 'Namibia' and now calls it 'South West Africa/Namibia'. Is this not indicative of a complete political turnaround?

He is a man who puts out what amounts to a kind of decree, warning 'To Whom it may concern' that: 'It has been decided by the Cabinet of the Transitional Government of National Unity that any correspondence or inquiry addressed to the Interim Government will not be responded to. The official title of this Government is THE TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNITY and all correspondence must be so addressed'. (sic)

So unless you address your letters to the above (in capital letters too, we presume), you will not receive a reply.

Only recently, it was called 'Gnu' (Government of National Unity), and now it has become Tgnu. And according to Mr K, you'd better get used to it, or else!

That the Cabinet can attain unanimity on a matter such as this, is doubtless a great step forward.

One wishes they had the same 'unanimity' in their rejection of detention without trial, and the implementation of their socalled Bill of Rights.

#### **THE POWERFUL 'KATJIUONGUA FAN CLUB'**

MR KATJIUONGUA should not be so averse to criticism, and he should expect an interest from the press when he travels abroad at the expense of the State, and achieves little in the process. He should, after all, be accountable to the taxpayers, and everyone pays tax in Namibia.

Mr Katjiuongua has a phalanx of pressmen at his disposal. He is assured of at least 15 minutes on SWABC news, and various other newsmen at his beck and call.

His dire warning to 'foreigners' therefore, is out of keeping with the situation in this country.

Mr Katjiuongua: Let us hear that you have denounced your citizenship of a foreign country, Sweden, and that you are prepared to carry a South African passport like all other Namibians under colonial rule.

/12851  
CSO: 3400/1144

NAMIBIA

SWAPO OFFICIAL INTERVIEWED IN INDEPENDENCE PROSPECTS

Windhoek THE NAMIBIAN in English 7 Feb 86 pp 10, 11

[Interview with Niko Bessinger, Swapo's Secretary for Foreign Affairs by Kevin Tollis: "Swapo: Behind the Issues"]

[Text] **SWAPO IS the main opposition to the current interim government and the only legitimate internationally recognised political party in Namibia. But despite their international prestige Swapo's policies are often obscured in the current political situation. In this in-depth interview Swapo's Secretary for Foreign Affairs NIKO BESSINGER discusses his party's strategy and his analysis of the prospects for Namibian Independence, with KEVIN TOOLIS.**

**SAVIMBI is in Washington at this moment. The likelihood is that he will at least get covert American aid. How will that affect the position vis-a-vis Swapo and PLAN ?**

I think that it will certainly affect the whole situation in southern Africa dramatically. The South Africans have been supporting Unita, they have been supportive of the rebel movement and if the Americans add something in the region of 38 million dollars in aid obviously that is going to affect the war. It will mean that the war will be escalated. That the war will probably take a longer time to be concluded and it will mean of necessity that the Angola government will have to ask help from its friends to resist the rebels.

**But how will the aid to Unita actually affect the situation ?**

At this point in time I can only speculate. We take it that this aid is going to be used in terms of hardware. I cannot say this is going to bring the Angolan government to a fall. I cannot 100 percent say it will procrastinate Namibian independence indefinitely because there are other factors at play in the situation.

**Is there any way that Dr Savimbi could be neutralised and taken out of the Namibian equation ?**

He has been put into the equation to deliberately frustrate the speedy implementation of independence for Namibia through the implementation of Resolution 435. So that artificial factor will remain there until such time as it removed as far as the independence of Namibia is concerned.

**What would happen in Angola if Fapla was successful against Unita ? Clearly at Mavinga they came very close ?**

I am not in a position to give a definitive answer. One can say that maybe the South Africans have committed themselves so far that it would be very difficult for them to withdraw.

**Why does South Africa stay in Namibia ? What is their purpose in being here ?**

Well, the purpose like most historic examples of a colonial power is to exploit the country economically. It has been stated many times that we have natural resources that industrialised countries are interested in. You have uranium, you have diamonds, you have copper and

other base metals. Gold has been discovered, quantities have not been established but it has been discovered. All of these things discourages South Africa from moving out of Namibia.

On the other hand through the exploitation of raw materials or the giving out of licences to foreign countries to exploit Namibia, South Africa is using Namibia to keep close ties and keep friends in Western countries.

**But as experience has shown in the rest of southern Africa, notably Zimbabwe and Botswana, SA companies like De Beers could and probably will come to some kind of accomodation with an independent Namibian government. Why does the South African government feel the need to keep this large military presence which does cost them a large amount of money ?**

It does cost them a large amount of money. The question that you have asked is one of those we want answered. We believe the time is long past when South Africa should have left Namibia. The question is best answered by the South Africans themselves.

**Is there a difference between Swapo's external mission abroad and internal Swapo in terms of its nationalist and socialist policies? In terms of its attitudes to for instance this very question of the future exploitation of Namibia's resources ?**

There is no difference in the organisational structures between 'outside' and 'inside' Swapo. There is one organisation. Because of geographical factors we have leadership outside and inside the country. We have one constitution which we all abide to and we jointly meet from time to time to discuss policy.

**Is that organisation a nationalist or a socialist movement ?**

At the moment I would say it is a liberation movement and in all liberation movements you will get fairly widespread opinions. Those usually crystallise very close to independence itself when you can gauge who are in the majority in the movement itself.

**Isn't that a very narrow, dictatorial definition of 'liberation struggle' and of a liberation strategy? There are reports of divisions within Swapo ranks. Can you comment on those allegations?**

There are no splits in Swapo's ranks at this point in history. We know that in the past similiar allegations were levelled against the organisation and one has found that one, two, three, a handful of individuals have severed ties with the organisation.

Similiarly it happened when the Vice-President Acting Mishake Muyongo got kicked out of the party. We are also talking here about a handful of people in relation to the population numbers of the country. **There are allegations that various atrocities and imprisonments have taken place in Swapo camps in Angola?**

Similiarly, in 1977 and 1978 the organisation was also accused and that was the time that Shipanga was incarcerated in Tanzania. At that time we invited those who made those allegations that there were atrocities committed against Namibians in these camps, to come and point out these camps. This allegation was also levelled at the President himself when he was in West Germany towards the end of last year and he invited the world community to go and visit the camps.

**Did anyone go ?**

No-one as far as I know has picked up the challenge. Outsiders would be free to visit Lubango - often cited as the main camp where prisoners are allegedly held.

**How do you see the immediate internal political future?**

The political situation surrounding Namibian independence cannot be fragmented. You cannot isolate the internal situation.

**Doesn't this lead you to another split in Swapo's ranks, internally, about what to do in the immediate future, whether to go towards community-action based projects or whether to hang everything on UN Resolution 435?**

You will have divisions. Its not necessarily that you have splits but you will have differences of opinion as to what will be the appropriate measures and strategies to be implemented at any one particular time. So I will agree with that but

I do not agree that it is a split.

**But is it not true that there were expulsions recently from Swapo over precisely this issue?**

The expulsions that have taken place were not necessarily expulsions but disciplinary measures that were taken by a regional committee that has the power to deal at that level with actions taken by members.

**What did they do wrong?**

As yet I have not received a report as to why the action was taken but we will get a report eventually.

**Internally, many people, including South African propagandists, regard Swapo as an Ovambo-dominated movement, a movement that will have difficulty in uniting all the ethnic communities in the country.**

**What do you say to that criticism?**

Well, in answering the criticism I would first point out that the majority of Namibians are Ovambo-speaking and if any organisation or government claims majority support in this country it will have to depend on a large majority of the Ovambo-speaking people. What makes Swapo not an Ovambo organisation is the fact that it is practically and probably the only organisation that has support breaking the ethnic barriers. So on that score we reject any claim from South Africa or anyone else that Swapo is an Ovambo organisation. **Certainly there are tensions between different communities in Namibia and these tensions may have been built upon in the current dispensation. How would Swapo go about healing these ethnic/tribal rifts?**

I really do not know if these tribal rifts are solely in the imagination of those that are in power. We certainly do not experience problems within the various ethnic groups in the organisation itself. One should be careful how you react to an artificially created situation. You are being told people cannot get along therefore people should be separated and all along these people have lived next to each other and they have grown up together.

We want to believe that is not true. **Ethnic divisions are a feature of African politics, some people would say they are a plague of African politics. Namibia is not any exception to that.**

We are starting within our own organisation and we have not had any problems. And hopefully the experience that Africa has been through would be the school through which we will have learnt how to deal with these problems.

**What is your attitude to the Multi-Party Conference?**

The MPC is an extension, or an agency of the South African government. I do not want to use cliches to label them but they are in fact puppets of the South African government. They have been imposed upon the Namibian people. They have not been elected popularly. They cannot represent the aspirations of the people of this country. **Can they do any good at all?**

Well that is a question to be asked. If you don't have power to whose benefit do you act?. We see them as people who can only act to the benefit of the South African government.

**But the leading figures within the Interim Government would argue against you saying at least they were doing something. They would say 'What has Swapo done?'**

Anyone who is not working towards achieving genuine independence and autonomy is frustrating the struggle for real independence. They are not working in the interests of liberating the country.

You will find that people who are working in this very capacity are people who were in the forefront or claimed to be in the forefront of the liberation struggle but who have then 'copped-out' to use the American term. Or who have run out of breath because the struggle becomes too long and they are people who want to see achievements within their own lifetime.

Whereas people committed to struggle know that the rewards are not necessarily immediate.

18 years in the history of a nation is a very, very short time we are not at all worried about the fact that the struggle has been going on for 18 years. If one looks a little south you see a bigger nation struggling for the last 74 years for their independence. **But that brings us to another point. Internally the ANC has through demonstrations, through boycotts, significantly challenged the**

**legitimacy of the South African government. Why have those things not happened in Namibia? Why is there no consumer boycott on Kaiser Street?**

There have been two different strategies employed. You must also realise that from the Namibian side of things as far back as 1966 this land was patrolled with side arms. Swapo was the one which started the war against the South Africans, which escalated the war, which has pinned down SA troops. That has seen to it that you have two of the biggest military bases in the Southern hemisphere on Namibian soil.

That did not happen out of thin air. That was caused by the fact that Namibians themselves took up arms, although in such small numbers compared to the South African forces, to challenge the occupation by the South African forces in Namibia. And for the short period of time that they have been engaged in the war that is quite an achievement.

**But there is a long way between harassing the enemy forces and moving towards power?**

Certainly there is this distinction that you have stated there. I was mentioning one dimension of action - that is the military offensive. We have a diplomatic offensive in which we try to inform and persuade the international community as to our situation. We have received recognition for that. We do get support for that, morally, materially and otherwise.

We have a political programme inside the country which obviously the South Africans through legislation are trying to frustrate.

It is obviously a new situation. One that has arisen over the last two years in terms of legislation and we are trying to work on that, trying to find ways and means to overcome the burdens that have been put on us?

**On the ground what does that mean?**

On the ground it means that we have to find a way to mobilise people, to make people aware of the situation they find themselves in and how to take effective political measures. Through legislation that has been taken away from us. We have devised other instruments, but for strategic reasons I will not mention them. Hopefully in the course of this year if people decide that action needs to be taken in a particular form we will do so.

**That all sounds terribly vague. How can Swapo be seen to lead? How can you draw and mobilise your support?**

The support is there and has always been there. The support has been established since 1959. We know that. It is not a new movement starting. We are living under very difficult times inside the country and people understand that. They are being suppressed. They know it.

**But then, for instance, the UDF are not given the red carpet treatment by South African troops. The UDF's strategy appears to be to confront the authorities. They do not seem to go behind vague cliches. They are out there, everyone knows it at least by their actions.**

Regardless of the laws that have been made to curb Swapo we have still come out publicly.

**But in 1985 the most significant challenge to an existing government came in South Africa through mass mobilisation and street demonstrations. Namibia, a satellite of the apartheid regime did not make an impact.**

There were other years that we made an impact when it was necessary. And we do not know what is going to happen in 1986.

**In recent days there has been a call for a congress, particularly on the part of the Swapo Youth League? Can you comment on this.**

Last Saturday the National Executive and Politburo had a meeting which was not as a result of a call by anyone, but on their own initiative.

A number of issues were examined at this meeting, namely, the vacancies which have arisen in leadership and the work of the various departments. We decided to prepare ourselves for an extended national conference towards the end of April, at which, among other things, regions will be asked to nominate and elect office-bearers for these vacancies.

There is also a possibility of a reshuffle coming about and where required, new blood will be introduced into the leadership.

**It has also been said recently that a new initiative is underway, and that the Council of Churches intends to chair a meeting of interested groups and parties on the future of Namibia, and the question of implementation of Resolution 435. Can you comment?**

There are rumours to the effect that an invitation has been extended to Swapo, but to date the invitation has not reached us. If the invitation reaches us we will examine it on its merits.

14 March 1986

## NAMIBIA

## GENERAL MEIRING SAYS FORCES ARE DEFEATING SWAPO

Windhoek THE NAMIBIAN in English 7 Feb 86 p 7

[Unsigned article: "'We Are Winning the Hearts and Minds' -- General Meiring"]

[Text] **OPERATION Askari was a turning point, and since this major incursion by the South African Defence Force into Angola in 1983, Swapo insurgents had said they could not survive in Ovamboland, said Major General George Meiring, Officer Commanding the SWA Territory Force in an interview in the latest edition of SA Indicator.**

In an interview conducted by Dr Simon Baynham, UCT political scientist, and reproduced in the Indicator, Major General Meiring said that at the beginning of 1983, Ovamboland was in the guerrilla phase of revolutionary war and Swapo had the full support of the population. After Operation Askari in the same year, a high-density civic action programme had been launched in the area, and their success was such that even insurgents had admitted they could not survive there.

General Meiring said that 'in Kaokoland there is no way that Swapo can survive .. and that central Ovamboland was the major recruiting area for 101 Battalion.

On the question of the Army's intelligence system, General Meiring said this was good in terms of feedback from the local population. 'In 1983 we had say, 65 cases where a

Swapo cache was discovered or a kill made as a direct result of information obtained from the local population. In 1984, we had almost 300 such cases, so the information flow from the local population has increased dramatically over one year.'

General Meiring felt that although counter insurgency was a protracted war, 'we are finally changing the people's attitude towards us, and this indicates more than anything else that we are winning not only the war, but also winning over their hearts and minds'.

He told Baynham that as far as he was concerned the military did not 'reign supreme' and that the only area where they had a major influence on decision-making was that of security matters in the actual security area.

'We support the local authorities and do not take any action whatsoever that is not cleared with these people, except where it is our responsibility - safeguarding the lives of people' he said.

General Meiring also conceded in the interview that 'Swapo propaganda' was very good. However, he felt that Swapo's internal popularity and support were waning 'and I think its actual strength has dropped from a potential fighting base of over 16000 in 1978 to just over 8 500 at present, despite their continued attempts at recruitment ... so I think we can counteract the propaganda here, but whether we can counteract overseas propaganda, I am not sure'.

Asked about the contribution of black soldiers to the overall result of the forces, General Meiring answered that of the fighting soldiers in the operational area, 61 percent were Namibians and of that proportion, almost 70 percent were black. 101 Battalion in Ovamboland had a strength of over 2000 men, and 'the black troops are seasoned fighters and have been responsible for some of the major kills'.

Asked about PFP MP, Helen Suzman's contention that Namibia would be better off without Koevoet, General Meiring said he would contradict the statement completely.

'Koevoet is a very good fighting unit. We found that a lot of atrocities ascribed to Koevoet were actually committed by the special constables, the guards of the local headmen. They are not under our control'.

'Koevoet is not scotfree at all. If you do a followup after some of your men have just been killed by a Swapo mine ... you see tracks leaving the local kraal, you ask the inhabitants where the Swapo people are, they say they don't know. Tempers begin to run high and it is natural that a few hard hits would be handed out round the corner. But as far as killing Swapo is concerned, Koevoet is a very effective machine. And they get information from the people ...'

Baynham put it to General Meiring whether it was good public relations for members of Koevoet to wear T-shirts with the message: 'Our business is killing, business is good', and General Meiring said that this had been changed, and the men no longer wore the T-shirts.

On Swapo's military strategy, General Meiring said that they had

'successes now and then' but they were 'stereotyped' and 'predictable' in their actions.

'I don't have a very high opinion of their fighting ability but I think they are better than Zapu (Zimbabwe African People's Union) and FAPLA (the military forces of the ruling MPLA in Angola)'.

Asked if cross-border, hot-pursuit operations were still the order of the day, General Meiring replied: 'It is like pushing a lorry up a very high dune. If you let it go, it will run all the way back, slowly at first and then faster and faster. You cannot really reduce people, reduce your effort, until you are completely on top. I think a reduction in the near future of the force would be disastrous.'

Asked whether the South African military and political authorities would overcome their longstanding opposition to a Swapo dominated Namibia, General Meiring said 'we do not want a Swapo dominated Namibia. Swapo stands for a Marxist, one-party state opposed to South Africa and would provide an ANC springboard into the Republic. We are working for the establishment of a country which will be favourably inclined towards South Africa ...'

Asked if the present arrangement for self-rule in Namibia made any sense, General Meiring replied in the affirmative, saying that the people now had a say in their own affairs. 'This does not negate the Un resolution and it is just an interim step ... now they are co-responsible with South Africa for their own well-being, I feel that the people of South West Africa have more interest in their own future than they had before'.

/12851  
CSO: 3400/1145

## NAMIBIA

### SWAPO MEMORANDUM SAYS EEC CAN HELP NAMIBIAN PEOPLE

Windhoek THE NAMIBIAN in English 7 Feb 86 p 7

[Text] SWAPO HAS SAID EEC-member countries can shorten the suffering of Namibian people. According to a memorandum by Swapo (of Namibia) to the meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the Frontline States and EEC in Lusaka, EEC member countries have a great role to play and shorten the suffering of Namibian people by denying the South African regime the support it requires.

The memorandum also requested the EEC members and West Germany in particular, to desist from giving recognition and credence to the illegal occupying regime and its puppets by entering into so-called pre-independence development aid agreements to Namibia.

It says any support intended for Namibia and other similar assistance, should be rendered through the United Nations Nationhood Programme for Namibia.

The paper said that while Swapo appreciated the withdrawal of military attaches by the Western countries, Swapo wanted them to apply mandatory economic sanc-

tions against South Africa and thereby bring about a peaceful solution to the problem, and implement UN Resolution 435 — because they have been made to understand that all outstanding issues have been resolved and South Africa had accepted the principle of proportional representation.

The memorandum also rejected the linkage of the Namibian question with the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola, adding that Angola was a sovereign state over which the Namibian people had no control and the issue was outside the terms of UN Resolution 435.

The United States of America was also condemned for repealing the Clark Amendment, which had stopped covert aid to Unita. It says 'Unita bandits, presently in Washington, were accorded the red carpet treatment and were promised aid totalling millions of US Dollars to directly fund Unita operations against the legitimate Angolan government.'

According to the memorandum, Angola can not withdraw Cuban troops from its country when there is such an imminent threat against its sovereignty.

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CSO: 3400/1145

NAMIBIA

SWAPO CALLS ON CUBA TO REDUCE TENSION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

Lusaka TIMES OF ZAMBIA in English 8 Feb 86 p 1

[Article by Dennis Kapata: "Help, SWAPO Tells Cuba"]

[Text]

HAVANA, Friday.

SWAPO has called on Cuba to play her "internationalist duty" to reduce tension in Southern Africa where the situation has become explosive because of imperialist intervention.

The call was made by SWAPO's secretary-general Tolvo ya Tolvo in his address to the third congress of the Communist Party of Cuba.

Mr Tolvo ya Tolvo told the congress that the recent coup in which prime minister Chief Leabua Jonathan was toppled demonstrated Washington-Pretoria's hegemonic ambition in the region.

He said racism South Africa was bent on destabilising independent African countries in the region. "The Washington-Pretoria axis, using counter-revolutionary groups and other criminal gangs, has created an explosive situation in our region which has become a threat to peace and stability in the

entire sub-continent," he said.

Mr Tolvo ya Tolvo stressed that Washington's determination to offer support to UNITA was an act of blatant aggression amounting to a declaration of war against Angola.

"It is our sincere hope that Cuba under the tested and wise leadership of President Fidel Castro will continue to resist imperialist pressure and will continue to play its internationalist duty," Mr Tolvo ya Tolvo told the congress which is being attended by about 196 delegations, including one from Zambia.

Mr Tolvo ya Tolvo condemned America's linkage of the presence of Cuban troops in Angola to the independence of Namibia. The people of Namibia could have long been free had it not been for the direct intervention of the Reagan administration in support of Pretoria.

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CSO: 3400/1146

NAMIBIA

CHARGE SHEET AGAINST SWAPO MEMBERS FOUND VALID

Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in Englsh 14 Feb 86 p 12

[Text]

WINDHOEK. — The Windhoek Supreme Court yesterday dismissed an application by seven Swapo members seeking to invalidate a charge sheet against them because it was in conflict with a Bill of Fundamental Rights embodied in the South African State President's Proclamation R101, which instituted the South West Africa transitional government last June.

The men are to be charged in terms of sections of the Terrorism Act and the Suppression of Communism Act.

The accused are Mr Frans Angula (28), Mr Norbert Ankome (25), Mr Elkan Simon (21), Mr Bernardinus Shikongo (47), Mr Desiderius Ankome (26), Mr Erastus Uutoni (28) and Mr Vilho Kashilulu (22).

According to the charge sheet, which runs to 14 pages, the State alleges they were connected with or had knowledge of a series of acts of sabotage in SWA/Namibia, including a bomb blast at Okatana service station in the north of the territory in April 1984.

Two United States diplomats, Mr Dennis Keogh and Lieutenant-Colonel Kenneth Crabtree, died in the explosion.

Defence counsel, Mr Ian Farlam, SC, submitted in argument earlier that Proclamation R101 superceded all security laws in SWA/Namibia which were not consonant with the Bill of Rights, which provided for freedom of speech and freedom of association, among other things.

In his ruling yesterday, Mr Justice Johan Strydom, said Proclamation R101 should not be regarded as a sovereign constitution for SWA/Namibia.

It should be read together with the South West Africa Constitution Act and other laws from which it became clear that the South African State President and the South African Parliament retained certain legislative powers over the territory.

The powers of the SWA/Namibian National Assembly remained subject to the legislative powers of the two South African legislatures.

In consequence, laws such as the Terrorism Act and the Supression of Communism Act remained in force until they were repealed by a "Competent authority". — Sapa.

/9317  
CSO: 3400/1110

NAMIBIA

BLACK POLITICAL PARTY CRITICIZES WHITE ADMINISTRATION

Johannesburg THE STAR in English 21 Jan 86 p 3

[Text]

WINDHOEK — One of Namibia's predominantly black political parties has attacked what it calls blatant corruption in the second-tier white administration.

Mr Emil Appollus, a senior member of the Swapo Democrats party, made the claim in reaction to a local newspaper report which alleged the government was losing millions of rands in subsistence payments to members of the National Assembly who had falsified their home addresses.

Mr Appollus defended his party against such allegations, and claimed that the paper which printed the report should be aware of the "blatant corruption" in the administration for whites, where millions of rands were spent on subsidising farms of farmers who had long since abandoned them.

Mr Appollus also alleged there was theft on a "giant" scale by the officials of the second-tier authority.

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CSO: 3400/1146

NAMIBIA

COURT TO HEAR NEW CHALLENGE TO SECURITY PROCLAMATION

Windhoek THE WINDHOEK ADVERTISER in English 28 Jan 86 pp 1, 3

[Text]

**AN IMPORTANT test case in which it is alleged that detention without trial conflicts with the Transitional Government's Bill of Rights was due to open in the Windhoek Supreme Court this morning.**

Mr John Akweenda of Onipa, Owambo, has applied for the court to order the Cabinet and the head of the Security Police, Brigadier Thomas Thomasse, to give reasons why four AG 9 detainees should not be released and why they cannot be given access to lawyers.

The Cabinet is opposing the application, and in papers before the court Brig Thomasse alleges that one of the detainees was a member of a cell "actively involved in deeds of terrorism" including an explosion at the Ondangwa Post Office and an incident in which 350kg of explosives were traced in Windhoek, Owambo and other places.

Brigadier Thomasse submits in an affidavit that the detainees' continued detention is necessary for the maintenance of law and order, to prevent them from harming themselves or disappearing or interfering with other witnesses.

He alleges that two of the detainees were involved in some of the acts of terrorism and had given evidence against members of the cell.

Mr Akweenda submits in an affidavit that the detainees' indefinite detention without trial since late August or early September last year is in conflict with Article 2 of the Bill of Fundamental Rights and Objectives.

Those detained were Mr Akweenda's brother, Thomas, 34, of Tsumeb, his brother Martin, 22, his cousin, Mr Absalom Linus, 26, of Oshitayi, Owambo and his brother-in-law, Mr Andreas Immanuel.

Mr Akweenda argues in the alternative that the Cabinet failed to comply with the rules of natural

justice by not allowing the detainees to make representations when their detention orders were renewed.

He submitted that the detainees have a fundamental right to consult legal representatives, and that this is not excluded by the provisions of Security Proclamation AG 9.

In his affidavit, attorney Mr David Smuts, said Brigadier Thomasse had told him he understood the provisions of AG 9 to mean it would not be possible for the detainees to consult lawyers.

Mr Smuts submitted that it was the fundamental right of every citizen who was detained to have access to legal representatives unless the law specifically excluded such rights.

In an affidavit, the Chairman of the Cabinet, Mr Moses Katjiuongua,

said while three of the men were still being detained, Mr Immanuel had been released because investigation had shown that further detention was not necessary.

Mr Katjiuongua said he had been told the police investigation was nearly complete and the matter would be placed before the Attorney General in the first week or next month.

He would decide whether to charge the detainees or use them as state witnesses or otherwise deal with them.

Mr Katjiuongua said he admitted the detainees had not been given a hearing when their further detention was considered but had been advised that this was not necessary.

He said the Cabinet was

satisfied that in terms of Proclamation AG 9 it was necessary for the maintenance of law and order that they be detained further.

Brig Thomasse said Mr Martin Akweenda had made a sworn statement from which it was clear that he was a member of a cell which was actively involved in acts of terror and sabotage.

Among these incidents were:

The use of explosives to damage the railway line at Brakwater, the Katutura bottle store, Nasboukor's Katutura buildings, the Toni Banana Shop in Owambo, the Oluno power transformer, the Ondjondo Wholesale Shop in Owambo, the top Ten Disco Shop, Owambo, and the tracing of 350kg of explosives at Windhoek, in Owambo and other places.

He said Mr Thomas Akweenda and Mr Absalom Linus had given evidence in their sworn statements against members of the cell who were involved in these incidents and confirmed they had helped in terror acts.

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CSO: 3400/1110

14 March 1986

## NAMIBIA

## MINEWORKERS UNION TO CHALLENGE NAMIBIAN LEGISLATION

Johannesburg SOWETAN in English 29 Jan 86 p 6

[Article by Joshua Raboroko's column "Workers' Diary"]

**[Text]** **The National Union of Mineworkers is to challenge a bill passed by the Namibian National Assembly which effectively forbids non-Namibians from organising local workers into trade unions.**

The NUM began organising employees of Consolidated Diamond Mines (CDM), a De Beers subsidiary, and talks have already taken place between the union and the company.

A CDM spokesman

said their talks would continue. However, the company has decided to discontinue preliminary discussions over an access agreement.

The company was committed to the freedom of association and the right of employees to organise themselves into the union of their choice, but this must be done in terms of Namibian law. The company could not operate outside it, he said.

/12851

CSO: 3400/1146

NAMIBIA

EDUCATION CRISIS HUSHED UP IN ALLEGED POWER PLAY

Windhoek WINDHOEK ADVERTISER in English 21 Jan 86 p 1

[Article by Heidi Von Egidy]

[Text]

**AMID CONTINUING reports of severe over-crowding in black schools, the Department of National Education has already accommodated some 400 pupils turned away from second tier schools countrywide in the past two weeks.**

The children, mainly high school pupils, have been placed in Windhoek and three new National Education schools in Ojiwarongo, Isumeb and Grootfontien, the Minister of National Education, Mr Andrew Matjila, told The Advertiser.

Mr Matjila said the department's system of double shifts in primary schools had meant that all applications could be accommodated.

No other department, as far as could be ascertained, implements similar measures in primary schools.

While confusion still reigns over the exact proportions of the over-crowding crisis, and a true picture is only likely to emerge next week when final statistics become available, most second tier authorities remain reluctant to comment.

It is however believed the crisis is being hushed up in a politically motivated attempt by second tier

authorities to save face in the light of the proposed centralisation of Namibia's education system.

Details of how centralisation can be achieved without a solution to the question of AG 8 are unknown, but cabinet ministers last week hinted at a solution before June.

Referring to the question of centralisation, Mr Matjila said today the solution was "not as difficult as it seems."

In a random survey of schools countrywide yesterday, The Advertiser found most primary schools able to cope with a general increase in the number of pupils.

Reports from headmasters and parents however show a bottleneck at high schools.

As far as can be established the cause is threefold.

Countrywide the number of primary schools exceed high schools, especially in rural areas, which is

causing the large influx to urban high schools.

The problem is further aggravated by a lack of hostel facilities, forcing parents to send children further afield despite day-school vacancies in smaller towns closer to the traditional areas.

Another contributing factor to the bottleneck is the decline in the drop-out rate at primary schools due to the somewhat improved quality of education over the past ten years.

Dr Daan Gresse, director of education research for the Department of National Education admitted the problem, saying research had already forecast the current situation, which could be expected to continue until a balance of facilities between primary and high schools was reached.

The particular crisis this year however, say educationalists, is the result of a cumulative effect of the growth in demand for schooling, pegged at around 5% a year.

At present there are 317 220 schoolchildren in the country.

Apart from facing a huge backlog, the experts say, the provision of teachers and facilities is nowhere near keeping pace with the growth in demand.

The Administration for Coloureds last week also blamed the current crisis on the number of pupils who are not returning to unrest-torn South African schools.

Most headmasters have said they are able to cope with the crisis, but warned they would not be able to cope with a similar increase next year.

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CSO: 3400/1145

NAMIBIA

## EDUCATION DEPARTMENT REJECTS NATIONAL PARTY CLAIMS

Windhoek THE WINDHOEK ADVERTISER in English 30 Jan 86 pp 1, 4

[Article by Heidi Von Egidy]

[Text]

**THE DEPARTMENT of National Education has labelled as 'grossly inaccurate' an article in the National Party mouthpiece, *Die Suidwester*, which last week claimed that Namibia's ethnic education system had resulted in an overall increase in the pass rate.**

In an article headlined 'Own education brings success', the newspaper quoted figures showing a decline in the matric pass rate of schools falling under the Department of National Education, while those of second tier authorities had increased.

Mr Ferdie Theron, Secretary for National Education, said in a statement the figures were an "unbelievable attempt to grossly distort the true picture of Namibia's educational system".

He said the evidence cited only represented the position of three authorities and did not show all external examination results which have shown a steady decline in the pass rate since 1982.

Ignoring the number of matrics who passed at Concordia College, the article round the pass rate of other

National Education schools to be 37.6% last year, a decline on last year's percentage.

In contrast there had been a 30% increase in the Damara authority's pass rate, and a 17% increase at Nama schools.

The article concluded that the figures proved ethnic education was more effective and that ethnicity was 'not the monster it was made out to be', citing them as proof that ethnic groups 'knew best' how to educate their own children.

It is, however, believed that the failure rate of Std 9 pupils is extremely high and that there has been a decrease in the number of pupils writing matric.

Mr Theron pointed out Damara schools were open to other ethnic groups and, by its own admission to *Die*

*Suidwester*, had only achieved the increase with the assistance of the White Administration, which provides subject advisors to the Damara authority.

"What happens to your principle of education for children by their own people now?" Mr Theron challenged.

While the Department of National Education has a high per capita expenditure per pupil, since the beginning of 1985, it has made its 70 subject advisers available to the Owambo, Kavango, Caprivi and Tswana administrations on an agency basis.

It also provides library services, school psycholo-

gy, teacher training services and educational research on the same basis.

All second tier authorities receive an education subsidy from the central government, but the whites are able to heavily supplement their subsidy from their own funds.

The other authorities, faced with a wide range of spending priorities, cannot find sufficient extra funds for the drastic improvements needed to upgrade their education services.

Centralised education would mean an general increase in per capita expenditure on education, Mr Theron said.

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CSO: 3400/1110

NAMIBIA

SUPREME COURT TOLD OF LAW CONFLICTING WITH BILL OF RIGHTS

Windhoek THE NAMIBIAN in English 7 Feb 86 p 5

[Text] SECTIONS OF THE ACT on Terrorism and the Suppression of Communism Act, were in conflict with the Bill of Fundamental Rights contained in the South African State President's Proclamation R101, the Windhoek Supreme Court heard this week.

Defence Counsel, Mr Ian Farlam, was submitting argument for the setting aside of charges against seven Namibians, charged with alleged sabotage and other contraventions under the Terrorism Act and the Suppression of Communism Act.

The accused are Vilho Kashilulu, 22, a student, Erastus Uutoni, 28, an insurance broker, Desiderius Ankome, 26, Bernardinus Petrus Shikongo, 47, both teachers, Elkan Shoombé Simon, 21, Norbert Ankome, 25, and Frans Angula, 28, the latter three all labourers.

No charges were put to the accused when proceedings began amid considerable public interest and tight security at the Windhoek Supreme Court.

Addressing the Court, Mr Farlam argued that Proclamation R101 was no ordinary law and contained 'important' constitutional provisions for Namibia. 'It represents a fundamental change in the constitutional law of the territory,' he said.

The Bill of Fundamental Rights annexured to Proclamation R101, he said, provided among other things for freedom of expression and freedom of association.

'Laws which seek to outlaw one or other political party, or one or other political doctrine are in conflict with the Bill of Fundamental Rights,' Mr Farlam said.

Proclamation R101, he explained, stated that fundamental rights should be 'respected and upheld by our successive governments and protected by entrenchment in the constitution,' he said.

He pointed out that the Court should give prime consideration to the recognition and protection of rights cited in Proclamation R101.

The fundamental rights of Proclamation R101 was retroactive and superceded all security legislation in Namibia which was not tenable with the Proclamation, Mr Farlam said.

Accordingly, he continued, the Terrorism Act and the Suppression of Communism Act 'are now subject to the Bill of Fundamental Rights.' Mr Farlam then asked the Court to uphold the Defence's objection to the indictment and to set aside the charges.

Counsel for the prosecution, Mr Hendrik Liebenberg, said in argument that the question before Court was whether the Bill of Fundamental Rights had the status of law.

He submitted that the Bill was a schedule to Proclamation R101 and had not been incorporated into the legislation.

'It cannot be regarded as a constitution that stipulates a charter of fundamental rights,' Mr Liebenberg argued.

He pointed out that the Bill merely laid down a guideline for the Namibian legislature which was empowered to repeal laws which were in conflict with the annexure.

It could not have been the intention of the legislator to suspend existing laws by way of an annexure to a proclamation, Mr Liebenberg said.

'It was 'unthinkable' that South

Africa and Namibia would dispense with security legislation by way of 'vague and indirect' provisions in a particular law, he said.

In reply, Mr Farlam said that it was clear that the South African State President had given his approval to the Bill of Fundamental Rights, and for that reason he incorporated the Bill in Proclamation R101.

He said there was a new dispensation in Namibia in which Proclamation R101 was paramount.

Existing laws which were inconsistent with the Proclamation simply became inoperative, he said, adding that the legislation should not be seen as a measure to confer certain powers on the territory's legislature to repeal certain laws which it may never get round to doing.

Mr Farlam said if the Defence's objection to the indictment were upheld, the resultant situation would not provide the accused with an escape from prosecution.

If there was any substance in the State's allegations concerning sabotage, the accused could be charged in terms of several other laws, he added.

Mr Justice Johan Strydom presiding, reserved judgement on the

application and adjourned the Court until February 13.

He said he would inform the relevant legal teams beforehand if he was unable to form a judgement when the trial was scheduled to resume later this month.

According to the charge sheet, the State alleges that the accused were linked (or had knowledge), of a series of acts of sabotage, including a bomb blast at the Okatana Service Station in northern Namibia during April 1984, when two US diplomats, Mr Dennis Keogh and Lieutenant-Colonel Kenneth Crabtree, died in the explosion.

The State further alleges that the seven men had promoted the aims of Communism and the doctrine of Marxist-Leninism, and that all the offences were in contravention of the Terrorism Act and the Suppression of Communism Act.

Also attending the trial was an official US observer, Mr Gerard Jackson, who is attached to the Political Section of the US Embassy in South Africa, as well as Bishop Bonifatius Hausiku of the Windhoek Vicariate, Mr Eliazer Tuhadeleni — an ex-Robben Island prisoner — and Swapo members and supporters.

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CSO: 3400/1145

NAMIBIA

NEW DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATIONS ON INDEPENDENCE SEEN POSSIBLE

Windhoek THE NAMIBIAN in English 7 Feb 86 p 4

[Article by Sue Cullinan: "New Initiative Underway on Namibia's Future?"]

[Text] **THERE IS growing speculation that the groundwork is being laid for renewed diplomatic negotiations on Namibia's independence.**

In the weeks since Dr Chester Crocker's latest visit to Southern Africa, there have been various reports concerning the substance of his talks with Angola on the one hand, and South Africa on the other, and even more diverse reports of what was achieved in these discussions.

The overall impression however, was that no breakthrough was achieved on the Angolan issue, least of all on the question of Namibia's independence, which is now vicariously linked to the Angolan situation.

The brief reference to Namibia in the South African President's much-heralded 'Rubicon II' speech in Cape Town last Friday seemed only served to confirm that the situation was still one of stalemate.

Mr Botha said, as he has said before, that a Cuban withdrawal from Angola remained a prerequisite for the implementation of UN Resolution 435 on SWA/Namibia.

'Only then will the Republic of South Africa reduce its troops (in SWA/Namibia in terms of the agreed arrangements)', Mr Botha was reported as saying.

Namibians sighed: independence was as far away as ever, irretrievably linked to a situation beyond the terms of the only agreed settlement plan for the territory, with little indication that there would be movement on the

Cuban issue, least of all on 435.

However, it now seems that there may be more to Mr Botha's seemingly insignificant reference to Namibia than would appear at face value.

Attention has been drawn by at least one local newspaper to the fact that the verbatim wording of Mr Botha's statement was as follows:

'The Republic of South Africa remains prepared to implement Resolution 435, provided agreement can be reached on the withdrawal of Cubans from Angola'.

Critical observers agree there may be a significant distinction between a 'withdrawal of Cuban troops' and 'agreement on withdrawal' as a precondition for Namibian independence.

It is highly possible, they say, that negotiations concerning Namibian independence could be resumed once a basic agreement has been reached on a timetable for a Cuban withdrawal.

The big question is whether any such agreement between South Africa and Angola, mediated by the US, is likely or even possible in the near future.

Proposals for a phased Cuban withdrawal were first submitted to the UN Secretary General by Angola in October 1984.

Since then, US envoy Chester Crocker has shuttled back and forth with South African counter-proposals, Angola's response, South Africa's reaction to Angola's response, in what seemed to be a never-ending exercise designed to

show that 'Constructive Engagement' was alive and well.

Then came the issue of US support for the South African-backed Angolan rebel group Unita. Political observers saw this as another 'linkage' factor in the quagmire of negotiations, and ruled out any possibility of progress on the Namibian issue for at least two years.

Why then the apparent signals from certain quarters that a new round of negotiations may be on the cards?

Could it be simply that South Africa no longer wants to be seen to

be holding up the process supposedly leading to Namibian independence, and is prepared to make some broad statement on proposals which are in any case unlikely to be implemented for some time?

Or is an announcement of a new round of trilateral talks, involving South Africa, Angola and the US, imminent?

The next few weeks should tell whether such developments are on the agenda; in the meantime Namibians remain as sceptical as ever that independence is anywhere near in sight.

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CSO: 3400/114

NAMIBIA

CONSTITUTIONAL COUNCIL SAID TO COST 2 MILLION RAND

Windhoek THE NAMIBIAN in English 7 Feb 86 p 1

[Article by Kevin Toolis]

[Excerpt] **DESPITE HAVING HELD only one formal meeting to discuss rules and procedures, the socalled Constitutional Council has cost the country almost a staggering million Rand, including the rent of a luxury suite at a Windhoek hotel at a cost of over R2 000 per month.**

The total bill for the 'Constitutional Council' in terms of salaries for the sixteen-member body, and rent and support staff, has now reached the staggering total of almost a million Rand. This week it was confirmed that a whole floor of a luxury Windhoek hotel has been hired by the interim government. Judge Victor Hiemstra, Chairman of the Constitutional Council, occupies one of these suites.

Apart from the Chairman's R76 000 salary per annum most of the sixteen members of the Constitutional Council have been paid R3 000 per month since October 1 - despite the fact that they have only met once in the last four months, and then only to discuss 'rules and procedures'.

The monthly wage bill for the Council's members now runs at R54 000 and that excludes the cost of secretaries and other support staff and the salary of an outside 'constitutional expert' - whose appointment has been confirmed by Judge Hiemstra himself.

Understandably the interim government are highly reluctant to reveal the cost to the taxpayer. Secretary to the Cabinet, Mr Tas Boonzaaier, refused to verbally answer queries by The Namibian about the salaries of 'Constitutional Council' members saying the members would be 'quite embarrassed' if their salary levels were made [remainder not included in original]

8309  
CSO: 3400/1171

NAMIBIA

TALKS START ON NEW DEAL FOR USE OF FISH RESOURCES

Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English 13 Feb 86 p 16

[Text]

WINDHOEK. — Negotiations have begun on a new deal for the utilisation of South West Africa's pelagic fish resources after South Africa threatened to withdraw from the International Conference on South East Atlantic Fisheries (ICSEAF) at its last meeting.

According to a news report published in Windhoek yesterday, the South African delegation to the meeting in Madrid late last year, which included SWA representatives, protested against the continued failure by other member countries to pay royalties into ICSEAF's Trust Fund for the territory.

In terms of ICSEAF regulations, member countries had to pay royalties for fishing within

the SWA 370 km exclusive economic zone.

A document on the meeting submitted to the SWA transitional government last week stated South Africa was the only country that paid its share into the fund.

Both South Africa and the United Nations Council for Namibia lay claim to the fund which has been frozen by ICSEAF until a settlement is reached in the SWA dispute.

The SWA transitional Minister of Sea Fisheries, Mr Eben van Zijl, on Monday announced the appointment of a panel of consultants to submit recommendations in April on the conservation and development of the territory's pelagic fish.  
Sapa

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CSO: 3400/1110

NIGER

#### ROLE OF LOCAL LOAN FUND EXPLAINED

Niamey LE SAHEL in French 26 Nov 85 p 2

[Article by Boubakar Soumare: "Territorial Communities Loan Fund: the Communities' Bank"]

[Text] After 23 years of existence, the Territorial Communities Loan Fund (CPCT) is still not well known. To remedy this situation, the CPCT has decided to approach its clients, the arrondissements and communes.

In 1962 the state decided on the creation of a Local Communities Loan Fund (CPCL), having as its field all financial operations of interest to the arrondissements and communes.

Eight years later, the local communities became territorial communities, and the CPCL changed name. It became the Territorial Communities Loan Fund.

The organization thus created is public and enjoys financial autonomy. The CPCT took over the assets and liabilities of the defunct CPCL as well as its mission. Thus it is charged with assuring the arrondissements and communes [the resources necessary] for the implementation of their investment programs, in the form of short-, medium- or long-term credits, or in the form of loan guarantees.

The CPCT can also grant short-term treasury loans, intended to offset delays in tax receipts at the beginning of the fiscal year.

Finally, the fund manages the territorial communities' deposits. For example, NIGELEC sends it the electricity fees. In cases of extension of the network, the financing goes through these funds. The fund also receives the proceeds of land sales, constituting an investment fund for the communities.

The CPCT is thus a real bank for the territorial communities, taking a hand not only in investment for the creation of economic, social and administrative infrastructures, but also for the development of production.

"Unhappily," laments Mr Moumouni Sina, CPCT director, "the fund's role is not well known, not only to the broad public, but also to our own clients, the communities." This is doubtless due to the fact that, until April 1984, the director of Niger Credit was also director of the CPCT.

It is now being managed autonomously. A management council of 10 members meets twice a year to decide upon overall policy and to grant loans.

With 500 million F/CFA in capital, divided between the central government (10 percent) and the territorial communities (90 percent), the CPCT enjoys a good financial position. Great borrowing possibilities thus exist which are unknown to the communities, which often do not even know that they have funds on deposit with the CPCT.

To remedy this situation and to permit the fund to play its role as the territorial communities' bank fully, the CPCT has decided to go out to its clients.

Today a seminar is beginning for leadership cadres and their staffs, members of development councils and departmental bureau chiefs. This will be an opportunity for the CPCT to become better known, with the support of the ministries of the interior, of planning and public works, and of housing, as well as that of the Development Bank of the Republic of Niger and the National Agricultural Credit Fund.

This is at the same time a training seminar, a contribution to the improvement of the territorial communities' budget management.

"In setting up this seminar, which will be followed by other meetings of the same kind in all the departments, the CPCT is inspired by the desire to make a place for itself in response to the new guidelines of the Development Corporation," indicates Moumouni Sina, who explains that the fund will be taking up a definite orientation in the wake of the recently adopted decentralization decisions. To attain all these objectives, it is indispensable to create dynamic relationships with the territorial communities. To this end, a restructuring project financed by the World Bank is presently under study.

13070/12859  
CSO: 3419/136

NIGER

BRIEFS

WELLS FOR NORD GOURE--The regular session of the Zinder Regional Development Council (RDC) at Tanout ended yesterday morning, having been attended by its president, the departmental prefect Lieutenant Colonel Moumouni Djermakoye Adamou. The council members made decisions aimed at preserving food-supply balance. To that end, they looked into the regional off-season-crop program, and the pastoral situation. Other equally important matters were reviewed with a view to finding adequate solutions for them. Thus the council members, in their recommendations, asked for the implementation of an emergency pastoral-wells program for Nord Goure by the East-Central Nigeria Project. They also examined the situation of the Magaria and Mirriah arrondissements and of the Commune of Zinder. As a result of the appointment of new heads for these units of government, the RDC had to take stock of the socio-economic and financial situation of these entities. In light of the financial situation prevailing in the Zinder commune, the RDC approved corrective measures taken by the Zinder Sub-Regional Development Council. The council members also decided on the intensification of off-season cropping, with a view to achieving food-supply balance and reversing the rural exodus. [Text] [Niamey LE SAHEL in French 21 Nov 85 p 1] 13070/12859

CSO: 3419/136

NIGERIA

BRIEFS

CATHOLIC BISHOPS CONFERENCE--Lagos, Feb 22 (AFP)--The Catholic Bishops Conference of Nigeria has called on the 5-month-old military government to withdraw from the organization of the Islamic Conference (ICO), according to reports today. Ending a 5-day meeting near Lagos, the bishops said in an official statement that Nigeria's membership in the Islamic body was "an injustice to the other religions." Nigeria joined the ICO in early February, causing a storm of protest from Nigerian Christians who charged that the membership violated the principle of a secular state enshrined in the constitution. The bishops said the ICO Charter implies that the head of state of all member countries shall be Muslim, which they said would "make political leadership the exclusive preserve of all particular religious groups," the report said. Nigeria has had no reliable census since 1963, and estimates of religious distribution are fuzzy. Most observers say Muslims make up about half the country's 100 million population, and Christians a third to a quarter. [Text] [Paris AFP in English 1459 GMT 22 Feb 86 AB] /8918

BRITISH AID--Britain has pledged a 14 million pound sterling assistance to Ghana this year. The assistance will be in the sectors of industry, health, and education. This was made known by the leader of a 3-man British delegation, (Aresh White), when the delegation called on the Ashanti regional secretary W.H. Yeboah. Mr (White) said his team is in the country to discuss disbursement of the aid with government officials. He said forest conservation is one area of importance to his delegation. He said there are at present three experts in the country to study the forest inventory project. Mr (White) also said there the possibility of Britain helping Ghana to produce drugs. [Text] [Accra Domestic Service in English 0700 GMT 25 Feb 86 AB] /8918

BAR ASSOCIATION TO MONITOR COUP TRIALS--The Nigerian Bar Association (NBA) has appointed five of its members to attend the trial of the suspected coup plotters "in order to know whether or not any fundamental right due to the suspects has been breached." The statement from the NBA in Enugu on Monday by its National President, Mr Ebele Nwonye, did not give the names of the members, but said the action was in response to the Federal Government's decision to allow the association to be represented at the trial as observers. "The association fully appreciates its duty as the watchdog of the people and thereby assures all and sundry that it is poised to play that role," the statement said. [Text] [Kaduna NEW NIGERIAN in English 29 Jan 86 p 3] /12828

RECRUITS FOR LIBERATION STRUGGLES URGED--The Minister of External Affairs Professor Bolaji Akinyemi has suggested that youths from all over the African continent should be recruited to join the liberation struggle. Addressing the closing ceremony of the 45th ordinary session of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) Liberation Committee, the minister said the 22nd summit of the OAU should be empowered to examine in consultation with the liberation movements the possibility of recruiting youths from all over the African continent to join in the liberation struggle. According to him, the youths of Africa are prepared to take up arms, and no longer want to sit on the sidelines. "The youths of Africa are prepared to die by the side of their brothers and sisters in South Africa and Namibia" he added. [Text] [Kaduna NEW NIGERIAN in English 31 Jan 86 p 9] /12828

MUSLIM SUPREME COURT URGED--A call has been made for the establishment of a Muslim Supreme Court at the Federal level where only those learned in Islam could sit and preside. A statement by the National Secretary of the Young Muslim Congress (YMC) of Nigeria, Alhaji Zubairu Kassim, also called on the Federal Government to establish Sharia Courts in Southern parts of the country. Commenting on Nigeria's membership of the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC), the YMC said this did not mean Nigeria would become an Islamic country. The YMC further said the country's membership of OIC was long over due, pointing out that we should have joined at the time we attained independence. [Text] [Kaduna NEW NIGERIAN in English 31 Jan 86 p 9] /12828

CSO: 3400/1127

SWAZILAND

KOMATIPOORT-MPAKA RAILWAY LINE INAUGURATED

Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English 15 Feb 86 p 9

[Text] THE provision of the Komatiport/Mpaka railway line through Swaziland by South Africa was evidence of cooperation — not destabilisation — with neighbouring states, the Minister of Transport Affairs, Mr Hendrik Schoeman, said yesterday.

Speaking at the inauguration of the 120km line — which links Managa in the north, with Mpaka and Lavumisa in the south — Mr Schoeman said:

"The provision of this railway line is tangible evidence of South Africa's willingness to further the spirit of cooperation between all the countries of the sub-continent."

He said although the line would mainly serve Swaziland and the Eastern Transvaal, it added to the infrastructure of the whole region by "proving a more diversified rail link to the export harbours of Maputo and Richards Bay."

The Republic was constantly being accused of destabilising the Southern African region, but the daily movement of 7 200 South African Railways wagons into neighbouring states proved that this was not true.

Mr Schoeman said 5.9-

million tons of traffic had moved across foreign borders from South Africa between April 1984 and March 1985.

Adjacent countries could not exist in isolation and mutual cooperation was essential. The membership of Southern African states to the Southern African Customs Union and air links were witness to this inter-dependence.

The more than 350 000 migrant workers from neighbouring countries employed in South Africa took more than R500-million to their home countries each year.

Mr Schoeman warned that the growing international call for sanctions and disinvestment in South Africa "would have negative effects that would retard the development of all the peoples of Southern Africa".

Neighbouring states "would be strangled if sanctions forced South Africa to take retaliatory action against its neighbours."

Closure of South Africa's borders with Botswana and Zimbabwe would cut 88 percent of traffic to and from the Frontline States, Mr Schoeman said. Sapa

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CSO: 3400/1142

SWAZILAND

MEDIA WAR BREAKS OUT; NEWSMEN WORRIED

Johannesburg THE STAR in English 17 Feb 86 p 6

[Text] MBABANE — A media war has broken out in Swaziland.

Eight years ago the tiny kingdom, with a population of about 600 000, had one daily newspaper, *The Times of Swaziland* — once owned by the Argus group, but now independently controlled — and a radio station which took commercial spots.

Since then a commercial television station has been set up, another daily newspaper is on the streets, a glossy monthly magazine concentrating on business and general news has been published and at the weekend a weekly newspaper appeared.

The latest addition is the *Weekend Sun*, a general newspaper with a bias towards sport which was founded by two former employees of *The Times of Swaziland*. It is reputed to be backed by an influential member of the royal Dlamini family.

The *Weekend Sun* follows the format of the two existing daily newspapers — most of its em-

ployees worked for one or the other at some stage — as a 16-page tabloid.

The first issue, priced at 25 c, offered a round-up of the week's news with heavy sports coverage.

Senior newspapermen in Swaziland are a little worried about a situation where too many media outlets seem to be chasing too few advertisers

COMMENT

A source at *The Times of Swaziland*, commented rather grimly last week: 'There really isn't room for all of us ...'

Ironically *The Times of Swaziland* prints both the *Weekend Sun* and its other rival *The Observer* at its printing plant because the printing facility intended for use by the other two newspapers has broken down.

● Saturday's first edition of the *Weekend Sun* set off on a provocative line with a lead story suggesting that the entire board which is now controlling *The Observer* was about to be sacked.

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CSO: 3400/1142

SWAZILAND

BRIEFS

SWAZI PRINCE ON WEAPONS CHARGE--Mbabane--Jailed Swazi politician Prince Mfanasabili Dlamini and a once-powerful close associate, Mr George Msibi, will be charged with possession of unregistered arms. Police spokesman, Mr Solly Mkhonta said two rifles, a shotgun, a revolver and 45 rounds of ammunition were found at the home of the Prince, who was arrested last week and is due to stand trial next month accused of subverting justice. A revolver and 44 rounds of ammunition were found at the home of Mr Msibi, but he was not arrested, the spokesman added. He did not say when they would be charged. The two men, once widely regarded as the most powerful political figures in Swaziland, were dismissed from the ruling Supreme Council of State last October. Their dismissals, the Prince's arrest and a crackdown on his associates are part of a behind-the-scenes power struggle that has been going on since the death of King Sobhuza in 1982, diplomats said. The spokesman said Mr Msibi, who has extensive business contacts with South Africa, was one of four close associates of Prince Mfanasabili whose passport had been confiscated in the past week. [Text]  
[Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English 15 Feb 86 p 15] /12851

CSO: 3400/1142

ZIMBABWE

## ASSEMBLY PASSES PRESIDENTIAL POWERS MEASURE

Harare THE HERALD in English 25 Jan 86 p 1

[Article by Ziana]

[Text]

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THE state of emergency has been extended by Presidential proclamation for a further six months from tomorrow. On Wednesday the House of Assembly, by a vote of 57 to 19, approved the extension. In terms of the Constitution the House must approve, with at least 50 MPs voting in favour, before the President can extend a state of emergency. — Herald Reporter.

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**THE Presidential Powers (Temporary Measures) Bill** passed through the second reading, committee stage and third reading in the House of Assembly yesterday amid heated debate following strong reservations by the Conservative Alliance of Zimbabwe and Zapu that it will confer sweeping powers on the Cabinet.

The Bill seeks to empower the President, on the advice of the Cabinet, to make emergency regulations in the event of unforeseen crises requiring urgent action.

Discordant voices centred on the Bill's provision to empower the President to make regulations on any situation, with some MPs venturing to say it would usurp the role of Parliament.

Attacks ranged from it being retrogressive, loose, to untidy.

Reluctantly lending his party's support to the Bill, CAZ leader Mr Ian Smith said it was going to be an improvement on the continuation of the state of emergency.

"We regret that we have to go along with this . . . it's the lesser of the two evils."

Other MPs complained that it had been rushed and that they had had no time to scrutinise it with their lawyers.

Cde John Nkomo (Zapu, Matobo) said certain aspects of the Bill needed to be reconsidered by Government. He did not specify.

"It's a bit loose and can be misused and we feel that any legislation must be more specific and to the point so that there is no possibility of unscrupulous people misusing that legislation."

Contributing to the debate, the Minister of Home Affairs, Cde Enos Nkala, lashed out at CAZ and Zapu, calling them "partners in the commission of crime".

The minister's attack came when several CAZ and Zapu members spoke strongly against the Bill.

The Bill had a tortuous passage through the second reading and committee stage where the CAZ called for and subsequently lost a motion to divide the House on an important clause.

During the second reading debate, veteran CAZ member for Mazowe/Mutoko, Mr Mark Partridge, criticised the Bill, labelling it "ill-timed,

ill-conceived and totally unnecessary".

He was supported by Cde John Nkomo who said Zapu was unhappy about the emphasis the Bill placed on preventive detention.

"We believe that a provision of this nature, if subjected to a wide range of people, is bound to be misused," said Cde Nkomo.

Responding to the criticism Cde Nkala reminded the House of the Entumbane uprisings of 1982 when the Government had to invoke the emergency powers regulations to crush an insurrection which had threatened to undermine the authority of the new Government.

Cde Nkala said the Government was noticing a new kind of partnership between Zapu and the CAZ as evidenced by the way they voted together against such crucial issues as the extension of the State of Emergency.

"The partnership between the 'RF' and Zapu is clearly a partnership of crime because Zapu has the potential for insurrection, can round up dissidents and the 'RF' cannot," said the minister.

"The 'RF' has always had the evil intention of removing this Government, while Zapu's problem is that it cannot accept that it has lost the support of the majority."

Cde Nkala said the involvement of the Zapu leadership in dissident activities was quite evident.

"They (dissidents) are organised from Botswana by Guduza who left this country together with Cde Nkomo when he left the country. Guduza was left behind deliberately by Cde Nkomo to organise dissidents," he said.

Cde Nkala said CAZ took advantage of Zapu's disaffection and "they support you and vote with you in Parliament".

He said the Government was surprised that Zapu talked about unity with Zanu (PF) and remarked: "Why don't you unite with the CAZ because you are one subversive people."

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CSO: 3400/1172

ZIMBABWE

LECTURERS TO ACCOMPANY 400 STUDENTS TO CUBA

Harare THE SUNDAY MAIL in English 12 Jan 86 p 1

[Text] Bulawayo--Zimbabwean lecturers will accompany the first batch of 400 student teachers from Zimbabwe who are going to Cuba in September for a five-year course that will lead to a Bachelor of Education Degree.

Speaking in an interview last week, the Deputy Secretary in the Ministry of Education in charge of education development, Cde Dumisani Bhila, said the Zimbabwean lecturers would teach philosophy of education, educational psychology and sociology of education, while the Cuban lecturers would teach physics, biology, chemistry and mathematics.

Because Cuba uses Spanish, successful applicants for the scholarships would be taught Spanish for four months by Spanish lecturers before going to Cuba. An advance group of five Cuban lecturers would soon arrive in Zimbabwe, followed by another 20.

The Zimbabwean students, together with their lecturers, will spend five years in Cuba.

Cde Bhila said the ministry envisaged sending 400 students in September 1986, 400 students in September next year and 400 students in September 1988.

"This year only physics, chemistry, biology and mathematics would be offered to the students because their content is universal. Next year technical subjects with a Zimbabwean bias and relevant geography would be considered as additional subjects on offer."

Referring to the advance party of Cuban lecturers coming to Zimbabwe, Cde Bhila said apart from teaching Spanish to the students going to Cuba, the lecturers would be seconded to teachers' colleges in order to learn Zimbabwe's rural environment to equip themselves with a better understanding of the background of their students.

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CSO: 3400/1172

ZIMBABWE

## FAMILY PLANNING CUTS BIRTH RATE BY 27 PERCENT

Harare THE HERALD in English 24 Jan 86 p 3

[Text] **ZIMBABWE would have had over 175 000 more births in 1984 but family planning cut the birth rate by 27 percent from 55 births per 1 000 people to about 40.**

A report in the December newsletter of the Zimbabwe National Family Planning Council said the total births prevented by modern programme methods was 122 871 while those prevented by traditional methods totalled 55 416.

"Obviously the family planning programme had a great theoretical impact on fertility and birth rates in 1984 . . ."

The report said that if there had been no programme of contraception the crude birth rate would have been 55 births per 1 000 compared to the actual 40 births per 1 000.

Similarly if there had been only programme protection and no traditional contraception the crude birth rate would have been 47 births per 1 000. The impact of traditional contraception on the birth rate was seven births per 1 000.

"Assuming there were neither a family planning programme nor traditional methods of contraception the crude birth rate in 1984 would have been 62 births per 1 000 people," the report said.

• The National Family

Planning Council is training health staff to improve their statistical and record-keeping services to allow the council obtain accurate data on the effectiveness of the programmes.

The co-ordinator of a week - long workshop which started in Harare on Monday, Cde Paul Shumba, told The Herald yesterday that since its inception the council had gone all out to launch programmes for effective population control but there had not been any reliable data to evaluate the effectiveness of the programmes.

"We need to have reliable statistics. For example, how contraceptives are being used and in what quantities."

The workshop was attended by about 40 participants.

With Government encouragement of population control, Cde Shumba said, the council had a great task to carry out with limited manpower.

It had about 1 000 people to advise about 22 percent of the population — the percentage of women in the child-bearing age group.

With the training it was hoped eventually to reach a stage where with

reliable statistics the council would be able to come up with recommendations as to whether the existing programme was having the desired effects or whether it needed to be expanded or improved.

"Reliable statistics are a better tool for planning than just working from haphazard ideas and suggestions." Cde Shumba said.

The training would help the people involved in the distribution and management of contraceptives assess their needs.

Dr Esther Boothe, programme co-ordinator at the council, said the training in supplies management would also play a part in the fight to control population. She said there was a need to systemise records for more effective services.

She said there was a lack of proper records, and therefore an imbalance in contraceptive supplies at the outlets.

"The community-based distributors usually complain about being out of stock of some contraceptive brand and clinics complain that they have not received supplies they ordered. All these are due to poor planning, poor forecasting and poor management of human resources."

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CSO: 3400/1172

ZIMBABWE

PRIME MINISTER CALLS ON WOMEN TO FIGHT 'SEXIST' CHURCH

Harare THE SUNDAY MAIL in English 26 Jan 86 p 1

[Text] Women's fight for equality must focus on the church where some negative aspects of religion discriminate against them on the basis of sex, the Prime Minister, Cde Mugabe, said in Harare yesterday.

He was speaking at a one-day meeting at Belvedere Teachers' College attended by more than 500 people to discuss the implications of the new Matrimonial Causes Act, the draft Succession Bill and the proposed National Women's Council.

Cde Mugabe said inequality in the church could not be accepted and women should take it upon themselves to "preach the gospel of equality to the priests, to the Pope and to the ayatollah and let us from Zimbabwe propagate this gospel throughout the world."

It was the closest the Prime Minister came to commenting for the first time on last week's diplomatic incident in which Hajjatoleslam Seyed Ali Khamenei and his delegation boycotted a banquet in their honour because they objected, on religious grounds, to the presence of women.

Cde Mugabe, who is the president and first secretary of ZANU (PF), said the party and government would continue to fight against all forms of discrimination against any member of society, especially women, who for decades had suffered from a double-edged exploitative environment created by colonial regimes and certain negative practices in indigenous culture.

"ZANU (PF) abhors discrimination against women in any socioeconomic sector and activity, for such discrimination at this stage of our development would not be contrary to the principles we fought for but also detrimental to development," he said.

"It is therefore in the forefront of all efforts being made to create a just society for all men and women, a society where men and women are in equal partnership, each contributing fully of his or her best talents."

He said ZANU (PF) would leave no stone unturned in an effort to uphold the principles of human rights and dignity which included equality between the sexes in every aspect of the development process.

The creation of the Ministry of Community Development and Women's Affairs was motivated to a great extent by the party's desire to address the fundamental question of man-made inequalities between the sexes.

The last six years had witnessed an increase in the number of employment opportunities for women both in the public and private sectors.

While women constituted only 30.7 percent of the total workforce on the eve of independence in 1979, they now make up 44.2 percent of the workforce.

The Prime Minister said that, having made all those changes to enhance the level, quality and participation of women, the stage was now set for the country to look at family relationships in order to make them supportive of positive growth in the status of women.

"I would like to stress ... that times are changing and our society and culture have to adapt to the requirements of the present-day socioeconomic environment. While we accept the need for a sound cultural base to our society, let us rid ourselves of the belief that whatever is found in our culture is either automatically good or permanent.

"Culture is dynamic and it is this dynamism that enables all cultures to rid themselves of obsolete institutions while allowing it to accommodate and assimilate new trends and thus enabling it to progress."

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CSO: 3400/1170

SOUTH AFRICA

ANC ATTACKS SEEN AS WAY TO ENHANCE REPUTATION OF POWER

Cape Town DIE BURGER in Afrikaans 7 Jan 86 p 9

[Article by Chief Reporter: "Attacks on 'Soft' Targets Intensified" -- "White Fear is ANC Goal"]

[Text] A reign of terror among Whites and the demonstration to Blacks that the African National Congress (ANC) is more powerful than they perhaps thought are the most important strategic considerations for the ANC's expected intensification of its attacks on civilian or "soft" targets. That is the opinion of experts on strategic studies and a senior member of the security community whom DIE BURGER approached yesterday for comment in connection with conjectures over the weekend in London that Oliver Tambo, leader of the ANC, is going to announce a new military startegy for the ANC this week.

According to the LONDON SUNDAY TIMES, Tambo is going to give an order at the 74th ANC Congress that certain white civilian targets in South Africa should be exempt. Professor Mike Hough, director of the Institute for Strategic Studies at the University of Pretoria, said this probably means that the ANC is going to increasingly exempt certain Whites, such as important officials who help "to administrate apartheid" and border farmers, as targets. [tr note: i.e. they may be exempt from the former ban on hitting civilian targets.]

Murder List

A senior lecturer in strategic studies, who wants to remain anonymous, said the choice of white targets is on the one hand aimed at conducting a reign of terror among the white population and, on the other hand, at demonstrating to Blacks that the ANC is more powerful than they perhaps thought. She differs with Professor Hough, who thinks that the ANC, like any terrorist organization, has a murder list -- in this case of important Whites. According to her, the demonstration of its power to Blacks is more important to the ANC. Urban terrorism (with bomb attacks on buildings) and the expansion of landmine attacks on farm regions -- in other words, attacks on the traditionally white areas -- can be expected instead. "For years it has been said in South Africa that no rural terrorism occurs and that the situation is under control. It is a breakthrough for the ANC to be able to

say it killed nine people with eight landmines and that within a few weeks it could demonstrate that it can enter and leave the country as it wants."

A senior official in security circles said he also does not think that the ANC works according to a murder list. "A landmine is not aimed at a particular person. The one who plants it wants the people to move out of the area." He agrees about the ANC's reasons for its intensification of the attacks on white areas. The rural attack is a new dimension in the struggle. The country has broad borders to guard, and all infiltrators cannot be stopped, "although we achieve great success," he said.

Professor Hough said "ANC fighters" were authorized at the ANC conference last year in Lusaka to concentrate on "soft targets." Later there were attempts to back out of that, and it was warned that civilians will inevitably be increasingly caught in the crossfire.

#### Targets

This has very clearly indicated a conflict within the ANC between the old and younger guard about that question, which Tambo -- who comes under quite a lot of pressure from the younger members of the ANC's top structure to no longer "spare" the Whites -- is trying to cover up. Professor Hough thinks that especially civilian defense personnel, border farmers and important officials who help to administrate apartheid may increasingly become targets. The development boards have already started to experience this, and members of the police have been targets for a long time.

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CSO: 3401/75

SOUTH AFRICA

#### ANC'S TACTICS OF TERROR CLOSE DOOR TO NEGOTIATIONS

Cape Town DIE BURGER in Afrikaans 7 Jan 86 p 8

[Editorial: "ANC Shuts the Door"]

[Text] In his reaction to the latest, unscrupulous landmine murders in the Transvaal bushveld, General Magnus Malan, on behalf of the South African government, left no doubt that reprisal measures by South Africa will follow. The vast majority of peace-loving South Africans will welcome it if terrorist movements such as the ANC are answered -- in General Malan's words -- with "the same language." But voices are still being raised that the government should unconditionally enter into talks with such an organization. That is farfetched and ill-considered advise under the circumstances. The ANC is not only persisting with its violence, but has also obviously decided that innocent civilians are more vulnerable targets than military or strategic installations and that the focus must be shifted.

That explains why a bomb was placed in a busy shopping center at Amanzimtoti and why landmines are now being planted on South African roads. It evidently does not make a bit of difference to the ANC who the victims of its terrorism are -- white or black, children or adults. When it comes right down to it, its goal is to create an atmosphere which will promote surrender to the ANC through intimidation and polarization of the different population groups.

Nobody expects that the British government should try to end the murder and killing by the Irish Republican Army by conducting discussions with the IRA, or that the governments of West Germany, France and Italy should extend the hand of peace to the radical organizations of violence in those countries. Is there a difference then between the ANC and the IRA and PLO?

The ANC is not only spoiling relations internally. It uses the territory of neighboring countries, with or without their knowledge, as a starting point for its attacks in South Africa. And whenever the government is compelled to undertake preventive or pursuit action, tension arises anew throughout the whole subcontinent, and South Africa is accused of destabilization. The ANC would certainly be able to participate in a discussion on the future of South Africa, but as long as it regards itself as the main instrument for violence, it closes the door itself to such participation.

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SOUTH AFRICA

RECTOR TAKES LEAVE AFTER DISRUPTION OF EXAMS AT UNIVERSITY

Cape Town DIE BURGER in Afrikaans 7 Jan 86 pp 1,2

[Article by Chief Reporter: "Exams Postponed After Student Troubles" -- "Rector Suddenly Leaves UWK"]

[Text] The Rector of the University of Western Cape Province [UWK], Professor Richard van der Ross, unexpectedly took a month's leave yesterday shortly after the outbreak of new disturbances at the UWK -- when a group of students disrupted examinations to the point that they were postponed again.

The disruption of the examinations was most strongly deplored yesterday by the chairman of the colored Council of Ministers, Rev. Allan Hendrickse, who warned against elements who misuse the field of education for their own purposes (report on p. 2).

Professor Van der Ross told DIE BURGER upon inquiry after the incident: "I want to examine my whole position before I do anything else." He denied rumors circulating the campus that he has resigned. Asked whether he is perhaps considering resigning, he said he would rather not comment at this stage "about things which are too far in the future." His tenure expires at the end of this year. Professor Jakes Gerwel, dean of the faculty of literature and philosophy, takes over from him on 1 January 1987. Professor Van der Ross said: "I asked for a month's leave. I feel I must reconsider my position on a tense period which I have experienced and am experiencing."

Class Boycott

After a group of students entered the examination hall yesterday and tore up examination papers, a delegation of students went to Professor Van der Ross with the request that the examinations be further postponed. The examinations, which were to be held last year, were initially postponed until this month on account of the protracted class boycott at UWK. They would have started yesterday and lasted until the 24th. Professor Van der Ross referred the students to the vice rector, Professor Jaap Durand, and Professor Gerwel, because he was not able to negotiate further with the students at that point in time. "Because it is within my authority, I decided to delegate the decisionmaking to Professors Durand and Gerwel," he said.

The student delegation claimed, among other things, that it would be unfair to continue with exams so soon after vacation time. Professor Van der Ross said he feels that he has made all the decisions himself for a long time "and should give them to other people for a while." I was greatly hoping that we could start (the exams) today without any disturbance."

According to a press statement issued by UWK, all examinations at UWK have been postponed for another two weeks. The UWK says in its statement that there is a decision to honor the students's request in light of the circumstances which make it difficult to pass exams at this time, and the consequent request of the students. "This gives the opportunity for two weeks of further preparation. The Student Council has also undertaken not to hold any mass meetings until the end of the supplementary examinations. The UWK has decided to move up the dates for the undergraduate and postgraduate examinations by two weeks. This means that the exams are postponed until the period from 20 January to 7 February. However, in the case of higher education diplomas, the scheduled examination starts on 13 January. The reexaminations, which were to take place from 27 January to 12 February, are now being conducted in the period from 10 to 26 February." The examanitions which were passed today will remain valid, but students have the option to answer the questions over again on 20 January," the statements says.

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SOUTH AFRICA

NEW ACTING RECTOR OF COLORED UNIVERSITY STATES POLICY

Cape Town DIE BURGER in Afrikaans 9 Jan 86 p 11

[Article "By Our Chief Reporter": "Professor Durand: UWC Preparing Itself for New SA"; passage enclosed in slantlines printed in boldface]

[Text] The University of the Western Cape is going through its own crucible. It is struggling to prepare itself for a coming new South Africa, and an unpleasant surprise awaits those who live in the dreamworld of white security and today look askance at the unrest at the UWC.

/So said the acting rector of the UWC, Professor Jaap Durand, in an interview with DIE BURGER yesterday./

Professor Durand was temporarily appointed in place of Professor Richard van der Ross this week after Professor van der Ross unexpectedly took a month's leave shortly after new campus rioting.

Professor Durand said that Professor van der Ross had taken a month's sick leave on the recommendation of his doctor because of the deleterious effect on his health of the recent tension at the UWC. Monday, when students walked into the examination room and tore up examination papers, "was the last straw."

Professor Durand said that "compared with the UWC there are many institutions in South Africa that lead a far more stable life, but in the long run the security they enjoy may be very fragile."

Scene

The UWC is in the process of developing a philosophy of its own that will fit in with this new South Africa, he said in answer to a question about the UWC's outside image as a result of the continued unrest on the campus.

It would be unrealistic to expect that the UWC should not experience something of the tempest that has become part of the South African scene.

"A peaceful UWC in the current tense and even violent situation in the Western Cape would have been an indication that something is seriously wrong with the university."

"It would have been an indication that the university is an alien island in its community and still a part of the old, archaic South Africa, which is in the process of disappearing, never to return."

#### These Reasons

For these reasons the UWC government does not believe in "strong action." "We regret the harmful effect of the things that are happening and will strive to restore normality--as normal as the abnormal conditions in South Africa permit--but we will do it in the UWC way, a way established by Professor van der Ross.

"A strong, aggressive reaction to student violence does not seem to be the answer, but I must stress this: The answer will not be a further extension of the examinations. As far as I am concerned, we have come to the end. The students know this."

He has "very great confidence" that the examinations--which have been extended to 20 January--will take place without any problems and that the academic year can be begun with confidence. No further security measures will be taken for the examinations.

Approximately 1,500 students accepted this date at a mass meeting on Monday and gave an assurance that there will be no further mass meetings in the interim that might give rise to problems.

Asked how the UWC will be affected by the recently announced wider opening of white universities to colored students this year, Professor Durand said that the UWC will be affected by this in the short term if there is a sudden rush of colored students to the other universities that previously had no significant intake of colored students.

"Whether that is going to happen is another question." What inclines him to further optimism is that according to estimates there are going to be more than 356,000 colored people who will want to attend institutions of higher education in the mid nineties.

#### Automatic

The existing institutions of higher education in the Western Cape will not be able to meet this demand.

It was automatic that he, the vice-rector, and not the rector designate, Professor Jakes Gerwel, was appointed acting rector, Professor Durand said in answer to a question. If Professor van der Ross had resigned, Professor Gerwel, dean of the faculty of philosophy and literature, would automatically have become rector.

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SOUTH AFRICA

EDITORIAL VIEWS RESPONSE TO TAMBO STATEMENTS

Cape Town DIE BURGER in Afrikaans 13 Jan 86 p 6

[Editorial: "Strange Reactions"]

[Text] It is unlikely that anyone has ever before so effectively unmasked the ANC as a band of cold-blooded murderers as its leader, Oliver Tambo, did last week in Lusaka. This organization will intensify its terror attacks on South Africa this year, Tambo promised, and in the process more and more civilians will fall victim.

One would have expected that a cry of shocked indignation to have gone up from the anti-government circles that have so far virtually acted as apologists for the ANC. There were in fact protests here and there, but in most cases they were still to a great extent qualified.

To what atrocities does the ANC then still have to turn before the scales fall from some people's eyes? Has Tambo not himself admitted that his organization cannot discipline some of its terror groups in South Africa and that further "Amanzimtoti's" can be expected? Remember, this comes from the mouth of the leader of an organization that wants to take over power in the country.

The leader of the PFP, Dr van Zyl Slabbert, did deplore Tambo's remarks, but apparently believes that a great peace will descend on the country if the government will only lift the ban on the ANC and introduce "a package of fundamental reforms."

If this sounds like political naivete, it doesn't even come close to the shameful statement by the Dutch Reformed minister who wanted to lead a group of clergymen to talk to the ANC in Lusaka last year. As a Christian, he says, he would choose to live under a Marxist regime rather than that there should be further loss of life. The church will always still retain the responsibility of bearing witness against such a regime.

If this minister thinks that there will be no loss of life under a Marxist regime and that he and others will be allowed to bear witness against such a regime, he is truly living in a fool's paradise.

It would be unwise for South Africans to dismiss Tambo's threats as inconsequential. It must be understood that they are part of a psychological struggle to unleash an anxiety psychosis in the country. We will have to guard against this with all our strength.

SOUTH AFRICA

PAPER WELCOMES REMARKS BY U.S. OFFICIAL

Cape Town DIE BURGER in Afrikaans 16 Jan 86 p 14

[Editorial: "American Intentions"]

[Text] At his departure the day before yesterday, Dr Chester Crocker, American undersecretary of state with responsibility for Africa, who took part in high-level talks in South Africa this week, said that it is perhaps time the world begins to listen to what South Africans say.

This is a significant admission, which it is to be hoped may have beneficial results. Because it comes from the architect of the Southern African policy of the Reagan administration, which has of late given many South Africans the impression that it wants to lay down the law and is only too keen to tell South Africa what it must do, even though it does not always do it itself.

Another observation of Dr Crocker's, that America does not want to wage an economic war against South Africa, is equally interesting. For many South Africans this may even come as something of a surprise. Because in the USA cities, states and universities are busy with an unprecedented campaign of disinvestment against South Africa. Some American congressmen talk incessantly of intensified sanctions. And President Reagan himself instituted limited sanctions--which among other things had the result of knocking the bottom out of the market for Krugerrands. This costs South Africa about 500 million rands a year in America alone, which has since begun issuing its own gold coins. After President Reagan's sanction example, the EEC countries also rushed in with their own punitive measures.

Nonetheless, if America does not now want to wage economic war on South Africa, this must be welcomed. All the more so if, for example, American trade missions, which are so diligently beating a path to "bastions of freedom and justice" like the Soviet Union, perhaps also want to come to South Africa.

In this way America can in fact make a positive contribution to development and stability in the Republic. In that respect many South Africans will wish Dr Crocker well in his just-announced intentions--even if his government does not succeed in its intention of getting the Cubans out of Angola.

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SOUTH AFRICA

HNP REFUSES TO PARTICIPATE IN MULTIRACIAL GOVERNMENT FOR NATAL

Pretoria DIE AFRIKANER in Afrikaans 6 Nov 85 p 1

[Article: "Zulus Would Have Control - Natal Multiracial Plan: White Leaders Say No"]

[Text] Natalians are opposed to the plan to implement a multiracial government for that province. Two leading figures of the HNP [Herstigte Nasionale Party] in Natal, Messrs Kosie Erasmus and Oscar Hartung, last week declared themselves most strongly against the plan according to which KwaZulu and Natal should form a mixed government. Such a proposal was accepted at the past congress of the NRP [New Republican Party]. According to reports, a convention to set up a constitution for Natal will be convened yet before the end of this year.

The proposed multiracial government is a continuation of the Buthelezi Report which recommended a single government for Natal and KwaZulu. Although the Buthelezi Report was initially rejected by the government, the minister of cooperation, development and education, Dr Gerrit Viljoen, later on several occasions made favorable expressions about certain aspects of the plan.

Mr Erasmus told DIE AFRIKANER last week that the white Natalians are unyielding in their view that they do not want to be a part of a Zulu-controlled Natal. "Although there are a lot of sweet words about a partnership among Whites, Blacks and Indians in the proposed government, everyone knows that it would be the Zulus who eventually would actually govern Natal," Mr Erasmus declares. "White Natalians will absolutely not accept that."

Mr Hartung says Natalians have noted with anxiety that the government is apparently not opposed to the plan. On the contrary: it appears as if the government has great sympathy for it. "Natal is not willing to be used as a guinea pig for NP [National Party] policy," Mr Hartung told DIE AFRIKANER.

Dr Viljoen said earlier this year that certain aspects of the plan deserve investigation and can serve as a basis for negotiation. Chief Buthelezi welcomed this statement by Dr Viljoen.

The Buthelezi commission had recommended that Natal should enjoy the same measure of autonomy as KwaZulu, but should remain a part of South Africa. The central government would retain its jurisdiction over defense, foreign affairs and transportation, but transfer all other powers to the new government. According to the recommendations, the Natal Executive Committee and the government of KwaZulu would be combined with the addition of Coloreds and Indians. Although the members of the proposed government would be appointed initially on a racial basis, they would later be permitted to regroup according to "political interests." Representation in the legislative body would not be proportionate to the numbers of the different racial groups. However, the commission stated that there need be no doubt that Blacks would make up the majority.

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SOUTH AFRICA

PAPER REPORTS ON 'TAX HAVEN' IN CISKEI

Pretoria DIE AFRIKANER in Afrikaans 6 Nov 85 p 7

[Article: "Ciskei Is Becoming a Tax Paradise"]

[Text] Ciskei is economically closely tied to South Africa. As a result of this, anything which Ciskei undertakes on an economic or financial level has a direct bearing South Africa's economy and finances. On the advise of the Hoggenheimers [translator's note: unscrupulous capitalists], Ciskei has created a tax paradise for entrepreneurs. The latter do not pay any income tax in Ciskei. This has consequences and creates yet to be determined problems for South Africa. With the impetus of tax exemptions a tax haven has now been created in the middle of South Africa, where South African and foreign companies can play their little tax games unhampered. It is clear, but not always known, that this is being done at the expense of the white taxpayer of South Africa.

Suppose you are an entrepreneur in South Africa and set up a business in Ciskei which you provide with goods that you produce in South Africa; of course at especially low prices -- on paper anyway. That enables you to greatly diminish your tax liabilities in South Africa because you show less profit. Then you make especially high profits in Ciskei -- tax-free! Then you transfer this profit to South Africa; or rather, loan it at high interest to your South African business... Must we explain further? Can you now understand why 36 factories and businesses suddenly arose in Ciskei over the past year? Later, when we have unraveled the shareholding, we will publish a list of the owners of the businesses.

The NP [National Party] government is failing on two points in its homeland policy:

- No provision has been made by agreements to thwart unilateral actions which are detrimental to the economy of South Africa;
- No pressure is applied to the countries in order to prevent undesirable practices.

In spite of all these problems, South Africa faithfully pays large amounts of money to Ciskei. Then we are not even talking about the lunacy of the customs

union agreement about which DIE AFRIKANER reported earlier. As you know, South Africa collects all the customs levies on imports which go through our ports and then pays 88 percent to the former protectorates and the TBVC [Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei] countries which are together with us in the customs union. The government even gives protection to Ciskei as a tax haven. When East London asked for a tax haven between Berlin and East London, it was flatly refused.

How should such government behavior be judged? Lack of logic? Stupidity? Sabotage? Just decide yourself.

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SOUTH AFRICA

EDITORIAL VIEWS FUEL PRICES EFFECT ON POLITICAL PROBLEMS

Pretoria DIE TRANSVALER in Afrikaans 11 Nov 85 p 14

[Editorial: "The Price of Fuel"]

[Text] Along with all the depressive aftereffects of the new fuel price -- and another increase is coming -- South Africa should still bear in mind the central message in the low value of our monetary unit. This is that we are paying dearly for fuel, in fact for all imports, as long as a solution is being sought for the country's political problems. It cannot be simply explained away that there is now little overseas confidence in the rand, let alone the pressure on the economy. The historic Rubicon speech and what followed it contributed little to restoring confidence. The rand remains under severe pressure and whenever the dollars sags, the gold price reacts weakly. It was formerly entirely different.

Influential businessmen returning from abroad all bring the same message: It's only a political solution that can again pull our economy up. This should also be the final answer to the viewpoints of rightist groups that South Africa can conveniently dissociate itself from the outside world. That's nonsense.

We are just now facing the glaring contrast that the world is about literally being flooded by a surplus of oil, but we have to pay most dearly. We are forced to do this because of political pressure; besides the fact that a heavy levy of sales tax has helped push the price over a rand a liter. Could not the government have devised a plan here? But in the final judgment it is the how and the when and the pace of reform which the expensive fuel will now regularly remind us of, perhaps again in January already. Calculated in rands and cents, we think it's worth the utmost attempts to now seek political solutions all the more.

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SOUTH AFRICA

WARNING ON OVEROPTIMISM ABOUT PROSPECTS FOR OIL, GAS FINDS

Cape Town DIE BURGER in Afrikaans 16 Nov 85 p 10

[Article by Dawie: "Oil News Is Exciting, but Beware of too Many Castles in the Air"]

[Text] Exploiting oil and gas from our own earth sources possesses a romantic impact that the production of fuel from coal never had. South Africa is now coming, although still on a limited scale, into the league of what traditionally has been known as the "oil countries" of the world. There is thus reason for excitement.

The announcement about the development on the southern Cape coast also has powerful economic and psychological significance because it occurs at a time when South Africa badly needs such a stimulus at home and abroad. May it bring the great advantages which are awaited with so much expectation. But let us also be realistic. We must not allow our imagination to run wild, or else there are going to be disappointments and people will get their fingers burnt. South Africa, which is virtually in a state of international siege, has already been working for decades on being less dependent on foreign oil sources. The important progress which is now being made and the consequences which will accompany it should, however, not be overestimated.

Bloody Noses

When the development of the Orange Free State gold field began around 1950, prominent circles had high estimates about what was coming. A second Witwatersrand was predicted, and many people who rushed in to make a killing with property, for example, got their noses bloodied. Just think of what was anticipated on the western Cape coast with the construction of the Saldanha-Sishen rail line. Precious little has thus far come from those castles in the air.

Privatization

The southern Cape coast is already a strong point of growth and it is now going to get a substantial push. But rather than expecting an "explosion" there, we wish healthy and consistent growth for the region. One of the most interesting elements of the contemplated development is that we are possibly

going to see involvement of private initiative. It can from the very beginning become an altogether different kind of project from similar ones which were tackled in the past. Private oil interests were already involved in the exploration, and some of them will probably want to participate further. There are indications that the government, which has proceeded on the road to privatization, will make use of this opportunity to further carry on its plan. The Central Energy Fund is presumably very strong, and it will be able to take the biggest share of the capital burden on its shoulders. One possibility which is hoped for in the private sector is that the Fund will lend private investors some of its money so that they can participate on a significant scale.

#### Talent

In so doing, it can then also be assured that quite a lot of technical and commercial talent is made available for the project. More details about the scheme, and exactly how it is going to be tackled, can in any case be expected in the near future. Questions are again being rightly asked whether the announcement should not have been coupled immediately with a big follow-up action by the Department of Mineral and Energy Affairs.

#### Leak

This sort of project, like with the announcement of the Orange River Plan in the early sixties, lends itself to marketing on a grand scale by information people who know what they are doing. In this case it looks as if such a thing was not possible. If you put two and two together, then you get the impression that a leak compelled -- as it were -- the state president to make the announcement earlier than what the plan was. Therefore, it happened in the presidential council, which in any case was given enough political food for thought. There are already other dates on the agenda when the project will be further elucidated. It is to be hoped that this will occur with a professional hand, such as has happened in the past on occasion, but also sometimes not. There are bodies of people who sit and hope that the government is going to become "irrelevant" and that the economy must further fall apart. But that very fact makes it necessary that the full potential of the project be spelled out.

#### Beacons

Enterprises such as Yskor, Sasol, the Orange River Plan and Koeberg are economic beacons in the country's history which have made it the leader in Africa. This week's announcement may be placed in the same class in the future.

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SOUTH AFRICA

SOUTH AFRICAN POLICE TO BE EXPANDED OVER NEXT SEVERAL YEARS

Cape Town DIE BURGER in Afrikaans 13 Nov 85 p 13

[Article by DIE BURGER police reporter: "Provisions Sufficient - SAP Level of Training Not Lowered"]

[Text] The South African Police have made sufficient provisions for the expansion of their force by about 40,000 men in the next 10 years in spite of the fact that there are now in South Africa only four training colleges meeting current needs. Upon inquiry from DIE BURGER, Lt. Col. H.V. Haynes, public relations officer in Pretoria, gave the assurance that the standard of training will not be lowered and that people will not be trained only for riot control. Persons who have only been trained in riot control and are not well-grounded in the knowledge of law and rounding-off of an ordinary policeman can only give rise to greater criticism of the police, especially in riot situations.

The training of a policeman now lasts six months, and the minimum admission requirements are matriculation [roughly = high school diploma] or equivalent qualification. Almost half of the present force of 47,500 men have also already completed a course in riot control which lasts three weeks.

According to Col. Leon Mellett, private secretary to Mr Louis Le Grange, minister of law and order, the decision to enlarge the police force was preceded by a thorough study by a special committee. The committee, under the chairmanship of Lt. Gen. J.B. Stevens, chief deputy commissioner of the South African Police, made a thorough study of the logistical implications of this roughly 100-percent increase in the police force, Col. Mellett said.

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SOUTH AFRICA

POLL: PRETORIA BUSINESSMEN FAVOR SOME RACIAL REFORMS

Cape Town DIE BURGER in Afrikaans 18 Nov 85 p 8

[Editorial: "Pretoria's Voice"]

[Text] The findings of a poll that Unisa [University of South Africa] did among Pretoria businessmen, such as that more than three quarters of them support opening up the central business area, contains illuminating direction indicators for the path of reform which South Africa has taken. Coming from the business people of a city which is generally regarded as especially "conservative", the results point to reconsideration among conservative Whites as well as the increasing realization that rights and privileges ought to be extended to colored fellow citizens. As such, it must be bad news for the CP [Conservative Party] leader, Dr Andries Treurnicht, who calls Pretoria and environs his "homeland", and for him and his fellow rightists it should put the bliss about the course which they have taken into a more realistic perspective.

The findings will strengthen the government's cause in its attempts to eliminate offensive discriminating measures and to strive for equal opportunities for all. This pronouncement by Pretoria's businessmen should be encouragement for the still quicker opening up of business centers for all groups elsewhere, where certainly even less opposition can be expected. A cumbersome procedure must be followed before a business area is declared a free commercial area, and it is too bad that not one such area has yet been proclaimed. The sooner Coloreds can have a part in the prosperity that central business areas can offer, the greater their connection with private initiative and free enterprise will be.

Other results of the poll, such as that about the opening up of movie houses and eating places and that Blacks should have political rights, are likewise encouraging confirmation that progress is being made on the path to reform.

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SOUTH AFRICA

U.S. CONSERVATIVES SAID TO HARM SOUTH AFRICAN CREDIBILITY

Pretoria BEELD in Afrikaans 27 Nov 85 p 12

[Column by Piet Muller: "Dubious Friends -- American Rightists Blunder on Renamo"]

[Text] We do not rightly know who causes South Africa the most embarrassment: its enemies or its friends. Whenever the country is driven into a corner internationally, there is always someone with a political reputation who in public overflows with friendship toward South Africa. Now that the liberal fury against South Africa is flaring up in America, all sorts of "conservatives" who want to try to make South Africa a springboard for their rightwing crusades are also crawling out of the woodwork. Earlier this year we were honored by the visit of a very rich rightist who regards himself as a possible presidential candidate. He held a rally of all kinds of "anticommunist liberation groups" in the southern Angolan bush.

Glowing Testimonial

A little while later it was again a reverend from the "Bible Belt" of the American South who came to represent the so-called "Moral Majority." The reverend went back to America with a glowing testimonial for South Africa, but merely the fact that he supports South Africa was enough to destroy the country's credibility in the eyes of millions of other Americans. And as if we have not had enough of "friendly" Americans, there is already again a group of rightwing senators in the country coming to announce the message that South Africa should suspend the Nkomati Accord and again openly support the Renamo movement. The reasons which they put forward are another classic example of the sort of oversimplification of which rightwing Americans are so often guilty: the Frelimo regime will never be anything but communist and thus anti-Western, while Renamo is at least avowedly anticommunist. They clearly do not take note of the fact that the reality in Mozambique is much more complicated. It is a matter of carrying on American politics. One can imagine that the things which they dispose of sound like music to the ears to quite a few people in Pretoria. Did not they already say the same things even before the signing of the accord?

### Admitting With a Red Face

Not long ago South Africa had to admit with a red face that it had violated the conditions of the Nkomati Accord, even though it was just a "technicality." What was evident from that episode is that there are quite a few people whose hearts at least are still with Renamo. Moreover, what the Americans have to say falls nicely into the pattern of "us" and "them"; of the powers of the light against the powers of darkness.

### A Thorn in the Side

And if a movement like Renamo just says that it is anticommunist, it must indeed be counted among the angels. It is therefore perhaps good if we again quietly contemplate a bit about the Nkomati Accord and determine precisely what it has meant to South Africa. To begin with, Renamo is a movement which arose from collaboration between a group of rightwing colonial Portuguese and the Rhodesian armed forces. For the Rhodesians it was to serve as a thorn in the side of Robert Mugabe's armed forces; and for the Portuguese it was a way to try to create a regime which would be sympathetic toward people who had not yet reconciled themselves to the decolonization of Africa. It must be seen in connection with the fact that few things have alienated South Africa from the rest of Africa as much as the very fact that it has refused for so long to associate itself with Africa's liberation struggle, but on the contrary has entered into alliances with colonial powers.

The Nkomati Accord has been regarded by at least some people in Africa as proof that South Africa is perhaps weaning itself from its colonial past and assuming its role as an African power; that it is throwing itself behind Africa's struggle for spiritual, material and political liberation. Black supporters of the accord have defended themselves against skeptics with the argument that the Afrikaner's mental makeup, and especially his well-known honesty, would cause the accord to be complied with in spirit and letter to the advantage of all of Africa.

### Emotional Implications

Persistent rumors about South Africa's continued secret involvement with Renamo have disappointed these people and damaged South Africa's image. And now a bunch of rightwing Americans want us to throw the little credibility South Africa still has to the winds. Another aspect which we -- and the rightwing Americans -- should pay attention to is that Africa has just undertaken its first successful multinational military operation: when Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Tanzania acted jointly against Renamo. In certain parts of Africa that is now being proffered as a "victory over the Boers." One wonders whether the enormous emotional and political implication of this has yet really gotten through to us.

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SOUTH AFRICA

TV PROGRAM ABOUT INDIANS IN ORANGE FREE STATE SUPPRESSED

Pretoria DIE AFRIKANER in Afrikaans 27 Nov 85 pp 1, 16

[Article: "Kobie Frustrates Program on OFS Indians"]

[Text] The minister of justice and leader of the NP [National Party] in the Free State, Mr Kobie Coetze, has prevented a television program about the admission of Indians to the Free State from being televised by the SABC [South African Broadcasting Corporation]. Earlier Mr Coetze also refused to take part in the program.

The SABC made television recordings weeks ago of the MP for Sasolburg, Mr Louis Stofberg, in which he expresses his position on the affair.

It has been reliably ascertained that Mr Coetze used his influence to ensure that the program in question was not televised.

In his commentary Mr Stofberg says that the fact that the program is no longer to be televised shows that the government--and especially Mr Coetze--are afraid of the consequences.

"The SABC also made film recordings of me, and from this it would seem that the SABC wanted to go ahead with the program. Mr Coetze is, however, afraid of the political consequences of a program like this for himself and for the Free State NP.

"In the roughly 40 seconds that were allowed me I said that the HNP [Herstigte Nasionale Party] is strongly opposed to admitting Indians into the Free State because it will corrode the nature and character of this "heartland" of Afrikanerdom. The Indians have no legitimate rights in the Free State and it is utterly unjust to saddle the ordinary Free State businessman with still further competition in these times of dramatic depression and misery."

Mr Stofberg says the lifting of the prohibition on nonwhite immigration to South Africa now makes it possible for Indians to emigrate to the Free State not only from other parts of South Africa, but also directly from India.

"The HNP will bring these matters to the public's attention at every available opportunity," Mr Stofberg declares. "We are going to hit the government hard!"

An amendment bill was published this past week in Cape Town in terms of which non-whites may also immigrate to South Africa. The amendment bill on Matters Concerning Admission to and Sojourn in the Republic provides that immigrants are no longer required to "identify with the white inhabitants."

An amendment bill making provision for the admission of Indians to the Free State and some districts in northern Natal has also just been published.

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SOUTH AFRICA

MWU REJECTS CHAMBER OF MINES PROPOSAL

Pretoria DIE AFRIKANER in Afrikaans 27 Nov 85 pp 1, 16

[Article: "MWU Says No To Mine Bosses Proposal"]

[Text] The Mine Workers' Union (MWU) has rejected a proposal by the Chamber of Mines in terms of which the positions of white mine workers are ostensibly guaranteed.

The secretary of the MWU, Mr Arrie Paulus, said in his reaction to the proposal that it will be virtually impossible to determine that a white mine worker has been discharged with the aim of hiring a black in his place. This proposal from the Chamber of Mines is therefore unacceptable.

The president of the Chamber of Mines, Mr Clive Knobbs, announced this past week that job guarantees have been given to white mine workers. Mines that are members of the chamber will give assurances to their members in this connection. The services of mine workers will only be terminated as a result of legislation or for reasons on which agreement has been reached with employees' organizations. Under no circumstances will a mine worker be fired with the express purpose of creating a vacancy for someone of another race. The chamber will also establish a body to hear appeals from mine workers who believe they have been discharged because of their race, Mr Knobbs said.

Mr Paulus and the MWU are currently involved in a long-drawn-out struggle against the government and the Chamber of Mines to protect the interests of the white mine workers. The Wiehahn Commission recommended as long ago as 1979 that all positions in the mining industry should be open to all races. It will require an amendment to the Mines and Industries Act to implement the recommendation. The government has not yet taken this step because it has asked the MWU and the Chamber of Mines to reach a mutual agreement. The Minister of Mineral and Energy Affairs, Mr Danie Steyn, has set 31 December as a target date for such an agreement.

Mr Paulus told DIE AFRIKANER that the MWU is ready to open discussions with the Chamber of Mines. "But we are not going to let anyone drive us into a corner."

12906/9274  
CSO: 3401/74

SOUTH AFRICA

RIGHTWINGERS URGE BOYCOTT OF INTEGRATED DURBAN BEACHES

Pretoria DIE AFRIKANER in Afrikaans 27 Nov 85 p 2

[Article: "Stay Away From Mixed Durban, Rightwingers Ask: Throwing Open of Beaches"; passage enclosed in slantlines printed in boldface]

[Text] /Stay away from Durban in the coming vacation," is the call of white-minded Durbanites after the city council decided to open most Durban beaches to non-whites./

In a display of political alliance the representatives of the National Party and the PFP [Progressive Federal Party] on the Durban city council decided last week to open Bay of Plenty Beach, Battery One Beach, Snake Park Beach and Dairy Beach to all races before Christmas. Only the section of beach between the harbor wall and the West Street pier is still reserved for whites.

Both the well-known Rachel Finlayson swimming pool and the children's wading pool are included in the mixed section of beach. A small patch of beach further north, known as the North Beach, is still white, but this regulation is regarded as unenforceable because non-whites from the two multiracial beaches on either side of North Beach will undoubtedly overrun it.

White vacationers will thus have the choice of sharing the most popular beaches and swimming pool with hordes of non-whites or of jostling one another on the small section of the beach that is still reserved for whites.

After eight months of negotiations between the National Party and the Progressive Federal Party on the city council, it is reliably learnt, they decided to form an alliance. After the leader of the NP on the council, Mr Gys Muller, proposed as an amendment that the opening up of the beaches only take place after the children's wading pool was built, the original motion to throw them open was passed by 26 votes to 2.

Mr Muller's amendment is generally regarded as a sham fight for the benefit of the conservative voters. Only two of the NP's nine city council members supported Mr Muller in his amendment.

A further development in the local alliance between the National Party and the Progressive Federal Party is the expectation that an NP city councillor, Mr Henry Klotz, will be elected mayor next year with the support of both parties.

It is predicted in political circles in Pretoria that this alliance will open the way to the cooperation of the NP and the PFP on the national level. A rightwing-inclined Durban city councillor, Mr Lew Philips, has already referred to the NP members as the "New Progs."

Miss Marian McGurdie of the Civic Action League was the only member of the city council apart from Mr Philips, who voted against the NP/PFP proposal to open up the beaches.

They warn that the opening up of the most popular sections of Durban's beach is only an interim stage. Within a few years the NP/PFP alliance will see to it that all beaches are opened up, as called for by the integration policy of both parties.

The Civic Action League is now organizing a petition against the city council's decision that will be handed to the administrator of Natal, Mr Radcliffe Cadman. The Natal Executive Committee must take the final decision on throwing open the beaches.

Advocate Martin Louw, HNP central executive member for Durban, says that rightwing-inclined whites in the Transvaal and Free State can help by staying away from Durban and relaxing elsewhere in the next and next-but-one vacation seasons. The rightwingers of this city have the majority of the voters behind them, says Advocate Louw, and once the financial interests that support the NP/PFP alliance find that multiracial beaches hurt their profits, the tide will turn.

A spokesman for the Little Kariba vacation resort of the ATKV [not further identified] at Warmbad said that inland holiday vacation resorts would profit if white vacationers were to feel ill at ease in Durban. Great expansion is already underway at Little Kariba.

In the meantime a beach struggle has also broken out in Port Elizabeth. There, too, Prog city council members are trying to make beaches multiracial. The HNP's regional organizer for the Eastern Cape, Mr Attie Loock, says that the coloreds should rather develop their own beach. According to newspaper reports, a Conservative-minded city councillor, Mr Danie Dorfling, has said that he will fight such a proposal for mixed beaches tooth and nail.

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CSO: 3401/74

SOUTH AFRICA

WRITER ADVOCATES MORE FLEXIBLE POSITION ON ANGOLA, NAMIBIA

Johannesburg DIE VADERLAND in Afrikaans 28 Nov 85 p 10

[Column by Harald Pakendorf: "Another Option"]

[Text] There is again a possibility of a settlement in the Angolan question. South Africa has reacted positively to earlier American proposals which had been based on discussions since late last year. Now Angola must also react. Discussions between Luanda and Washington are now taking place.

The central question is still that there are Cubans in Angola keeping a Marxist government in power against attacks from Unita, which in turn is supported by South Africa; and that Swapo operates from Angola, compelling South Africa to have soldiers at the border at great cost since 1966. Getting Angola off the map of problems will also help a lot in bringing progress in the Southwest [i.e. Southwest Africa = Namibia]. South Africa has already promised that. But the question must be raised whether South Africa is assessing its own interests right and whether there is not another possibility of approach; in short, that a South African withdrawal from the entire African west coast would not hold any noteworthy disadvantage to its interests and that it would greatly raise its international prestige -- something which these days is urgently needed in order to get a pause in the sustained and severe world attack on the country's domestic policy. In other words, that clinging to control in the Southwest, among other things by supporting Unita, is possibly not the only or best answer.

We are against elections in the Southwest, among other things because deep in our hearts we know Swapo would win, and that what is suspected would be a Marxist government would rule in Windhoek; also that it would threaten South Africa itself. But what can any Windhoek government do to us in the end -- without transportation lines outside our control, without a port, and an economy which can only survive with our support? Absolutely nothing! There will not be any Western help. Zimbabwe has already proven that. Namibia would have to look after itself -- and cannot do that without our support. And that is the ideal way to keep danger at bay.

It must be assumed that there will be Cubans in Angola for a long time yet. The MPLA cannot manage without them, unless suicidal tendencies are the

strongest instinct of the government in Luanda. It would thus be more subtle to try to limit the Cubans -- in numbers and geography -- and try to make Dr Jonas Savimbi less a participant in a Luanda government, with this promise: He too would be geographically limited so that he does not threaten the MPLA's existence. Our reasonableness would then be highly reputed internationally, time for domestic evolution of policy would be gained and our national security would not be threatened. Is that not an option which should be considered?

13084/8918  
CSO: 3401/17

SOUTH AFRICA

THEOLOGIAN CRITICIZES CHURCH INTERVENTION IN POLITICS

Pretoria BEELD in Afrikaans 10 Dec 85 p 8

[Article by Professor Bouke Spoelstra of the Reformed Theological School at Hammanskraal: "Church and Democracy -- Motives for ANC Talk Born of Frustration."]

[Text] It has recently been conspicuous how an arbitrary group of "preachers" are setting themselves up as a National Initiative for Reconciliation and trying to intervene in the socio-political situation by means of a day of prayer. Following the example of the political opposition, businessmen and Stellenbosch students, other preachers have also tried to go to "talk" with the ANC in Lusaka. The media of course draws our attention to the initiatives in the midst of riots in black residential areas, a few violent incidents in cities, unemployment and the weak rand-dollar rate of exchange. The motives for the initiatives are surely sincere and noble, but yet born of frustration and an appeal for "democracy."

The media devotes little attention to church questions elsewhere in the world. It is striking how the largest Protestant churches (NHK and GKN) in the Netherlands are also in conflict with the government and also implement methods such as prayer days for this purpose. The fight against the deployment of American nuclear missiles is now raging fiercely as an antipode to Russian nuclear weapons. The differences of opinion in churches over this military affair threaten to assume church-destroying proportions. People simply use church leaders and church structures for their political views, although they give them a little "church" color. The same churches are at the same time engaged in economic assistance to "liberation organizations", and they recognize by name only the ANC as the organization to bring about the desired change in South Africa. They have also recently discovered Mandela as the leader who must be released. The churches do not regard the deeds which led to his sentence in a court of law as any crime. He is simply a political sacrifice of the "policy of apartheid."

It is significant that the internal struggle against nuclear missiles and foreign support of the ANC by these churches related to us are making the Russians laugh all the way. They get as a bonus useful church pieces on the chessboard to win the West for a world socialist state under Russian control. As soon as the final stage comes, communism can liquidate the church pieces.

In that respect, it is noteworthy that the ANC in Lusaka is also beginning to serve as a catalyst for groups in South Africa.

Against the backdrop of what is taking place in the Netherlands, a well-known theologian, Harry Kuitert, recently wrote a book in which he takes as a premise that everything is politics, but that politics is not everything. Church, faith, theology (and we may add religion) have a political side, but when that side is exaggerated, these things themselves are ruined. He observes that top leaders and top structures of churches are meddling in all kinds of political matters in a "drastic and concrete manner." There is no true democracy in the church, because the ordinary churchgoers have nothing at all to say about what these leaders assert on their behalf. He poses the question: On whose behalf do the church councils, the WCC [World Council of Churches], speak; and we add the WBGK [World Federation of Reformed Churches], NIV [expansion unknown] , moderatorships [synod executive councils] and commissions?

According to Kuitert, it is expected that a church should involve God and faith. However, whenever politics, economic assistance, liberation movements, welfare and armament policy are involved, one must ask whether the church should become a welfare organization or a political party. What lies behind this? Are churches and church leaders trying to blow life into themselves while they are engaged in secularization and politicization? The central question is, according to him, why people want to belong to a church and take part in it. When their expectations are not met, their interest withers and the result is predictable.

It looks as if a series of factors, so poorly handled since the debacle of the Enlightenment, has shocked the credibility of the political rulers and that individuals want to now take over from the rulers with an appeal for "democracy." The most valuable element of "democracy" is not electing a "party", but the positive and negative accompaniment of the rulers with criticism which asks for accountability and responsibility. We have unfortunately gone through phases where politicians have silenced academics and preachers, among others, with the slogan "cobbler, stick to your last." The hampering of the true democratic process has surely aroused frustrations. This probably explains something of the recent vogue in which leftist and rightist politicians, businessmen, students and preachers want to rush off to Lusaka in the belief that they can attain the peace which the rulers cannot.

It is important that the government regain its credibility in all sectors of the national economy. The Scriptural demands for a healthy relationship between government and subject is based on the principle that a government does what God wants it to do. The maintenance of law and justice and peace stands in the forefront of that. Preachers and churchmen who want to take over the political talks and military struggle against the ANC from the rulers must also ask the question: "What is really expected of the talks?" Are the preachers going to let themselves be persuaded by the ANC ideology and are they open to changing their church basis in the light of this? If the answer to this is "no", the counterquestion comes up immediately; namely, why the ANC abroad would be so "open" to renouncing its own ideology and accepting that of the clergymen?

The motive of personally making an input to peace is noble. But the method may be catastrophic. The "democracy" of the French Revolution indeed brought chaos and confusion before the strong hand of Napoleon intervened. The logical, churchly and responsible way seems to be that the breach which has arisen between politicians and other sectors should be healed. Responsible bona fide people rather than representatives of select structures should have access and look for rulers. Mutual talks and understanding must be built on this level. "Democracy" should be more than a method of election. Preachers can also do a lot to stimulate the democratic process by analyzing the powers working at home and abroad and exposing them to the congregations. When we search our own hearts, we can all ask: To what extent do we adhere to a race model of white, colored and black, which makes for conflict, while we pretend that it is a matter of a cultural diversity of peoples in South Africa?

13084

CSO: 3401/12

SOUTH AFRICA

PHILOSOPHER SUGGESTS ALLIANCE OF AFRIKANERS, ZULUS

Cape Town DIE BURGER in Afrikaans 17 Dec 85 p 13

[Article by Political editorial staff: "Afrikaners and Zulus 'Must Cooperate'"]

[Text] STELLENBOSCH. - Cooperation between Afrikaners and the Zulus, the most numerous groups of Whites and Blacks respectively, is necessary for the future of South Africa. Dr Anton van Niekerk of the department of philosophy at the University of Stellenbosch said this yesterday at the Festival of the Covenant at Assegaaibos in Jonkershoek.

By negotiating with the Zulus, a front of moderates can be set up which can become an active player in the political game. A prerequisite is that the Afrikaners' and Zulus' minimum requirements are met. The Afrikaners' minimum requirement is that a system of one person, one vote is rejected. On the other hand, the Zulus ask the government for a statement of intent regarding black participation and that the Buthelezi Commission's proposals for Natal be seriously considered, Dr Van Niekerk said.

He said there are several factors which hamper communication between the Afrikaners and Zulus, but the factors which bind these two groups together are much stronger. The most important thing is that these groups have acquired a common value system since [the battle of] Blood River; namely, respect for a democratic form of government, free enterprise and competition in the economy, the Christian religion and a rich spiritual life. The extent to which that has become a part of the Zulu nation is evident from the conduct of Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi, chief minister of KwaZulu. Therefore it is "high time that the Afrikaner begins to show esteem for Chief Buthelezi, because he has proved himself a true champion of values of human civilization." "We do not at all yet realize what a strong ally we have in Chief Buthelezi," Dr Van Niekerk said.

13084  
CSO: 3401/76

SOUTH AFRICA

SECURITY MEASURES AFTER MINE ATTACKS DESCRIBED

Cape Town DIE BURGER in Afrikaans 18 Dec 85 p 2

[Article by special representative: "Farmers, Realize Now the Seriousness of the Situation"]

[Text] Messina--The abhorrent death of the six landmine victims Sunday afternoon on the Chatsworth farm on the Limpopo [River] has drawn the attention of the local residents to the critical side of the situation, Mr Willie Esterhuyse, commander of the local commando, said yesterday. Mr Esterhuyse, a nephew of Professor Willie Esterhuyse of Stellenbosch, farms in the area. He said that, although the incident upset everybody, it brought about a greater sense of solidarity. According to him, General Magnus Malan, minister of defense, who visited the area immediately after the incident, has undertaken to meet the security needs of the farmers and other residents as far as possible. Mr Esterhuyse warned that people should avoid the area if they are not sure the roads on which they want to drive are safe.

Some of the security measures which are already in effect or have immediately come into effect are:

- the use of the military area radio network (Marnet) by which farmers are in contact with each other and the security force;
- intensification of Defense Force presence;

Blocking of Roads

- driving is restricted to the minimum;
- the blocking-off of secondary roads in the area until they are declared safe by the Defense Force;
- visitors to uninhabited farms in the area in particular should report beforehand to the Soutpansberg's Military Area headquarters;
- anyone who wants to drive in the area can make arrangements with the Defense Force;
- security fences are going to be put up at all farm residences;
- all access to the Limpopo through the security fence is closed, and opened only under the supervision of the security forces;
- the carrying of firearms by men, women and children; and
- some farmers have already started to pack sandbags in front of their doors

and windows, while wire fences to avert handgrenades are also soon going to be installed in front of the windows of most of the farmhouses.

Some of the measures being planned are:

- the purchase of landmine-proof vehicles; - the partial reinforcement of regular vehicles with armor because of the costs connected with landmine-proof vehicles;
- instituting a curfew;
- plans to have weekend farms which are now empty inhabited; and
- children will be transported to and from their boarding schools on weekends in vehicles of the security forces.

13084

CSO: 3401/76

SOUTH AFRICA

UK CRITICIZED FOR CONDONING ANC WHILE CONDEMNING IRA

Cape Town DIE BURGER in Afrikaans 18 Dec 85 p 12

[Editorial: "Yes, but..."]

[Text] The tragic death this week of six civilians in a landmine explosion in North Transvaal raises questions about the attitude especially of the Western countries toward the ANC. Unequivocal responses would be preferred in light of the barely concealed pride with which the ANC accepted responsibility for the coldblooded deed. America and Britain did condemn the explosion, but refrained from addressing the ANC outright and aloud. Or do they still intend to do that? Whenever it comes to condemning South Africa and its share in the situation of violence here, numerous Western countries do not lack for the strongest choices of words. Some of them go even further by not only threatening punitive measures, but putting them into practice.

In the meantime, some of them allow a self-acknowledged murder organization not only to promulgate hate against South Africa within their national borders, but also to set up offices in quite a few Western capitals. Are these countries at all willing to reconsider such concessions to the ANC after this week's murders? We strongly doubt it.

South Africa has already been living so long with double international standards that it is tuned in to the "yes, buts" from abroad in advance; such as: yes, but it must be remembered that an organization like the ANC is driven by the evil South African system to commit acts of violence like those in the Northern Transvaal; and: yes, but if the South African government would only be willing to negotiate unconditionally with the ANC, such things would no longer happen.

Is the British government willing to negotiate with the Irish Republican Army? Unthinkable, say the British, for it is a terrorist organization. Yet Britain is one of the countries which officially allows a gang of murderers like the ANC to establish permanent offices on its own soil.

A last question which the Western countries can ask themselves is whether their accommodating attitude so far toward the ANC is not indirectly interpreted as encouragement by this organization; hence the ANC's bravado after this week's atrocity.

13084  
CSO: 3401/76

SOUTH AFRICA

PAPER WARNS AGAINST MISINTERPRETING COUNTRY'S ATTITUDE

Cape Town DIE BURGER in Afrikaans 23 Dec 85 p 12

[Editorial: "The Hand of Peace"]

[Text] The government has always, even in the most difficult circumstances and in the midst of great provocation, held out the hand of peace to its neighboring countries and further to the rest of Africa. Healthy cooperation with other African countries, good neighborliness and peace and stability in Southern Africa are and were the avowed goals of successive prime ministers of South Africa. However, the reaction of some neighboring countries to this is sometimes least positive.

There can be no doubt about the government's willingness to solve tension and conflict through dialogue and negotiation. Its reaction to the recent landmine incidents on the border with Zimbabwe is a telling proof. But its attempts to strive for peace with great patience should not be seen as weakness or unwillingness to defend itself.

Stability on the subcontinent has lately been seriously threatened by enemy elements who, spurred on by the internal unrest and sudden increase in international concern with South Africa's policy, have intensified their attempts to arouse the impression that it is now open season on the country and its government. This may have contributed to a conception by some governments of neighboring countries that the international pressure on South Africa is now so great that they can connive to permit terrorist organizations such as the ANC to operate against South Africa from their territory without danger of countermeasures. This would be a dangerous misconception which may have serious consequences for them and the whole region. The particularly strong language with which the State Security Council has warned certain of South Africa's neighboring governments about the activities of ANC terrorists in their countries does not leave any uncertainty about this.

The government's position is clear: South Africa has chosen peace and is doing everything in its power to maintain peaceful relations with its neighboring countries. But whenever its hand of friendship is refused, its forbearance tried beyond the breaking point and its security threatened by terrorists in neighboring countries, its first duty is to ward off that threat "with all the means at its disposal." The message is that it will do that if it is forced to.

13084

CSO: 3401/76

SOUTH AFRICA

BRIEFS

COOPERATION WITH MOZAMBIQUE--Maputo--The South African Government is going to render active assistance to Mozambique this week by making available a ferry-boat which will provide service between Maputo and Inhaca Island. This information was announced Saturday on the island of Inhaca by the South African trade representative in Mozambique, Mr Colin Paterson. "The boat that was used between Inhaca and Maputo sank recently, which means that the more than 6,000 inhabitants of the island do not have any way to bring food provisions here," Mr Paterson said. A boat from Durban will be used for this purpose as a temporary measure. In addition to transporting food and other necessities to the island, the boat will also be made available for rental for fishing and pleasure trips. An inquiry will also be undertaken to make a fulltime arrangement in this connection as well as [investigating] the port facilities on the island. "The optimal use of Maputo is also going to be investigated by South Africa. South Africa regards that investigation as of the greatest importance for South Africa and Mozambique," Mr Paterson said. He further said that the Stabilization of commerce between Maputo and Komatipoort is also being investigated. Inquiries are also being made regarding the improvement of the road between Komatipoort and Maputo and the settling of farmers along that road.

[Text] [Pretoria BEELD in Afrikaans 25 Nov 85 p 2] 13084/8918

CSO: 3401/17

SOUTH AFRICA

DETAILS OF BUILDING INDUSTRY SLUMP GIVEN

Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English 1 Feb 86 p 8

[Text] **ALTHOUGH** the country's building slump has been described as the worst in living memory, certain property experts believe that it has bottomed out and that there could be an up-swing in house-building activity in the second half of 1986.

Official building trade statistics for 1985, released for the first time yesterday by the Central Statistical Services, reflect not only a big drop in buildings completed during the year but an even bigger drop in the value of plans passed for new buildings.

Seen against the background of constantly escalating material costs, experts say the slump is even bigger than reflected in the official statistics.

Hardest hit is the residential side of the industry.

Already last year the value of houses completed dropped by more than 20 percent, bottoming at R1 328-million compared with R1 677,5-million in 1984.

Residential buildings as a whole, completed dropped by 10,2 percent to R1 860,9-million from R2 072,9-million.

The picture darkens further when the value of

building plans passed during the year is analysed.

Plans for residential buildings as a whole dropped by a massive 31,-7 percent in value to R1 819,7-million from R2 663,3-million in 1984.

The value of plans for houses passed dropped by 26,4 percent to R1 359,6-million in 1985 from R1 846,7-million in 1984.

In terms of buildings completed, there was still an overall "plus" at the end of 1985, compared with 1984 -- thanks to projects planned in 1984.

Last year in all categories -- residential, non residential buildings and additions and alterations - was rounded off by a 5,6 percent increase.

This meant a grand total of R3 853,5-million worth of buildings and projects completed, compared with R3 647,6-million in 1984.

However, in the plans passed category, 1985 was rounded off by an overall negative growth rate - except in the category of additions and alterations.

Total value of plans passed in all categories in the year were seen to start tapering strongly in the second part of the year, for the year to end with a total value of R4 631,5-million worth of buildings compared with 1984's R5 684,9-million.

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CSO: 3400/1138

SOUTH AFRICA

TRANSVAAL FOUR-LANE HIGHWAY PLANS BEING REVISED

Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English 3 Feb 86 p 3

[Article by Janine Simon: "PWV Road Plans Being Revised"]

**[Text]** The Transvaal provincial authorities are revising planned road systems for the entire PWV area and will consider the reaction of Randburg and Sandton residents to the proposed four-lane highway through their towns.

Transvaal Roads Department director Mr Louis Terblanche said his department would consult the municipalities concerned after they received representations from residents about the planned highway.

Last week almost 300 Randburg and Sandton residents resolved to petition the State President, Mr Botha, to stop any further development of the proposed PWV3 highway and four-lane arterial road which will cut through the Sandton Field and Study Centre and parts of the Braamfontein Spruit.

They also resolved to send a letter to the Administrator of the Transvaal.

Mr Terblanche said the road plan for the entire PWV area was based on projected land-use patterns from 1975 figures and was being revised.

"We don't plan in secret. We consult engineers and approach each owner when we draw up a road plan," he said.

He could not say when the proposed highway was likely to be built, but added that land

could be expropriated for roads up to 40 years before they were built.

"It is well known that we have more road needs than money to construct them, but we cannot delay the planning stage of a road even though it is unclear when the construction stage will be implemented."

Both the Transvaal Roads Department and Jomet (Johannesburg Metropolitan Area) are responsible for the planned PWV3 and its connecting four-lane east-west arterial through Randburg and Sandton.

The provincial authorities began planning the PWV3 in 1974 and completed a detailed plan of the highway in 1979.

The responsibility for transport planning in the area was passed on to Jomet, established by the 1977 Urban Transport Act to orchestrate planning for the core city and surrounding towns.

Later Jomet plans showed that the highway would be cut off on the western outskirts of Randburg and eastern side of Sandton and linked by an arterial road.

The Jomet "Transportation Concept 2000" indicates a four-lane east-west highway from the proposed President Fouche Drive in North Riding to the Lombardy link road just north of Marlboro in Sandton.

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CSO: 3400/1138

SOUTH AFRICA

BOOST TO EXPORT COAL LINE RUNS ON TIME

Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English 4 Feb 86 p 22

[Article by Madden Cole]

**[Text]** THE R1,25-billion construction work for the upgrading of the capacity of the coal line between Blackhill and Richards Bay, the biggest project in transport engineering ever undertaken by the South African Transport Services (Sats), is going according to schedule and the first 200 truck coal train should be running by July 1988.

The purpose of the construction programme on the original "Coal Line" which at its completion in 1976 was designed to carry 21-million tons of coal a year, is to keep pace with increasing coal exports. When completed the line will have a capacity of 65-million tons a year.

**Doubling line**

The multi-million rand project involves the doubling of 230 km of the existing line, the construction of 133 km of deviations, the construction of a 65 km third line between Blackhill and Broodshoersplaas in the Eastern Transvaal coalfields and the strengthening of 714 km of existing track.

Included in these civil engineering works are 14 tunnels with a total length of 20 718m, 35 bridges spanning a total of 5 600 m, nine viaducts and about 290 minor bridges, access structures and culverts.

A third line on the Blackhill-Broodshoersplaas had become necessary to relieve the pressure on the existing lines which have to cope with transporting vast quantities of coal intended for the country's internal usage.

Private sidings from export mines will feed directly onto the third line, which will be used solely for export purposes, and will bypass station yards thus not disrupting the operation of the other two lines.

Other improvements in the upgrading of the coal line are the installation of highly sophisticated signalling, telecommunications and train fault detection systems costing R162-million.

To operate the 200-truck trains with 26 ton axle loads, constituting a gross train load of more than 20 000 tons, gradients against loaded trains have to be flattened to a maximum of 1 in 160.

compared with the standard of 1 in 66.

The upgrading has notched up a number of "firsts" for Sats. The mechanical relaying and replacement of existing rails and sleepers with heavier material is one of the biggest projects of its kind in the world.

The special chrome/manganese rail has been developed to carry the heavy 26ton axle loads and a new concrete sleeper has been designed

### Two fronts

Relaying work is being carried out on two fronts by mechanised means, a mechanised track relaying train and a gantry type operation. The 714 km of relaying requires 85 680 tons of rails, 1,07-million concrete sleepers and 780 000 m<sup>3</sup> of ballast.

Two double track tunnels of 2,2 km and 2,8 km in length, designed with a semi-circular profile instead of the conventional horseshoe type, are the first tunnels of this design in the country.

As two of the major tunnels planned for the deviations, its design will prevent problems foreseen with oxygen starvation and over-heating should diesel locomotives be required to haul long trains through tunnels more than one kilometer in length.

Other firsts include the marshalling yard at Ermele where two 100 truck trains can be linked into one, the introduction of 25 Kv electrification of a line and the ordering of Class 11E electric locomotives which have not been used before by Sats.

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CSO: 3400/1138

SOUTH AFRICA

**SATS TO UNDERGO CAPITAL CUTBACK**

Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English 4 Feb 86 p 22

[Text]

PROJECTS the size of the Richards Bay coal line are unlikely to be repeated by the South African Transport Services (Sats) in the foreseeable future because of the general cutback in capital spending, says inspecting engineer David Janisch who is in charge of the line's civil engineering works.

"We are adopting a more cautious approach these days and are concentrating more on shorter term projects instead of long term ones where the returns cannot be calculated with absolute certainty.

"It is therefore unlikely that we will return to the time when big spending was the order of the day both by the public and private sectors."

Only schemes where returns can be guaranteed and which will be fully utilised are considered now, Mr Janisch says.

He points out that spending on the R1.25-billion Richards Bay line reached a peak in 1985/1986 when R250-million was spent on civil engineering works and R50-million on signalling systems and electrification.

During 1986/1987 these amounts were reduced to R125-million and R25-million and the amount spent will decrease each successive year until the completion of the project in 1988, Mr Janisch says.

Inspecting engineer (plant) Tienie Crous agrees the days of high spending are over and

cannot foresee the need for any major expansion for the next few years.

"We have reached the stage in the development of our transport services network where I do not expect any urgent requirement of anything the size of the Richards Bay project for some time."

Mr Crous says the coal line's completion date was originally set for 1986, but with the downturn in the economy which followed the coal export boom, this had to be revised.

"We managed to keep the job going in spite of budget reductions and shortage of cash, but had to extend the completion date to 1987 and eventually to 1988 with the agreement of the coal exporters."

He is confident too that the multi-million expansion programme will not saddle Sats with any financial loss as guarantees have been obtained from exporters to maintain exports at a minimum of 44-million tons a year. A clause exists if contract tonnages drop.

"The special contract rates will also be reviewed each year to prevent inflation eroding the profitability of the line. However coal producers expect exports could increase over the next few years and so Sats should be able to recoup its total expenditure within the 30-year period for which the Government has authorised coal exports," Mr Crous says.

SOUTH AFRICA

MOTOR INDUSTRY DIFFICULTIES DESCRIBED

'Great Potential'

Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English 11 Feb 86 p 62

[Text] CAPE TOWN. — South Africa's motor-vehicle industry had enormous growth potential although 1985 new vehicle sales fell nearly 25 percent from the previous year to 305 327 units, Deputy Minister of Finance and Trade and Industry Kent Durr said.

"The narrowing of the income gaps between Whites and other groups will continue to have a stimulating effect on the sales of new and second-hand vehicles and other durables," he told a convention of the National Automobile Dealers Association.

Mr Durr said small cars had amounted to 60 percent of car sales at the end of last year, compared

with 48 percent at the beginning.

"This buying pattern is expected to continue and it is being forecast that small cars will constitute no less than 70 percent of passenger vehicle sales by the end of this year," he said.

Mr Durr said the local content programme introduced by the Government had played an important role in encouraging the recent growth of the motor industry.

The Government had requested the Board of Trade and Industries to investigate the possibilities of a local manufacturing programme for heavy commercial vehicles and a decision was expected soon, he said. — Reuter.

'Recovering Slowly'

Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English 12 Feb 86 p 2D

[Text] THE motor industry, although experiencing extremely testing times, is recovering slowly, according to the University of Stellenbosch's Bureau for Economic Research (BER).

In its latest quarterly review of trade and commerce, it says the index which reflects sales of new cars is recovering slowly and reached 50 in the fourth quarter of 1985.

"This figure is substantially higher than the 20 recorded in the second quarter of 1985 and is expected to increase to 63 during the first quarter of 1986."

Used cars were reported to be selling well and sales were above those of a year ago.

"In spite of the drop in orders placed for new cars demand was such that the majority of dealers were overstocked. —Sapa.

### Sales Take Another Dive

Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English 12 Feb 86 p 24

[Text] PASSENGER car sales took another steep dive in January, reflecting the continuing depressed state of South Africa's motor industry with sales 27,7 percent down on the previous month.

Latest Naamsa figures show that total vehicle sales, passenger and commercial are down 26,8 percent on December and 24,7 percent on January last year.

Top performers in the passenger vehicle section were Toyota and BMW while GM showed the largest single losses.

Toyota's passenger vehicle market share in January was 25,7 percent, followed by Samcor with 20,7 percent which includes combined Ford and MMI sales. Next were Mercedes Benz with 11,7 percent, BMW 8,3 percent, Nissan 7,5 percent and GM 5,7 percent.

Toyota Corolla was the top-selling car with 2 725 units sold with the Volkswagen Golf/Jetta second

with 1 674 units sold. BMW's 3-series which sold 890 units took BMW to the highest point it has ever reached in Naamsa passenger car rankings.

In the light commercial field Naamsa figures show Toyota was again ahead of the field with a 42,5 percent share of the market with Nissan in second place with a 22,6 percent share.

Heavy vehicle sales of 507 units were the worst since 1962. Mercedes Benz with 177 unit sales was in the lead, followed by Toyota with 83 unit sales.

Total passenger and commercial vehicle sales for January were 20 202 compared with December's 27 616.

Toyota marketing director Brand Pretorius says that the depressed sales figures were not unexpected for a number of reasons such as the pre-emptive pre-Christmas buying which took place to avoid price rises.

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SOUTH AFRICA

R6 MILLION OFFSHORE WALL TO REPAIR FLOOD DAMAGE

Johannesburg THE STAR in English 17 Feb 86 p 11

[Article by Duncan Guy]

**[Text]** PORT ST JOHNS — A R6.12 million off-shore retaining wall is to be built at the mouth of the Umzimvubu River to re-establish a tarred road and dunes washed away in flash floods about a year ago.

Tenders will be called for the construction of the wall this month, according to the director of Works and Energy in Transkei, Mr A R B Hyde.

RESEARCH

It will be made of interlocking sheet piling.

Extensive oceanographic research by consultants led to a recommendation by the department that the wall be built.

The consultants' recommendations predicted that the wall would change the sedimentation pattern and channel-forming mechanisms at the river mouth.

In recent years, the original channel where the river entered the sea has been blocked by a sand bank created by sediment brought downstream because of the poor soil conservation methods in the Umzimvubu's densely populated catchment

area.

Floodwater, blocked by the sand bank, spilt out to sea through a different channel, washing the road away.

The consultants also suggested that the wall would permit the coastal dunes to redevelop and expand Port St Johns' First Beach, which has been almost washed away.

On the environmental front, the flood destruction at Port St Johns is an example of why development should not take place in coastal forests and on dunes, according to Mr Paul Dutton, the planning officer for the Transkei Department of Nature Conservation.

"The parts of Port St Johns which are built on dunes could even be washed out to sea as further flooding eats away more sand, if the sand dune ecology is not stabilised," he warned.

"Dunes are delicate ecological systems which are in fact moving pieces of land," he explained. Rehabilitation of the area should involve the pooling of ecological and engineering skills, Mr Dutton suggested.

SOUTH AFRICA

SAA LOSS SOARS TO R50 MILLION

Johannesburg SUNDAY TIMES (BUSINESS) in English 26 Jan 86 p 1

[Article by Ciaran Ryan]

**[Text] FALLING passenger loads and soaring fuel and interest costs resulted in South African Airways losing R50-million in the nine months to December.**

That is the bad news. The good news from chief executive Gert van der Veer is that losses are being pared — he hopes without fare increases.

SAA has sold and leased aircraft and trimmed staff numbers in an attempt to stem the red ink. Mr van der Veer also takes heart from a rand that has risen from a low of 36 US cents to the present 44 US cents.

Only once before has SAA lost more than this — in 1983 when the deficit was R98.2-million.

### Tourism slump

Because of the rand's collapse, SAA's fuel bill doubled last year and now accounts for 40% of total costs compared with 10% five years ago.

Foreign views that South Africa is a dangerous destination all but killed tourist traffic. International passenger volume between April and November last year dropped 10.5% on the comparable time in 1984.

Mr Van der Veer says SAA's interest costs amounts to between 8% and 9% of turnover — R135-million on turnover of R1 500-million.

As the international outcry over apartheid intensifies, SAA faces the prospect of being locked out of its foreign markets, although Mr van der Veer says this not a short-term likelihood.

About 60% of all SAA's costs are denominated in foreign currency as against 25% of its revenue.

Mr Van der Veer dispels speculation that SAA's recent attempts to find a foreign financier for the sale and leaseback of its 737 fleet are to pre-empt creditors' seizing SA assets abroad in response to the debt standstill.

He says: "It was our domestic, not our international fleet that we were trying to sell and leaseback."

Drastic efforts to curb expenditure and stimulate sales have been implemented, including:

- The leasing of two Boeing 737s and two Boeing 747s and the sale of an Airbus to reduce unused capacity.
- The search for a foreign buyer for SAA's 737 fleet of 18 aircraft which are to be replaced with more fuel-efficient Airbus A320s, due to come on to the market in 1988. A sale and leaseback scheme would reap a handsome capital return while enabling SAA to maintain its flight capacity.
- Slashing the number of domestic flights, resulting in a 16% saving in fuel consumption since August last year.
- Numerous international flights have been combined to compensate for the fall in demand.
- Staff size is to be scaled down by 600 in the coming

year. No staff will be laid off, but vacancies will not be filled.

● Introduction of discount fares on domestic and international routes — 40% of all domestic passengers now use fare discounts.

## SA funds

SAA made a profit of R2.2-million in 1985 before the rand plunged. Mr van der Veer says the strengthening of the rand and falling oil prices may reduce the R50-million loss before the March yearend.

He told Business Times: "I do not expect passenger volumes to sink any lower this year. A lot depends on the political climate in the country, but I think things are going to start improving."

"When volumes started dropping last year we were quick to respond and we can respond similarly if volumes start to pick up again."

Mr van der Veer expects no problem in financing the replacement of SAA's 737 fleet, part of which is 18 years old. He says suppliers are willing to finance the scheme or SA funds can be obtained on the open market.

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SOUTH AFRICA

BRIEFS

CONSTRUCTION HIT BY ESCOM CUTBACK--The recent announcement by Escom that it was pruning R700 million a year from its costs over the next five years was welcome news for the consumer, but for the troubled construction industry it was a severe blow. To make a saving of that order the commission must hold back on some capital projects. There is even a possibility that work on the huge Majuba power station could be further deferred. Majuba, a major development in South Africa's power network, was shelved for two years in October, 1984 -- a blow for construction companies eagerly awaiting a share of the then R3,4 billion total contract value. The Majuba "freeze" was due to be lifted at the end of this year and construction men were expecting the go-ahead for a massive spread of work which, in today's terms, could have reached the R4 billion mark. Now, however, there is the chance that the Majuba contract will be put back on ice again. [By Frank Jeans] [Excerpt] [Johannesburg THE STAR (BUSINESS) in English 18 Feb 86 p 18] /12851

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